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Administrative Procedure. Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review of 
Jamestown, 142 A.3d 191 (R.I. 2016). An appeal from a  trial 
court’s denial of reasonable litigation expenses under the Equal 
Access to Justice for Small Business and Individuals Act (EAJA) 
requires a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island. A municipal zoning board of review is an agency under the 
EAJA, and a variance hearing before the board is an adjudicatory 
proceeding under the same Act for purposes of seeking reasonable 
litigation expenses. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In September 2010, Plaintiffs Henry and Mary Tarbox 
(Plaintiffs) sought to convert their single-family home in 
Jamestown into a duplex to allow Henry Tarbox’s mother to live 
with them.1  Even though the town’s zoning ordinance allowed  
this kind of use in the zone where their house was located, the 
parcel of land that they owned did not have the required 
dimensions to accommodate a duplex in compliance with the 
zoning laws.2 In response, the Plaintiffs filed an application for a 
dimensional variance with the zoning board of review of 
Jamestown (Zoning Board).3 At the hearing for the variance 
application, the Plaintiffs were represented by counsel, and Henry 
Tarbox testified on his own behalf; the Zoning Board questioned 
both Henry and his counsel extensively.4 No one came forward to 
oppose the variance application, and the Zoning Board heard no 
evidence in opposition to the variance application.5 Despite the 
apparent lack of opposition, only three of the five Zoning Board 
members   voted  to  approve   the   application,  resulting   in   the 
 
1. Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Jamestown, 142 A.3d 191,193 (R.I. 
2016). Henry and Mary were attempting to build an apartment attachment, 
thus converting it into a duplex. Id. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
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variance’s denial.6 
The Plaintiffs promptly filed a complaint and appealed the 
Zoning Board’s denial to the Newport  County Superior  Court.7 
The trial justice issued a written opinion, which overturned the 
Zoning Board’s decision and granted the plaintiffs relief in the 
form of a dimensional variance.8 After expending time and money 
on the appeal to finally get what they wanted, the Plaintiffs  
moved for reasonable litigation expenses under the EAJA.9 
Reasoning that the Zoning Board was not an “agency” covered by 
the Act and a hearing before the board was not an “adjudicatory 
proceeding,” a second superior court justice denied the plaintiffs’ 
motion.10 The trial justice then entered final judgment, which 
included the order to overturn the Zoning Board’s decision, as well 
as the denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for reasonable litigation 
expenses.11 The Plaintiffs subsequently filed a notice of appeal to 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court to challenge the denial of their 
post-trial motion.12 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Before the Court could get to the true issues under appeal,13   
it first had to dispose of a tricky, procedural issue arising from the 
Plaintiffs’ decision  to file a notice of appeal  rather than a  writ  of 
 
 
6. Id. (citing R.I. GEN LAWS ANN. § 45-24-57(2)(iii) (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Legis. Sess.)) (“The concurring vote of four (4) of the five (5) 
members of the zoning board of review sitting at a hearing is required to 
decide in favor of an applicant on any matter within the discretion of the 
board upon which it is required to pass under the ordinance, including 
variances and special-use permits.”). 
7. Id. at 194 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-24-69 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Legis. Sess.)) (allowing “an aggrieved party” to “appeal a 
decision of the zoning board of review to the superior court for the county in 
which the city or town is situated by filing a complaint.”). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. Plaintiffs also amended their complaint to reflect the additional 
request.  Id. n.4. 
10. Id.at 194; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-92-3 (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
11. Tarbox, 142 A.3d at 194. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. The Court stated that “[o]n appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial 
justice misinterpreted the act in concluding that the board is not an ‘agency’ 
and that the hearing on plaintiffs’ variance application was not an 
‘adjudicatory proceeding’ under the act.” Id. 
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certiorari.14 The Court summarily disposed of the Zoning Board’s 
argument that a writ of certiorari was required because the  
appeal fell under the auspices of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA)15 by noting that the APA “does not encompass zoning 
appeals.”16 Despite this fact, the Court still held that a writ of 
certiorari was required for other reasons.17 The Court explained 
that this case first arose as a result of “an appeal from a decision  
of a zoning board in accordance with section 45-24-69,” and the 
Plaintiffs were only eligible to request reasonable attorney’s fees 
under the EAJA after their victory on the merits of that appeal.18 
Thus, the Court reasoned that because the claims were connected, 
the proper procedure under well-established Rhode Island law was 
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.19 
In rejecting the Plaintiffs’ construction of the EAJA, the Court 
explained that section 42-92-3 of the Act provides for two distinct 
procedural avenues through which a victorious plaintiff may 
appeal a decision for reasonable litigation expenses.20 Under the 
Court’s understanding of the statute’s plain meaning, the first 
avenue is under section 42-92-3(a), which allows “an adjudicatory 
officer” to award reasonable litigation expenses to the party 
challenging an agency determination if that agency did not have 
“substantial justification” for its determination in an adjudicatory 
proceeding.21 The Court read this provision in pari materia with 
section  42-92-5,  which  states  that  “[a]ny party dissatisfied with 
 
14. Id. 
15. Id.  “[T]he APA provides for review to this court by certiorari . . . .” 
Id. 
16. Id.  More specifically, 
[t]he [APA] does not apply to review of administrative action by 
municipal agencies. An aggrieved party pursuant to . . .§ 45–24–69 
may appeal a decision of a Zoning Board of Review to the Superior 
Court sitting in  the  county  in  which  the  city  or  town  is  
situated. Where municipal agency action is by statute reviewable in 
the Superior Court, again the [APA] does not apply. 
Robert B. Kent et al., Rhode Island Civil Procedure § 80:1 at 639 (West 2015). 
17. Tarbox, 142 A.3d at 195. 
18. Id. “There is no indication that the act creates a cause of action 
independent of the proceedings before the agency and the judicial review 
thereof.”  Id. at 198. 
19. Id. at 195; e.g., N. Trust Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Westerly, 899 
A.2d 517, 519 (R.I. 2006). 
20. See Tarbox, 142 A.3d. at 196. 
21. Id. at 198. 
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the fee determination by the adjudicatory officer may appeal  to 
the court having jurisdiction to review the merits of  the 
underlying decision of the agency adversary adjudication.”22 The 
thrust of the Plaintiffs’ argument was that the trial justice was an 
adjudicatory officer, which allowed them to simply file a notice of 
appeal.23 However, the Court found that the statute’s definition of 
adjudicatory officer was entirely inconsistent with this 
interpretation, and the proper procedure under this avenue is to 
appeal a decision of the adjudicatory officer to the superior court 
by filing a notice of appeal.24 
The Court then determined that because a trial justice should 
not be considered an adjudicatory officer, her determination of 
litigation expenses under section 42-92-3(b) should connect with 
section 45-24-69, as the underlying appeal came from a decision of 
the Zoning Board, which has no adjudicatory officer.25 Thus, the 
Court stated that because the Plaintiffs “were not even entitled to 
seek reasonable litigation expenses until they received a favorable 
decision from the Superior Court,” the Supreme Court’s review 
encompassed both the underlying Zoning Board decision and the 
trial justice’s denial of litigation expenses.26 Although the Court 
held that all plaintiffs proceeding by this procedural avenue must 
petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, the Court 
treated the Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal as if it were a writ of 
certiorari because this was an issue of first impression for the 
Court.27 
The Court then moved on to the merits of the case by 
interpreting the EAJA.28 The Rhode Island Legislature made its 
intent clear in the statute that the EAJA would be a deterrent 
against  abuses  of  power  by  state  agencies  that  might  seek  to 
 
 
22. Id. at 195–96. 
23. Id. at 197. 
24. Id.; see R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-92-2(1)  (West,  Westlaw  through 
2016 Legis. Sess.) (“the deciding official, without regard to whether the 
official is designated as an administrative law judge, a hearing officer or 
examiner, or otherwise, who presided at the adversary adjudication.”). 
25. Tarbox, 142 A.3d at 198–99. 
26. Id. at 199. 
27. Id. In doing so, the Court issued a stern warning to all those coming 
after that a writ of certiorari is absolutely required in all future cases of this 
kind.  See id. 
28. Id. 
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impose their will on citizens who have little to no chance to 
challenge the agency’s decisions on their own.29 The Court noted 
that in 1994 the legislature amended the definition of “agency” 
under section 42-92-2(3) to include municipal entities “authorized 
by law to make rules or to determine contested cases,” and held 
that a municipal zoning board fell into this category.30 Although 
the Zoning Board argued, among other things, that it should not 
be considered an agency because it could not bring an action in  
law or equity, the Court determined that, in general, the Zoning 
Board—and all state municipal zoning boards—are authorized by 
law to hear contested cases and make rules regarding zoning 
procedure,31 even if they do not meet some of the other disjunctive 
criteria for an agency.32 
Lastly, the Court addressed whether the Zoning Board 
hearing was an “adjudicatory proceeding” under the EAJA.33 
Because the variance hearing involved “notice and an opportunity 
to be heard,” the Court determined that it crossed the first 
boundary, making it quasi-judicial in nature.34 The Court next 
noted that the Plaintiffs were restricted from building a duplex on 
their lot not as a result of the board’s decision, but because the 
city’s zoning ordinance did not allow for this kind of use.35 The 
Plaintiffs were then forced to seek a dimensional variance, which 
the Court likened to a permit to depart from the usual zoning 
requirements.36  Reasoning   that   the   Zoning   Board’s   decision 
 
29. Id. at 199–200. 
30. Id. at 201. 
31. Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45–24–56(a) (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Legis. Sess.) (“The [zoning] board [of review] shall establish 
written rules of procedure . . . .”). 
32. See Tarbox, 142, A.3d at 201. Other criteria for an agency includes 
the ability “(2) ‘to bring any action at law or in equity, including, but not 
limited to, injunctive and other relief, or’ (3) ‘to initiate criminal 
proceedings.’” Id. 
33. Id. An adjudicatory proceeding is defined as “any proceeding 
conducted by or on behalf of the state administratively or quasijudicially 
which may result in . . . the denial, suspension, or revocation of a license or 
permit or which may result in the compulsion or restriction of the activities of 
a party.” R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-92-2(2) (West, Westlaw through 2016 
Legis. Sess.). 
34. Tarbox, 142 A.3d at 202. (quoting Campbell v. Tiverton Zoning Bd., 
15 A.3d. 1015, 1025 (R.I. 2011)). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
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concerning the Plaintiffs’ application in the quasi-judicial variance 
hearing resulted in the denial of such a permit, which in turn 
restricted the Plaintiffs’ activities, the Court held that the zoning 
variance hearing was an “adjudicatory proceeding” under the  
act.37 In remanding the action to the to the superior court, the 
Supreme Court required the trial justice to make findings on 
whether the Zoning Board had “substantial justification” for the 
denial of plaintiffs’ variance application, as none had been made.38 
COMMENTARY 
Although the issues that the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
dealt with in this case were issues of first impression, it did not 
seem to struggle to find analogies within the laws of Rhode 
Island.39 Because the Zoning Board does not have an  
“adjudicatory officer,” all appeals of variance applications must 
necessarily come under the purview of section 45-24-69.40 The 
responsibility of the trial justice then, is to determine whether or 
not the agency’s decision was substantially justified, entitling the 
plaintiff to reasonable litigation expenses under section 42-92-3(b) 
of the EAJA.41 It is peculiar that the Rhode Island Legislature 
chose to remain silent on the appeal process required for all other 
agency determinations without an adjudicatory officer; however, 
as the Court noted, the Legislature did provide a clear procedural 
path for zoning appeals in section 45-24-69.42 Here, the Court 
seemed to be acting in the interest of equity and justice, as the law 
in this area was far from settled, and it would have been an 
injustice to prevent a homeowner from obtaining reasonable 
litigation expenses against the Zoning Board on account of a very 
technical procedural violation. 
The spirit of equity and justice is embodied within the EAJA 
itself, as the Rhode Island Legislature so eloquently put it in the 
statute, “[i]t is declared that both the state and its municipalities 
and their respective various agencies possess a tremendous power 
 
37. Id. at 202–03. 
38. Id. at 203 (quoting Krikorian v. R.I. Dep’t of Human Servs., 606 A.2d 
671, 676 (R.I. 1992)). 
39. E.g., id. at 197–98 (citing Campbell, 15 A.3d. at 1025). 
40. See id. at 199. 
41. See id. at 198. 
42. Id. at 199–200. 
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in their ability to affect the individuals and businesses they 
regulate or otherwise affect directly.”43 Because of this inequality 
of power, the Legislature wished to guard against potential 
arbitrary and capricious decisions of powerful state agencies on  
the citizens of Rhode Island.  While the EAJA certainly does have 
a punitive aspect, it was passed—and subsequently amended—to 
apply in a wide variety of cases where justice demanded that 
citizens and small businesses who are of meager means should be 
able to challenge agency decisions that arbitrarily limit their 
rights.44 
The Court certainly does not stretch the meanings of “agency” 
or “adjudicatory proceeding” as defined in the act by applying the 
plain meaning of the words, aided by the use of dictionaries and 
secondary sources, which are usually among the first sources 
drawn upon in judicial interpretation.45 That the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court would use its role as the ultimate arbiter of justice 
in the state to imbue the statute with such a broad meaning is no 
surprise, especially in a case such as this, where there is no 
evidence on record of why the Plaintiffs’ variance application 
should be denied.46 In separating and clarifying the procedural 
avenues to appeal under the EAJA, the Court ensured a statutory 
scheme that will cover a wide range of agency actions all over the 
state, which ensures that citizens are not left out in the open to 
fall prey to the whims of an overzealous agency. The superior 
courts may now be either reviewers or deciders of reasonable 
litigation expenses under the EAJA, but no more can they deny 
that the EAJA applies to decisions of municipal zoning boards. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court first held that a plaintiff 
proceeding from the procedural avenue of a zoning appeal must 
petition for a writ of certiorari to challenge a trial justice’s 
determination of reasonable litigation expenses under section 42- 
92-3(b) of the EAJA. Next, the Court determined that the clear 
legislative intent of the EAJA, as amended in 1994, was to include 
 
43. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-92-1(a) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. 
Sess.). 
44. See Tarbox, 142 A.3d. at 200–01. 
45. Id. at 201–02. 
46. See id. at 193. 
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municipal agencies such as the zoning board of review in the 
definition of “agency” under the EAJA. Finally, the Court held  
that a variance application hearing is an “adjudicatory  
proceeding” under the act because it is a quasi-judicial hearing 
which may result in the denial of a permit to vary land from the 
usual town ordinance. 
David M. Remillard 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arbitration. Lemerise v. Commerce Ins. Co., 137 A.3d 696 (R.I. 
2016). Trial courts may not supplement review—either through 
admission of testimony or other documentary evidence—when 
considering an applicant’s motion to modify an arbitration award 
pursuant to R.I. General Laws section 10-3-14. Reviewing courts 
shall deny effect to arguments not raised during arbitration and 
enter confirmation of an arbitration award unless modification is 
justified under the narrow grounds of section 10-3-14. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
This case involved a dispute between Joseph Lemerise 
(Plaintiff) and the Commerce Insurance Company (Defendant) 
regarding the superior court’s decision to modify an arbitration 
award to conform with the Plaintiff’s insurance policy limit.1 The 
Plaintiff argued that the superior court erred by modifying the 
arbitration award because the Court had no grounds to do so 
pursuant to Rhode Island’s Arbitration Act.2 Meanwhile, the 
Defendant sought affirmance of the superior court’s modification 
and claimed that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by granting 
an award in excess of the Plaintiff’s insurance policy limit.3 
The parties stipulated largely to the underlying facts but 
disagreed on the extent of the Plaintiff’s injuries.4 In August of 
2011, the Plaintiff was struck by an uninsured motorist while 
crossing the street in Newport, Rhode Island.5 Following the 
collision, the Plaintiff filed a claim for coverage under his 
automobile insurance policy.6   The parties attempted  to negotiate 
 
 
1. Lemerise v. Commerce Ins. Co., 137 A.3d 696, 697 (R.I. 2016). 
2. Id. (Rhode Island’s Arbitration Act is codified in G.L. 1956 chapter 3 
of title 10). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id.  The Plaintiff sustained injuries to his foot and ankle. Id. 
6. Id. The insurance policy was registered with the Plaintiff’s mother, 
although the Defendant did not dispute that the Plaintiff was entitled to 
compensation under the policy. Id. 
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appropriate compensation for the Plaintiff’s injuries to no avail.7 
After filing  suit in  the Newport County Superior  Court,   the 
Plaintiff eventually agreed to “participat[e] in Arbitration pursuant 
to the terms of the Plaintiff’s [un]insured motorist policy.”8 The 
arbitrator sought to determine the extent of the Plaintiff’s injuries 
and award sufficient compensation.9 After deliberation,  the  
arbitrator  assessed  the  Plaintiff’s  injuries  at 
$150,000 and added prejudgment interest of $47,550, which 
brought the total award to $197,550.10 
Following arbitration, the parties filed cross motions in the 
superior court.11 The Plaintiff moved to confirm the arbitration 
award, while the defendant sought modification.12 The superior 
court supplemented its review with a copy of the Plaintiff’s 
insurance policy, took testimony from the arbitrator, and 
eventually granted the Defendant’s motion to modify the award to 
conform with the insurance policy limit of $100,000.13 The  Plaintiff 
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court in pursuit  of a 
reversal and confirmation of the initial arbitration award.14 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court began its opinion by 
discussing the appropriate standard of review upon an applicant’s 
motion to confirm an arbitration award by both emphasizing public 
policy in favor of deference to an arbitrator and the consequent 
narrow scope for modification.15 In particular, the Court explained 
that “[p]ublic policy favors the finality of arbitration awards, and 
such awards enjoy a presumption of finality.”16   The Court further 
expressed a policy against  allowing 
 
 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 705 (stipulating to a stay of the underlying litigation). 
9. Id. at 698. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 10-3-11, 14 (West, Westlaw 
through Jan. 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
13. Lemerise, 137 A.3d at 698–99. The trial justice stated that he would 
not “‘allow [plaintiff] to take advantage of some technicality to get more than 
he bargained for in this case.’”  Id. at 699. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 699–700 (citing § 10-3-14). 
16. Id. at 699 (internal citations omitted). 
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litigants to sidestep the binding effect of arbitration awards by 
moving for modification in the trial court.17 As such, courts 
reviewing a motion to confirm an arbitration award must grant 
confirmation unless (among a few other narrow exceptions)18 
modification of the award is justified pursuant to section 10-3- 14.19 
Through precedent and a limiting construction of section 10-3- 
14, the Court rejected the Defendant’s argument that the 
arbitrator overreached his authority by assessing prejudgment 
interest.20 To  the  contrary,  the  Court  relied  on  its holding in 
Sentry Insurance Co. v. Grenga21 where it concluded that 
arbitrators “should” award prejudgment interest unless the 
parties specifically contract otherwise.22 In line with Sentry, the 
Court explained that the arbitrator’s award of prejudgment 
interest to the Plaintiff did not justify modification.23 The Court 
implied that arbitrators possess a wide range of discretion.24 As a 
product of its deference, the Court narrowly interpreted the trial 
court’s latitude to modify the award pursuant to section 10-3-14.25 
The Court determined that the Defendant effectively waived 
certain defenses to the arbitration award—including arguments 
related to choice of law and insurance policy limits—by not raising 
such   defenses   in   the  arbitration  proceedings.26 The  Court 
extrapolated that waiver analysis by referencing its holding in 
Wheeler  v.  Encompass  Insurance  Co.27   where  it  concluded that 
 
17. Id. (quoting Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 687 A.2d 440, 
441 (R.I. 1996)). “[P]arties who have contractually agreed to accept arbitration 
as binding are not allowed to circumvent an award by coming to the courts and 
arguing that the arbitrators misconstrued the contract or misapplied the law.” 
Id. 
18. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 10-3-12, 13 (West, Westlaw through  Jan. 
2016 Reg. Sess.) (detailing other grounds for modification not relevant here). 
19. Lemerise, 137 A.3d at 700. 
20. Id. at 700–02, 703–04. 
21. 556 A.2d 998 (R.I. 1989). 
22. Lemerise, 137 A.3d at 701 (quoting Paola v. Commercial Union 
Assurance Co., 461 A.2d 935, 937 (R.I. 1983) (“arbitrators should add 
prejudgment interest to their awards unless the parties specifically provide 
otherwise by agreement.” (emphasis added))). 
23. Id. at 704 (internal citations omitted). 
24. See id. at 702. 
25. See id. at 703–04. 
26. Id. at 704. 
27. 66 A.3d 477, 483 (R.I. 2013). 
  
 
2017] SURVEY SECTION 707 
 
mistakes of law are not grounds for modification to an arbitration 
award.28 Here, the Court decided that the Defendant’s failure to 
submit a copy of the Plaintiff’s insurance agreement during the 
arbitration proceedings constituted a waiver of a policy-limit 
defense, and, even if the arbitrator erred as a matter of law, that 
would not justify modification of the arbitration award.29 For 
similar reasons, the Court rejected the Defendant’s argument that 
Massachusetts law should have been applied.30 The Court solely 
analyzed issues explicitly raised in arbitration and  admonished the 
superior court for expanding its review beyond those boundaries.31 
The Court ultimately found for the Plaintiff by vacating the 
superior court’s order and remanding the case to the  superior court   
with   instructions  to   confirm   the   arbitrator’s   award of 
$197,550.32 The Court’s holding rested largely upon its position that 
the arbitrator did not err by awarding prejudgment interest, and 
that the Defendant waived its right to invoke the insurance policy 
limit as a defense by failing to raise the defense during 
arbitration.33 
COMMENTARY 
Dissenting, Justice Robinson disagreed with the Court’s 
finding of a waiver of insurance policy-based defenses and proposed 
a two-step approach to the confirmation of an arbitration award.34 
First, an arbitrator should evaluate the plaintiff’s  injuries and 
determine a “fair and reasonable compensation.”35 Second, the 
superior court should turn to the terms of the insurance policy and 
reduce the plaintiff’s award to conform with 
 
28. Id. at 698. 
29. Id. at 704. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 702–03. The Supreme Court explained that the superior court 
erred by conducting a de novo review of the arbitration award. Id. at 702. 
Specifically, the Supreme Court took issue with the superior court justice’s 
consideration of the insurance policy and the arbitrator’s testimony in its 
review. Id. 
32. Id. at 704–05. 
33. Id. at 700–02, 703–04. 
34. Id. at 705 (Robinson, J., dissenting); see also Wheeler v. Encompass 
Ins. Co., 66 A.3d 477, 484–89 (R.I. 2013) (Robinson, J., dissenting)  (explaining 
the two-step approach in greater detail). 
35. Lemerise, 137 A.3d at 705. 
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the policy’s limitations.36 Justice Robinson seemingly diverged from 
the Court in that he sought to simultaneously promote deference to 
the arbitration award and enforce the insurance policy.37 Justice 
Robinson proposed that, in this case, such an analysis would yield 
an arbitration award equal to the Plaintiff’s insurance policy cap of 
$100,000.38 
The Defendant attempted to manipulate the arbitration 
system, and the Court committed itself to punishing the Defendant 
for doing so.39 The Defendant evidently undervalued the Plaintiff’s 
injuries.40 As such, it wanted to divert the arbitrator’s attention 
away from the insurance policy for fear that the large policy limit 
would yield an overvaluation  of  the Plaintiff’s injuries.41 Upon 
dissatisfaction with the award, the Defendant sought modification 
of the arbitrator’s valuation by reference to the policy the Defendant 
intentionally withheld from the arbitrator.42 The Court explained 
that the Defendant’s approach was “fraught with danger[,]” and the 
Defendant now must accept the consequences of liability in excess 
of the policy limit.43 
While the Court was apparently motivated to encourage 
parties to enter future arbitration agreements, its decision might 
produce the opposite result.44 Some people feel that arbitrators  are 
less partial, inferior adjudicators when compared to trial justices. 
The legislature likely intended to quell those concerns by providing 
trial courts with a method to modify arbitration awards in   
accordance   with   section   10-3-14.45        The   Court’s  narrow 
 
36. Id. 
37. See id. 
38. Id. 
39. See id. at 704 (majority opinion) (referring to the Defendant’s  decision 
to withhold the Plaintiff’s insurance policy limit as “tactical in nature” and 
explaining that it is “bound to suffer the consequences in the event that the 
arbitrator disagrees with [the Defendant’s] valuation to such an extent that 
the policy limit is exceeded by the award.”). 
40. Id. 
41. See id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. See id. at 699. The Court likely assumed that by creating a sense of 
finality to arbitration awards, contracting parties would develop faith in the 
arbitration system.  See id. 
45. Because § 10-3-14 confers an additional power upon the judiciary to 
check the arbitration system, one must read § 10-3-14 as affording protection 
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construction of the enumerated grounds for modification under 
section 10-3-14 has weakened the safeguards implemented by the 
Legislature.46 Consequently,    the    Court’s    holding    might 
discourage otherwise hesitant parties from entering future 
arbitration agreements in light of the decreased scope for review. 
The Court’s decision is also troubling because it fails to provide 
adequate guidance to lower courts, regarding waiver of defenses not 
raised in arbitration proceedings. At times,  the Court seems to 
suggest a broad rule that would deny effect to all arguments not 
raised in arbitration, while, in other instances, it seems to narrowly 
carve a rule prohibiting the introduction of issues intentional 
withheld from an arbitrator.47 It remains unclear whether the 
Court was persuaded by the  Defendant’s mere failure to introduce 
the insurance policy during the arbitration proceedings or the 
Defendant’s bad-faith reservation.  A broad reading of the Court’s 
holding might produce injustice for parties denied the right to raise 
issues not specifically expounded in arbitration, whereas a narrow 
interpretation might hinder the Court’s stated goal of adding 
finality to arbitration awards. Regardless of the lens of generality a 
lower court adopts, it might select the wrong scope, thus yielding 
an unintended result. 
CONCLUSION 
When considering a motion to modify an arbitration award 
pursuant to section 10-3-14, trial courts may not expand review 
beyond evidence presented during the arbitration proceedings. 
Trial courts shall ignore arguments not raised during arbitration 
and enter confirmation of an arbitration award absent a need to 
make modifications in accordance with the narrow grounds 
delineated in section 10-3-14. 
 
Matthew Strauss 
 
 
 
from mistaken arbitration awards. 
46. See id. at 700–02, 703–04. The Court’s narrow construction  of section 
10-3-14 must be viewed as a retraction of protection from errant arbitration 
awards because such construction inevitably limits a litgant’s redress.  See id. 
47. See id. at 703–04. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Procedure. Albanese v. Town of Narragansett, 135 A.3d 
1179 (R.I. 2016). A Rhode Island Superior Court justice has broad 
discretion in regulating discovery, and their decisions not to reopen 
discovery and to deny a motion for continuance will only be 
disturbed when they have abused their discretion. Additionally, an 
attenuated spousal conflict of interest does not meet the personal 
bias requirement for recusal. Lastly, summary judgment should 
not be granted in cases where there is a genuine dispute of material 
fact despite the fact that the record contains little evidence. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Sometime during 2006, Joanne Albanese (Albanese) brought 
suit against the Town of Narragansett, Rhode Island, the Town 
Treasurer, the Town police department and two law enforcement 
officers (collectively, Defendants), claiming assault and battery, 
negligence, misconduct, and false arrest following a physical 
altercation between herself and a maintenance worker employed by 
her apartment complex.1 Albanese first claimed that the police 
officers responding to the physical-assault call, Sergeant Favreau 
and Lieutenant Sutton, used excessive force when retaining her at 
the scene when they allegedly “drag[ged] her [out] of her car . . . 
with her jacket over her head,” and second that the police officers 
falsely arrested her.2 Albanese also claimed that the Defendants 
acted with gross negligence by failing to act in a professional 
manner in the ongoing landlord-tenant dispute over the mold issue 
Albanese was experiencing.3  In her fourth claim, Albanese alleged 
 
 
1. Albanese v. Town of Narragansett, 135 A.3d 1179, 1182, 1183 (R.I. 
2016). Albanese was charged with one count of simple assault and/or battery 
after attacking a maintenance worker employed by the apartment complex in 
which she lived. State v. Albanese, 970 A.2d 1215, 1217 (R.I. 2009). The 
dispute arose after the maintenance department failed to address Albanese’s 
mold issues, and Albanese allegedly body slammed the maintenance worker 
while he was bringing trash to the dumpster. Id. 
2. Albanese, 135 A.3d at 1183 (alterations in original). 
3. Id. 
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negligence per se, stating that the “[D]efendants had intimidated 
and harassed her,” attempting to dissuade her from making any 
further complaints about the mold issue, and that the Defendants 
failed to address any of her reports of mold.4 Albanese also included 
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and requested 
punitive damages in her prayer for relief.5 
Though the suit was originally filed in 2006, the suit lied 
dormant for a number of years until 2013, when a Washington 
County Superior Court justice imposed a discovery-close deadline 
of July 17, 2013.6 A few months later, counsel for Albanese 
withdrew representation, stating that there had been “a breakdown 
in the attorney-client relationship,” and Albanese continued with 
her claims pro se.7 The trial justice required the Defendants to 
submit any dispositive motions by October 11, 2013, in preparation 
for a December 10, 2013, trial date and gave Albanese until 
November 8, 2013, to file any objections.8 
On September 20, 2013, Albanese wrote a letter to the court, 
stating that she was undergoing surgery and requested to postpone 
the deadline to file an objection until after her surgery.9 One week 
later, a status hearing was held, where Albanese stated that 
surgery had not been scheduled yet.10 The trial justice denied the 
request to postpone the deadline.11 On October 10, 2013, the 
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.12 A status 
hearing followed eight days later, where Albanese announced there 
was still no scheduled date for surgery; the trial justice set another 
status hearing for November 15, 2013, and extended the deadline 
to file an objection to November 29.13 
On November 15, 2013, Albanese notified the court that her 
surgery was complete and requested another extension, stating 
that she was “too ill to work on her objection” due to the recent 
 
 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 1183–84. 
11. Id. at 1184. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
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surgery.14 The trial justice granted a new deadline of December 13 
and warned Albanese that any further requests for continuances 
would be denied.15 On December 6, 2013, (one week before the 
deadline) Albanese filed her written objection to the motion for 
summary judgment and alerted the court that a memorandum and 
supporting documentation would soon be submitted.16 
Additionally, Albanese filed a document entitled “Emergency 
Motion for an Extension of Time/Continuance in which to Complete 
[Plaintiff’s] Answer to Summary Judgment and Continuance for 
Hearing On Summary Judgment.”17 Albanese argued that she 
needed more time because her previous attorney had never asked 
for any kind of discovery.18 The trial justice refused to reopen 
discovery but granted another extension, contrary to her previous 
warning, and set a new deadline of January 17, 2014, for Albanese 
to file an objection.19 Over the next month, Albanese filed 
numerous motions requesting additional time, but at the hearing 
on January 31, 2014, the trial justice denied Albanese’s motions 
and proceeded with oral arguments on the issue of summary 
judgment.20 Albanese was given the opportunity to provide oral 
response, and after she did so, the trial justice granted Defendants’ 
summary judgment on all counts.21 At some point during this time, 
Albanese had also moved for the trial justice to recuse herself from 
the case, stating first that the trial justice failed to take her 
seriously as a litigant acting pro se, and second that the trial justice 
had a conflict of interest that would have warranted recusal.22 
On appeal, Albanese claimed that the trial justice erred in 
denying the motion to reopen discovery, denying motions for 
continuance, denying the motion to recuse, and granting summary 
judgment.23 
 
 
 
 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. (alteration in original). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 1185. 
22. Id. at 1186, 1187. 
23. Id. at 1185. 
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court considered four issues, the 
first of which was whether or not the trial justice erred in denying 
Albanese’s motion to reopen discovery.24 The Court established 
that a trial justice has broad discretion in regulating discovery for 
the sake of judicial economy, and that the parties are bound to 
comply with the timing of discovery set forth in the scheduling and 
other orders once they have been set by the court.25 More than six 
years had passed between the time that Albanese first brought the 
suit and when the court imposed the discovery deadline, so she had 
plenty of time to request materials during that period.26 Albanese’s 
argument that her former attorney failed to seek important 
documents for the case was unsuccessful because Albanese did not 
move to reopen discovery until several months after her attorney 
withdrew representation.27 
For similar reasons, the Court determined that the trial justice 
had broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a 
continuance.28 The Court acknowledged that managing the trial 
calendar is extremely difficult, and thus justices must be afforded 
wide discretion in denying continuances, and the Court will 
question such decisions only when there is a showing that the lower 
court abused its discretion.29 Here, Albanese was granted an 
extension on October 18, 2013, and she had twenty-five days to 
work on the objection before her scheduled surgery, only three less 
days than were initially allotted.30 Albanese also received two more 
continuances after surgery even though her case was stagnant for 
a number of years with no activity, and she further received several 
continuances thereafter.31 By the final due date, Albanese had 100 
days to respond to the summary judgment motion.32 Thus, given 
the broad discretion the trial justice has in order to successfully 
 
 
24. Id. 
25. Id. (citing Shelter Harbor Conservation Soc’y, Inc. v. Rogers, 21 A.3d 
337, 343 (R.I. 2011)). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 1186. 
29. Id. (citing Boucher v. Galvin, 571 A.2d 35, 37 (R.I. 1990)). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
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manage the trial calendar and the amount of time Albanese had to 
submit the proper documents, the trial justice did not err in denying 
any of Albanese’s motions for continuance.33 
Third, the Court addressed whether or not the trial justice 
erred in denying Albanese’s motion to recuse.34 Albanese argued 
that the trial justice failed to take Albanese seriously as a pro se 
litigant, encouraged the Defendants to move for summary 
judgment, even though they had not yet filed a motion to do so, and 
had a conflict of interest because the trial justice’s husband was a 
law-enforcement officer who might have had contact with the 
officers in the underlying case during his course of employment.35 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court dismissed the first two 
contentions stating that Albanese was a “recalcitrant litigant,” and 
that the “trial justice went to great lengths to make exceptions for 
Albanese’s behavior . . . and help[ed] [her] clarify her arguments 
before the court,” despite the fact that she once needed to be 
removed from the court room by a deputy sheriff.36 Further, the 
Court found that Albanese failed to provide evidence showing that 
the trial justice encouraged the Defendants to move for summary 
judgment.37 Lastly, the Court held that the spousal conflict is an 
“old rooted claim” and was mere conjecture, ultimately ruling that 
the trial justice did not err in denying the motion to recuse.38 
Finally, the Court considered whether or not the trial justice 
erred in granting summary judgment, taking each count 
separately.39 On the false arrest, gross negligence and misconduct, 
and punitive damages claims, the Court concluded that the trial 
justice did not err in granting summary judgment.40   However, on 
 
 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 1187. 
37. Id. When the trial justice denied the motion to recuse, she stated on 
the record that she had not ordered the Defendants to move for summary 
judgment but instead had set a timeline for them in an effort to move the case 
along. Id. 
38. Id. at 1188. The conflict of interest argument was not raised in time 
to be considered in oral argument.  Id. at 1187–88 (citations omitted). 
39. Id. at 1188. 
40. Id. at 1189–91. The Court found that on the false arrest claim, 
summary judgment was appropriate because the officer had probable cause to 
arrest Albanese due to physical confrontation and failure to adhere to the 
officer’s instructions.   Id. at 1190.  On the negligence and misconduct claims, 
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the assault and battery claim, the Court found that summary 
judgment was not appropriate.41 The Court reasoned that 
summary judgment is not appropriate when there is a genuine 
dispute of material fact, and that despite there being very little 
evidence on the record, the Defendants’ story conflicted with 
Albanese’s version of the events.42 Thus, a genuine dispute of 
material fact existed, and the trial justice erred in granting 
summary judgment on that count.43 
COMMENTARY 
It is evident that the Rhode Island Supreme Court heavily 
considered the rationale behind affording trial justices a great deal 
of discretion when determining whether or not the trial justice 
erred in denying the motions to reopen discovery and grant a 
continuance.44 Litigation is a time-intensive process in and of 
itself, and delaying the process further by reopening discovery and 
granting multiple extensions contributes to the development of a 
clog in the judicial stream. Further, granting continuances for any 
and all circumstances diminishes the importance of moving for a 
continuance in emergency situations. The Court reasoned the same 
way regarding recusal.45 Recusal requires a judge to make a 
personal reflection and determine whether or not their conflict of 
interest is strong enough to interfere with their ability to make an 
unbiased judicial decision. Thus, this is inherently an area in which 
a judge should be afforded more discretion. Beyond that, it is 
important to allow such discretion in order to create a limit for 
recusal. If grounds for recusal extend to such attenuated 
circumstances as here, where the judge’s spouse might have had 
some form of contact with the law enforcement officers in 
Albanese’s  case,  recusal  would  occur  in  the  majority  of  cases, 
 
 
the Court found that there was no evidence on the record to support these 
claims. Id. at 1191. On the punitive damages claim, the Court found that 
punitive damages are only available “when a defendant’s conduct requires 
deterrence and punishment,” which was not necessary here. Id. (quoting Pier 
House Inn, Inc. v. 421 Corp., 812 A.2d 799, 803 (R.I. 2002)). 
41. Id. at 1190. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 1185. 
45. Id. at 1187. 
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especially in smaller communities.46 
The Court also made a clear distinction that despite the 
relatively scant evidence on the record, regarding the assault and 
battery charges, summary judgment should not have been awarded 
to the Defendants because there was still a dispute of fact between 
the law enforcement officers’ testimony and Albanese’s testimony.47 
A strong motivating factor for granting summary judgment has 
been to weed out claims that do not actually contain a triable issue 
in order to promote judicial economy and place a limit on already 
costly and time-intensive litigation. Considering the Court was 
erring on the side of judicial economy when deciding the other 
issues in the case, reversing summary judgment when the evidence 
appears facially weak makes an important statement. It 
emphasizes that the amount of evidence is secondary to whether or 
not there is a genuine dispute within the evidence that does exist. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a trial justice has 
broad discretion in regulating discovery and denying motions for 
continuance in order to help preserve judicial economy, and these 
decisions will only be disturbed when the trial justice has abused 
his or her discretion. Furthermore, the Court held that an 
attenuated spousal conflict does not meet the threshold of personal 
bias required for recusal, and summary judgment may be granted 
if there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, despite an 
overwhelming lack of evidence. 
 
Camille M. Ingino 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46. See id. at 1188. 
47. Id. at 1190. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Procedure. Manning v. Bellafiore, 139 A.3d 505  (R.I. 
2016). The Rhode Island Supreme Court, under its  inherent  
power to fashion an appropriate remedy that serves the ends of 
justice, has the authority to award attorneys’ fees against a party 
that acts in bad faith. A party acts in bad faith by either failing to 
directly answer questions during discovery or providing false 
testimony at trial. The Court can infer from a trial justice’s 
findings that a party’s conduct constituted bad faith. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On March 4, 1998, Michael Manning (Manning), after falling 
unconscious at his home, was admitted to South County Hospital 
(SCH).1 Doctor Peter J. Bellafiore, who was responsible for 
Manning’s care, wanted Manning to undergo a magnetic  
resonance imaging (MRI) test in order to determine whether 
Manning was suffering from a stroke.2 Over the course of four 
days, Dr. Bellafiore was unsuccessful in having Manning undergo 
an MRI test at least two times because Manning had a 
claustrophobic reaction, and the sedatives Dr. Bellafiore 
administered to Manning failed to mitigate Manning’s 
claustrophobia.3 On March 7, 1998, Manning suffered a stroke 
while at SCH and passed away two days later at Massachusetts 
General Hospital.4 
On January 6, 2000, Manning’s estate (Plaintiff) filed a 
negligence and wrongful death suit against Dr. Bellafiore and two 
others.5   On January 5, 2004, after an extensive discovery period, 
 
 
1. Manning  v.  Bellafiore  (Manning  IV),  139  A.3d  505,  507–08  (R.I. 
2016). 
2. Id. at 508. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. The claims against Dr. McNiece, Manning’s primary care 
physician, and South County Hospital were subsequently dismissed. Id. at 
507 n.1. 
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the trial commenced.6 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. 
Bellafiore.7 Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, 
and moved for sanctions against Dr. Bellafiore and his attorneys, 
White & Kelly, P.C. (White).8 Plaintiff contended that during 
discovery, White failed to disclose conversations that Dr.  
Bellafiore had with Manning on March 5 and March 6.9 
On November 4, 2005, the trial justice granted Plaintiff’s 
motion for a new trial against Dr. Bellafiore on the grounds that 
the verdict was not supported by the evidence.10 Dr. Bellafiore 
subsequently appealed the trial justice’s decision.11 
On April 12, 2010, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial justice’s decision to grant a new trial because “the trial 
justice conducted the appropriate analysis, did not overlook or 
misconceive material evidence, and was not otherwise clearly 
wrong.”12 As a result, Dr. Bellafiore settled with Plaintiff, but 
expressly preserved the claims for sanctions against Dr. Bellafiore 
and White.13 
On September 10, 2012, the trial justice granted Plaintiff’s 
motion to sanction both Dr. Bellafiore and White and awarded 
Plaintiff $152,998.57.14 The trial justice sanctioned Dr. Bellafiore 
and White under Rule 11 of the Rhode Island Superior Court 
Rules  of  Civil  Procedure,15   on  the  grounds  that  Dr. Bellafiore 
 
6.     Id. at 511. 
7.     Id. at 512. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Manning v. Bellafiore (Manning I), No. W.C.2000-63, 2005 WL 
2981660, at *24 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2005). 
11. Manning IV, 139 A.3d 505, 512 (R.I. 2016). 
12. Manning v. Bellafiore (Manning II), 991 A.2d 399, 410–11 (R.I.  
2010). 
13. Manning IV, 139 A.3d at 513. 
14. Manning v. Bellafiore (Manning III), No. 2000-0063, 2012 WL 
12796483, at *22 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2012). 
15. Rule 11 states in relevant part that: 
[E]very pleading, written motion, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be personally signed by at  least  
one . . . attorney of record . . . . The signature of an attorney . . . or 
party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read 
the pleading, motion, or other paper . . . and that the pleading, 
motion, or other paper is not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation . . . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is 
signed in violation of this rule, the court . . . may impose upon the 
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made five assertions at trial that were “drastically different” from 
his pretrial disclosures.16 Specifically, the trial justice found that 
Dr. Bellafiore’s pretrial disclosures omitted the following: (1) the 
term “conscious sedation”; (2) a discussion with Manning about 
anesthesiology; (3) a drug called “[v]ersed”; (4) discussions with 
Manning about sedatives; and (5) an apology Manning made to  
Dr. Bellafiore.17 The trial justice concluded that sanctions were 
appropriate against Dr. Bellafiore because “[e]ither [he] was  
hiding the complete answers, or he opted to modify his version of 
the truth far into the trial.”18 The trial justice found that  
sanctions were appropriate against White because it failed to refer 
to a “board letter,”19 which detailed Manning’s refusal to undergo 
an MRI on March 5 with “maximum sedation,” when White 
responded to Plaintiff’s interrogatories.20 Further,  the  trial  
justice explained that although no evidence showed “[White] knew 
that Dr. Bellafiore had such a detailed recollection of the specific 
events of the key conversation[,]” White “was obligated but failed 
to determine the issues with . . . Manning’s anesthesia  and . . . 
[his] concerns about the anesthesia.”21 
However, the trial justice found that Dr. Bellafiore was 
“primarily culpable” because “[h]e responded to his attorneys’ 
questions, drafted interrogatory answers, signed answers under 
oath, responded to deposition questions under oath, . . . and 
uncorked the surprise testimony deep into the marathon trial.”22 
Accordingly,  the  trial  justice  held  Dr.  Bellafiore  eighty percent 
 
 
person who signed the pleading, motion, or other paper, a 
represented party, or both, any appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of 
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the 
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s 
fee. 
R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 11. 
16. Manning IV, 139 A.3d at 513. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 513–14 (alterations in original). 
19. Id. at 514. The trial justice found that Dr. Bellafiore  submitted to  
the Rhode Island Board of Medical Licensure a letter detailing conversations 
with Manning, and that Dr. Bellafiore directed White to use the board letter 
to answer Plaintiff’s interrogatories. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. (alterations in original). 
22. Id. 
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responsible  and  White  twenty percent responsible.23 Both Dr. 
Bellafiore and White appealed the trial justice’s decision.24 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the superior court’s order, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court sought to determine whether Rule 11 of the Rhode 
Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure applies  to 
discovery violations, and whether the superior court abused its 
discretion or was otherwise clearly wrong in  imposing sanctions 
on Dr. Bellafiore and White.25 Conducting a de novo review of the 
rule’s language, the Court determined that Rule 11 was not 
applicable to the alleged discovery violations against Dr. 
Bellafiore.26 Nevertheless, the Court determined that it “may 
award attorneys’ fees as an exercise of its inherent power to 
fashion an appropriate remedy that would serve the ends of 
justice.”27 The Court explained that in order for it to impose 
sanctions, under its inherent power, the record must show that a 
defendant acted in “bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons.”28 
First, the Court addressed the actions of Dr. Bellafiore.29 
From the outset of the Court’s analysis, it explained that although 
two of the trial justice’s five findings were actually part of 
discovery,30 the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive 
material evidence regarding whether sanctioning Dr. Bellafiore 
was appropriate.31 Then, the Court focused on several statements 
that Dr. Bellafiore made at trial with significant new details but 
 
 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 515. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 515–16. 
27. Id. at 516 (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, 911 
A.2d 706, 711 n.5 (R.I. 2006)). 
28. Id. (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991)). 
The Court noted that under its inherent power, attorneys’ fees are also 
appropriate when the award is “(1)  pursuant  to  the  common  fund 
exception . . . [or] (2) as a sanction for the willful disobedience of a court   
order . . . .”  Id. (alteration in original). 
29. Id. at 516–17. 
30. Id. at 517. The Court noted that Dr. Bellafiore’s testimony regarding 
“[c]onversations with Manning about sedations on March 5 or March 6” and 
“Manning[‘s] apolog[y]” were disclosed during discovery. Id. 
31. Id. 
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were not disclosed in discovery.32 For example, the Court took 
issue with the fact that at deposition, Dr. Bellafiore indicated that 
“he did not consider anesthesia . . . as a desirable treatment for 
Manning prior to [March 7] because [anesthesia] would pose too 
much of a risk . . . .”33 However, at trial, Dr. Bellafiore testified 
that he offered “conscious sedation” with the help of an 
anesthesiologist on March 5 and March 6.34 
Additionally, the Court found that Dr. Bellafiore’s  
inconsistent statements in responding to interrogatories and 
deposition responses and trial testimony35 supported the trial 
justice’s conclusion that Dr. Bellafiore “[e]ither . . . hid[] the 
complete answers, or he opted to modify his version of the truth 
far into the trial.”36 As a result, the Court held that although the 
trial justice did not explicitly assign the terms “bad faith, 
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons”37 to Dr. 
Bellafiore’s conduct, “a finding that Dr. Bellafiore acted in bad 
faith can be inferred by the trial justice’s decision and that such 
decision did not overlook or misconceive material evidence, and is 
not otherwise clearly wrong.”38 
Next, the Court addressed the actions of White.39 Although  
the Court found that White had a duty to disclose requested facts, 
White’s conduct did not amount to acting in bad faith.40   Thus, the 
 
32. Id. at 518. 
33. Id. (alterations in original). 
34. Id. 
35. Specifically, the Court stated that “[t]he record . . . is clear that, at a 
minimum, Dr. Bellafiore failed to answer questions posed in plaintiff’s 
interrogatories and at his deposition completely and that he added significant 
new details in his testimony at trial.” Id. 
36. Id. (alterations in original). The Court also found that an inference  
of bad-faith could be drawn from “[t]he trial justice’s findings that Dr. 
Bellafiore was ‘motivated by improper purposes and lacking in good faith[]’ 
[and that he] ‘knew his sworn answers were indirect, evasive, significantly 
incomplete, and had little concern for the result.’” Id. at 519 (alterations in 
original). 
37. Id. at 518. 
38. Id. at 519. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 519–20. The Court noted that the White’s actions were more 
along the lines of negligence. Id. Furthermore, the Court explained that 
“[had] there been a finding that [White] acted in bad faith because White . . . 
knew that Dr. Bellafiore was providing false testimony, then [White] would 
be in violation of Article V, Rule 3.3 of the [Rhode Island] Supreme Court 
Rules of Professional Conduct.”  Id. at 520 n.11 (alterations in original); see 
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Court vacated the judgment against White because the trial 
justice’s decision neither showed a fact nor supported an inference 
that White acted in bad faith “as necessary when relying on the 
court’s inherent powers to impose a sanction.”41 
Finally, the Court addressed the amount of the sanction 
award.42 While noting that “a trial justice [has] wide latitude to 
fashion an appropriate remedy for sanctionable conduct,”43 the 
Court was troubled with the trial justice’s assessment of the 
evidence in calculating the $152,998.57 award.44 The Court 
explained that the Plaintiff did not have to incur the additional 
costs of a second trial because the parties settled.45 In addition,  
the Court found that the trial justice made an erroneous 
assessment by including the attorneys’ fees for the hours spent on 
the claims against the two other defendants that were 
subsequently dismissed and the attorneys’ fees incurred by the 
Plaintiff during the sanction proceeding.46 The Court reasoned 
that, if it included Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees incurred during the 
sanction hearing, “[i]n essence, the [C]ourt would be sanctioning 
Dr. Bellafiore for defending against a motion to impose a sanction 
on him, rather than for any sanctionable conduct.”47 
Consequently, the Court vacated the $152,998.57 award and 
directed the superior court to sanction Dr. Bellafiore in the 
amount of $38,398.53.48 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly acknowledged that  
it has the inherent power to award attorneys’ fees as an 
appropriate remedy to serve the ends of justice and can refer to  
the  Rhode  Island  Superior  Court  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure   by 
 
 
 
R.I. SUP. CT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.3(a)(3) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . 
offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”). 
41. Id. at 520. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pleasant Mgmt. LLC v. Carrasco, 
918 A.2d 213, 217 (R.I. 2007)). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 521. 
46. Id. at 521–22. 
47. Id. at 522. 
48. Id. 
  
 
2017] SURVEY SECTION 723 
 
analogy as a guide to review a trial justice’s findings.49 Here, the 
Court used the rationale of Rule 11, “to deter repetition of the 
harm, and to remedy the harm caused,” to guide its decision.50 In 
addition, the Court clarified that the trial justice must find, either 
explicitly or implicitly, that the party acted in bad faith in order  
for sanctions to be appropriate under a court’s inherent power.51 
Moreover, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to balance 
the purpose of imposing sanctions and the high standard of 
awarding attorneys’ fees pursuant to its inherent  power.  The 
facts of this case support the Court’s adherence to balancing these 
principles because Dr. Bellafiore either willfully refused to directly 
answer questions during discovery or committed a fraud on the 
superior court by giving false testimony.52 
However, the dissent argues that the trial justice’s decision 
contained several errors. Specifically, the dissent explains  that 
the trial justice mistakenly applied Rule 1153 and that two 
assertions Dr. Bellafiore made at trial were disclosed in 
discovery.54 While these were erroneous findings  made by the  
trial justice, Dr. Bellafiore’s conduct allows the majority to 
underplay these errors and focus on his key inconsistencies. For 
instance, although two of the assertions Dr. Bellafiore made at 
trial were disclosed during discovery, Dr. Bellafiore still made 
three key assertions at trial that either were significantly changed 
or omitted in his responses during discovery.55 In addition, even 
though the superior court applied the wrong rule when awarding 
Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, the Supreme Court undoubtedly has the 
discretion to use its inherent power to award attorneys’ fees56 and 
may use the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure by analogy to 
 
49. Id. at 516. 
50. Id. (quoting Huntley v. State, 109 A.3d 869, 873 (R.I. 2015)). 
51. Id. at 519. 
52. See id. at 518. 
53. Id. at 523–24 (Robinson J., concurring in part and dissenting in  
part). Justice Robinson concurred with the majority on vacating the sanction 
against White.  Id. at 522. 
54. Id. at 523. Justice Robinson also argued that the trial justice 
erroneously found three inconsistent statements because, although Dr. 
Bellafiore never used the word “[v]ersed,” Dr. Bellafiore implicitly mentioned 
the word “[v]ersed” in deposition testimony. Id. 
55. Id. at 517–18 (majority opinion). 
56. Id. at 516 (citing Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, 911 
A.2d 706, 711 n.5 (R.I. 2006)). 
  
 
 
724  ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:717 
 
guide its review.57 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that even though the 
trial justice applied Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in 
sanctioning Dr. Bellafiore because an inference of bad faith could 
be drawn from his conduct either during discovery or at trial.58 In 
addition, the Court held that the sanctioning of White was an 
abuse of discretion because there was neither a fact nor inference 
that could be drawn to support a bad faith finding.59 Finally, the 
Court   reduced   the   original    monetary   sanction   imposed   to 
$38,398.53 because the trial justice erroneously calculated the 
amount of the award.60 
 
Steven Davis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57. Id. (citing Lett v. Providence Journal Co., 798 A.2d 355, 365 (R.I. 
2002)). 
58. Id. at 519. 
59. Id. at 519–20. 
60. Id. at 521–22. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constitutional Law. State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131  (R.I. 
2016). The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed  whether a  
trial court erred in denying a defendant’s motion to suppress 
evidence when officers entered into his home and arrested him 
without warrants, and whether that denial violated the 
defendant’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. The Court clarified factors to consider  
when applying the analyses for warrant exceptions, the 
attenuation doctrine, and the harmless error principle. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Shortly before midnight on January 21, 2012, Tony Gonzalez 
allegedly shot and caused the death of a man at the home of 
Gonzalez’s ex-girlfriend, Patricia Dalomba, in Warwick, Rhode 
Island, in the presence of Dalomba and her current boyfriend;   
both Dalomba and her current boyfriend were unharmed.1 
Dalomba, the only eyewitness, called 911 to report the shooting 
and identified Tony Gonzalez as the shooter several times as well 
as provided his home address and physical description.2 
Following the 911 call, Warwick police officers began to arrive 
at the station shortly after midnight on January 22, 2012, where 
they were immediately informed that Gonzalez was the shooter.3 
In the early morning hours of January 22, 2012, officers attended 
briefings, interviewed Dalombra, discussed strategy, and 
determined Gonzalez’s location.4    At approximately 7:00 a.m.,  six 
 
1. State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131, 1135-36 (R.I. 2016). 
2. Id. at 1142. Dalomba’s current boyfriend was taking shelter in the 
closet and unable to see the shooter.  Id. at 1140. 
3. Id. at 1152 (majority opinion), 1159 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The 
identification of Gonzalez as the shooter was based on Dalomba’s eyewitness 
identification as well as testimony from Dalomba and her boyfriend, 
regarding a series of hostile and threatening text messages and phone calls 
exchanged among them and Gonzalez in the days leading up to the shooting. 
Id. at 1136, 1139, 1142–43, 1157 (majority opinion). 
4. Id. at 1139, 1140 (majority opinion), 1159–60 (Goldberg, J., 
concurring). 
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Warwick police officers joined at least six Providence police  
officers at a Providence substation before they “departed in a 
‘caravan’” for Gonzalez’s residence, which he shared with his 
mother Cira Gonzalez.5 Police officers were highly aware that 
Gonzalez was likely armed as both Dalomba and Gonzalez’s 
brother informed them that Gonzalez almost always carried a gun 
and “typically [slept] with a handgun under his pillow,” which 
could pose a threat to officers’ safety.6 
At the Gonzalez residence, the police officers established a 
perimeter around the house, and three or six officers approached 
the front door.7  An officer carrying a tactical shield knocked on  
the door while officers with guns “displayed” stood directly behind 
him.8 Ms. Gonzalez opened the door and spoke to the lead officer 
for ten to fifteen seconds.9 When asked for information on 
Gonzalez’s location, Ms. Gonzalez, at most, gestured to the stairs 
and/or glanced at the stairs10—no verbal answer was given—and 
the police entered the Gonzalez residence.11 The Warwick and 
Providence police officers arrested Gonzalez just after 7:00 a.m. on 
January 22, 2012.12 While in the process of handcuffing Gonzalez, 
but before reading him his Miranda rights, the arresting officer 
repeatedly asked about the location of the gun, to which Gonzalez 
replied, “[the gun’s] not here. It’s not in the bedroom.  I don’t have 
a gun.”13 Officers removed Gonzalez from the home, placed him in 
the back of a marked police car, and departed for the station.14 
At 8:10 a.m. while still in her home, Ms. Gonzalez read and 
signed a written consent for the officers to search her home.15 At 
approximately the same time, the police officers transporting 
Gonzalez pulled into a parking lot, removed Gonzalez’s handcuffs, 
and  Gonzalez  read  and  signed  a  written  consent  to  search his 
 
 
5. Id. at 1160 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
6. Id. at 1137–38 (majority opinion) (alteration in original). 
7. Id. at 1149, 1154. 
8. Id. at 1149. 
9. Id. at 1138, 1149. 
10.    Id. at 1139, 1149. 
11. Id. at 1138, 1139, 1140–41, 1149. 
12. Id. at 1152. 
13. Id. at 1139.   The gun used in the shooting was never located.   Id. at 
1143 n.6. 
14. Id. at 1139. 
15. Id. at 1150. 
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bedroom.16 The police officers subsequently searched Gonzalez’s 
bedroom and seized evidence of gun paraphernalia and clothing 
that matched Dalomba’s description of the shooter.17 The police  
did not have an arrest warrant or a search warrant.18 
On May 22, 2012, a Kent County grand jury indicted Gonzalez 
on four charges: (1) first-degree murder, (2) assault with intent to 
commit murder, (3) discharging a firearm while committing 
murder, and (4) discharging a firearm while committing assault 
with intent to commit murder.19 
Gonzalez filed motions to suppress evidence found in his 
bedroom as well as his comments regarding the gun made during 
his arrest based on his “contention that his arrest was unlawful 
because the police did not have a warrant to enter his home and 
arrest him.”20 The trial justice (1) denied the motion to suppress 
Gonzalez’s statements made during the arrest and before he was 
advised of his Miranda rights, finding that the question asked by 
the police officers as to the location of the gun was “prudent” given 
the officers reasonably assumed Gonzalez was armed;21 (2) denied 
the motion to suppress evidence on the grounds of lack of consent 
to search, finding that both Gonzalez and his mother “freely and 
voluntarily” gave written consent to search;22 (3) denied the 
motion to suppress evidence on the grounds of lack of arrest or 
search warrants, finding that exigent circumstances justified the 
warrantless search;23 and (4) denied the motion to suppress 
evidence from the arrest and search based on lack of consent to 
enter the house, finding that Ms. Gonzalez consented when she 
opened the door, nonverbally indicated that Gonzalez was 
upstairs, and allowed police officers to enter.24 
In February 2013, following a nine-day trial, the jury found 
 
 
16. Id. at 1155–56. 
17. Id. at 1140. Evidence seized included: an open black gun case, 
miscellaneous gun parts, a loaded magazine, and receipt from a gun store, 
identifying Gonzalez as the purchaser of a nine millimeter handgun, a black 
vest, a black scarf, a black jacket, and gray boots. Id. 
18. Id. at 1136. 
19. Id. at 1135. 
20. Id. at 1135–36. 
21. Id. at 1141. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 1141–42. 
24. Id. at 1142. 
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Gonzalez guilty on all counts and sentenced him to two, 
consecutive, life sentences.25 Gonzalez appealed this decision to 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which granted his petition to 
determine if the trial justice’s denial of the motions to suppress 
were clearly erroneous and whether or not police violated 
Gonzalez’s federal constitutional rights to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.26 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court deferred to the  trial 
justice’s factual findings, applied a “clearly erroneous standard,”27 
and conducted an independent, de novo review of the evidence in 
the record, in a light most favorable to the State, to determine if 
Gonzalez’s Fourth Amendment constitutional rights were 
violated.28 Therefore, the Court would reverse the trial justice’s 
denial of the motion to suppress only if “‘(1) his or her findings 
concerning the challenged statements reveal clear error, and (2) 
[the Court’s] independent review of the conclusions drawn from 
the historical facts establishes that the defendant’s federal 
constitutional rights were denied.’”29 
The Court reviewed Fourth Amendment principles including 
federal and Rhode Island precedent on the issue of exceptions to 
the warrant requirement for searches and seizures.30 The Fourth 
Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in   
their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”31 The “Fourth Amendment 
has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent [a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement], that threshold 
 
 
25. Id. at 1145. 
26. Id. at 1135, 1145. Gonzalez also appealed the decision based on the 
contention that two of the jurors in his case were biased and either should 
have been dismissed or he should have been granted a mistrial, but the Court 
declined to address that issue in light of its ruling on the motions to suppress. 
Id. at 1159. 
27. Id. at 1145 (citing State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40, 50 (R.I. 2014), cert. 
denied 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015); State v. Cosme, 57 A.3d 295, 299 (R.I. 2012); 
State v. Page, 709 A.2d 1042, 1044 (R.I. 1998)). 
28. Id. (citing State v. Harrison, 66 A.3d 432, 441 (R.I. 2013)). 
29. Id. (quoting State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 513 (R.I. 2004)). 
30. Id. at 1146–47. 
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”32 This strong 
protection of privacy in the home creates a presumption that 
warrantless searches are unreasonable.33 Exceptions to the 
warrant requirement include when the search is consented to, and 
when exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry into the 
home.34 
A. Consent 
First, the Court addressed the purported consent of Ms. 
Gonzalez for the police officers to enter her home, noting that the 
burden is on the State to prove by a “‘fair preponderance of the 
evidence’”35 that consent was “‘freely and voluntarily’”36 given 
when assessed under the totality of the circumstances.37 Some of 
the factors to be considered under the totality of the circumstances 
include “‘the number of officers entering the home,’ ‘the 
apprehension of a family member,’ ‘the time of day,’ and a ‘display 
of weaponry.’”38 The Court held that the trial justice’s 
determination that Ms. Gonzalez consented to police officers 
entering the home and resultant denial of the motion to suppress 
were erroneous, as she did not freely and voluntarily give 
consent.39 The Court summarized the totality  of  the 
circumstances of when Ms. Gonzalez opened the door to the police 
officers: she faced at least three officers, several of whom had their 
weapons drawn and one held a tactical shield; it was 7:00 a.m. on 
a   Sunday  morning;  and   the   officers  demanded   to  know  the 
 
 
32. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1146 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 590 (1980)). 
33. Id. at 1146 (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 586). The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court has applied the prohibition of warrantless entry to a person’s 
home to purposes of both searches and arrests.  State v. Linde, 876 A.2d  
1115, 1124 (R.I. 2005) (citing Illinois v. Rodriquez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990)). 
34. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1147 (citing Duquette v. Godbout, 471 A.2d 
1359, 1362 (R.I. 1984)). 
35. Id. (quoting State v. O’Dell, 576 A.2d 425, 427 (R.I. 1990)). 
36. Id. (quoting State v. Bailey, 417 A.2d 915, 918 (R.I. 1980)). 
37. Id. at 1147–48 (quoting Palmigiano v. Mullen, 377 A.2d 242, 246  
(R.I. 1977) (stating that “the question of whether consent was ‘in fact 
voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a 
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.’”). 
38. Id. at 1148–49 (quoting State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1374 (R.I. 
1984)). 
39. Id. at 1149. 
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location of her son.40 The Court then concluded that these were 
“hardly circumstances conducive to voluntary consent.”41 The 
Court continued that while nonverbal consent can be freely and 
voluntarily given, Ms. Gonzalez’s glancing and/or gesturing up the 
stairs—which could also be explained as reflexive after the officer 
first looked up the stairs when asking for the location of 
Gonzalez—further supported the lack of free and voluntary 
consent.42 
Secondly, the Court applied the analysis to  determine 
whether Ms. Gonzalez’s written consent was freely  and 
voluntarily given.43 The Court held that Ms. Gonzalez did not 
freely and voluntarily give written consent and that the trial 
justice’s denial of the motion to suppress was erroneous.44 The 
Court noted a lack of evidence in the record upon which to a 
determine that the “state met its burden of proving that Ms. 
Gonzalez’s written consent was free and voluntary by a fair 
preponderance of the evidence.”45 The Court emphasized that, 
upon examination of all the facts, a mere hour-and-ten-minutes 
passed between Ms. Gonzalez opening her door to armed police 
officers and signing the written consent.46 In this amount of time, 
police officers repeatedly asked Ms. Gonzalez where her son was 
and she stood by as police officers sprinted up the stairs, arrested 
her son, and removed him from their home47; furthermore, there 
were still several officers in her home, and she expressed a range 
of emotions from the time officers entered her home despite 
appearing calm at the exact time she read and signed the written 
consent agreement.48 
 
 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. (comparing State v. O’Dell, 576 A.2d 425, 427 (R.I. 1990) (holding 
that defendant’s mother’s valid consent to search home did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment)). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 1149–50. 
45. Id. at 1150 (citing O’Dell, 576 A.2d at 427). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. Ms. Gonzalez appeared calm when she read and signed the 
written consent, but she had previously cried at several points. In addition, 
the detective who obtained her written consent testified that he prefaced her 
reading of the consent agreement with a hypothetical scenario that the 
officers would obtain a search warrant if she did not consent to the search 
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B. Exigent Circumstances 
Next, the Court addressed the State’s reliance on exigent 
circumstances for not obtaining a warrant, noting that the burden 
is on the State to overcome the presumption that all warrantless 
home searches are unreasonable by viewing the facts as known to 
the police at the time of the arrest.49 The Court is extremely 
mindful that “‘[w]hen an officer undertakes to act as his own 
magistrate, he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to 
some real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed an 
action to get a warrant.’”50 Immediate and serious consequences 
may be present where (1) there is a potential for evidence to be 
destroyed inside the home before a warrant could be obtained; (2) 
there is a risk that the suspect may escape; or (3) the suspect  
poses a threat to the lives or safety of the public, the police  
officers, or themselves.51 
The Court held that exigent circumstances did not exist in 
this case, and thus the warrantless arrest was invalid.52 The 
Court detailed the difference between an “emergency situation” 
and a “planned arrest,” stating that an emergency situation 
requires prompt police action where it is not practicable to obtain  
a warrant while, in contrast, a planned arrest does not stem from 
an ongoing investigation in the field and it is practicable to obtain 
a warrant.53 The Court found that the facts present in this case 
were much more comparable to a planned arrest than an 
emergency situation,54 and put strong emphasis on the seven 
hours between approximately midnight when the police had 
sufficient reason to suspect that Gonzalez was the shooter and 
7:00 a.m. when the police arrested him in his home.55 During 
these seven hours, police made no attempt to obtain a warrant.56 
The Court did not find evidence to support that swift action was 
 
 
and presented consent simply as a second option. Id. 
49. Id. at 1150–51. 
50. Id. at 1151 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Welsh 
v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 751(1984)). 
51. Id. (citation omitted). 
52. Id. at 1154. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 1153. 
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necessary during this entire seven-hour period,57 and while law 
enforcement argues that “[t]o sit down at a desk and type out a 
warrant at that point in time . . . was a waste of resources,”58 “the 
mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can 
never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.”59 
Furthermore, law enforcement indicated that it felt evidence, 
namely the gun, could be destroyed and that Gonzalez may be a 
threat to officer safety or himself; however, the Court found that 
assertion was based on generalized conjecture instead of specific 
facts of the investigation.60 “[S]ubjective, generalized statements 
of the police—about their concern for destruction of evidence and 
the possibility that defendant could harm himself or others or 
escape arrest—are neither sufficient nor fact based” and cannot 
support a determination that exigent circumstances are present.61 
C. Attenuation Doctrine 
Finally, the Court determined whether Gonzalez’s written 
consent to search his bedroom was valid even though the 
underlying arrest was illegal.62 In general, the fruit-of-the- 
poisonous tree doctrine deems evidence derived from an illegal 
search or arrest as inadmissible because the evidence was tainted 
by the primary illegality;63 however, the attenuation doctrine 
allows evidence obtained by illegal means to be admissible if the 
connection between the arrest and the consent to search is 
sufficiently remote so as to purge the evidence of the primary 
taint.64 When assessing whether attenuation is sufficient to  
render consent valid, the Court considers “[t]emporal proximity of 
the arrest and the [consent to search], the presence of  intervening 
 
 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 1153, 1164 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (alteration in original). 
59. Id. at 1153 (majority opinion) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 
385, 393 (1978)) (comparing United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 
1980)). 
60. Id. at 1164 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
61. Id. at 1165. 
62. Id. at 1155 (majority opinion). 
63. Id. (citing State v. Bailey, 417 A.2d 915, 919 (R.I. 1980)); Fruit-of-the- 
poisonous-tree Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
64. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1155 (citing State v. Casas, 900 A.2d 1120, 
1134 (R.I. 2006); Attenuation Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
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circumstances . . . and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of 
the official misconduct . . . .”65 The State bears the burden of 
proving that the primary taint has been purged from the 
evidence,66 and “‘consent [that] is obtained during the course of an 
illegal detention is presumptively . . . invalid.’”67 Here, the Court 
held that the facts presented by the State were not sufficient to 
overcome the presumption that the evidence is invalid as fruit-of- 
the-poisonous-tree stemming from the illegal arrest.68 The Court 
emphasized that only a short time passed between Gonzalez’s 
illegal arrest in his home and his signing the written consent to 
search his bedroom.69 In addition, Gonzalez was handcuffed until 
just before he signed the written consent, was still in the back of a 
police car with two police officers standing nearby,70 and was only 
one-half mile from his home.71 Under the totality of these 
circumstances, the Court could not discern any “intervening 
circumstances that would lead to the determination that 
[Gonzalez’s] consent was sufficiently attenuated from his illegal 
arrest so as to be untainted by the preceding illegal police 
activity,” and, therefore, the consent was not voluntary.72 
D. State’s Argument of Harmless Error 
While the Court held erroneous the denial of all four motions 
to suppress, the State contended that even if the evidence was 
illegally obtained, admitting it was harmless due to the “‘truly 
overwhelming’ evidence of [Gonzalez’s] guilt.”73 The Court noted 
that “the United States Supreme Court has applied the harmless 
error principle to the admission of evidence obtained in violation  
of  a  defendant’s  Fourth  Amendment  rights[,]”74   but  the  State 
 
 
65. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1155 (quoting Casas, 900 A.2d at 1134–35). 
66. Id. (citing State v. Parra, 941 A.2d 799, 805 (R.I. 2007)). 
67. Id. (quoting Parra, 941 A.2d at 804). 
68. Id. The concurrence highlights that officer testimony indicates that 
the handgun case was removed from the bedroom before Gonzalez was even 
presented with the written consent statement, further underscoring the 
appropriateness of it being suppressed.  Id. at 1161 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
69. Id. at 1155 (majority opinion). 
70. Id. at 1155–56. 
71. Id. at 1162 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
72. Id. at 1156 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
73. Id.; Error, harmless error, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
74. Id. (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970)). 
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must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained 
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”75 When assessing 
whether the error to allow evidence is harmless, the Court looks at 
factors including, “the relative degree of importance of the witness 
testimony to the prosecution’s case, . . . the presence or absence of 
evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the 
witness on material points, . . . and . . . the overall strength of the 
prosecution’s case.”76 
Here, the Court found that while there was substantial 
evidence of Gonzalez’s guilt presented at trial, it was not so 
overwhelming as to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
tainted evidence did not influence the verdict.77 The Court 
emphasized that the evidence from Gonzalez’s bedroom, 
particularly the clothing he was wearing the night of the shooting, 
not only was direct evidence of his guilt but also served to directly 
corroborate the testimony of Dalomba, the sole eyewitness.78 This 
lent credibility to Dalomba, which is critical in light of the fact 
that neither side considered her a palatable witness, and the State 
remarked in its closing arguments that she was a “horrible 
person;” therefore, the illegally obtained evidence potentially 
impacted a juror’s decision whether or not to believe Dalomba.79 
 
75. Id. at 1156–57 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)) (citing United States v. Sasso, 695 F.3d 25, 29 (1st  
Cir. 2012); State v. Mercurio, 89 A.3d 813, 822 (R.I. 2014); State v. Smith,  
446 A.2d 1035,1036 (R.I. 1982)). 
76. Id. at 1157 (quoting State v. Bustamante, 756 A.2d 758, 766 (R.I. 
2000). The Court noted that it will not apply the harmless error principle 
where there is an “overwhelming amount” of evidence indicative of a 
defendant’s guilt.  Id. (quoting State v. Perez, 882 A.2d 574, 590 (R.I. 2005). 
77. Id. at 1157, 1158–59. 
78. Id. at 1158. The Court also found that the receipt for Gonzalez’s 
purchase of a gun might have influenced a juror who was uncertain whether 
Gonzalez could have afforded a gun. Id. 
79. Id. at 1157–58 (citing Mercurio, 89 A.3d at 822–23 (holding that  
error was not harmless where it effected witness credibility and credibility 
was “central to the case.”)).  In this case, the prosecutor stated: 
I told you all that at the beginning; you weren’t going to like 
[Dalomba], she’s going to be rude, obnoxious, defiant, and 
disrespectful. . . . But one thing she didn’t do was lie to you.  . . . 
[T]he accounts of what happened, that she gave on th[e] stand [are] 
corroborated by the physical evidence that was obtained in this case. 
Id. at 1157 (first alteration not in original). The defense counsel stated, 
“[Dalomba’s] the least credible person in this room right now . . . [i]f her 
mouth is moving, she’s lying.”  Id. at 1157–58. 
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COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court further clarified the 
circumstances that will not support the determination that a 
warrantless entry into a home, a warrantless search, or a 
warrantless arrest was valid. It is well established that 
warrantless searches are unreasonable unless one of the limited 
exceptions to the warrant requirement is present, including a 
defendant’s voluntary consent or exigent circumstances.80 
Searches conducted outside of these bounds are a violation of the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment right, and any evidence collected 
is inadmissible in court unless the harmless error principle 
applies.81 
In holding that the motions to suppress at issue here were 
erroneously denied, the Court considered several factors, but 
heavily focused on elapsed time when deciding whether obtaining 
a warrant is reasonable, assessing whether exigent circumstances 
were present, and determining whether consent to a warrantless 
search is freely and voluntarily given.82 Here, the Court clarified 
that because law enforcement had seven hours before the arrest of 
Gonzalez, there was ample time to at least pursue an arrest 
warrant, and it could have been done in a manner that would not 
have distracted from the investigation.83 Furthermore, the Court 
determined that lack of time between an illegal arrest and 
obtaining consent for a subsequent search can render consent 
coerced and invalid, especially where there are no intervening 
circumstances.84 The Court also declined to hold this admission of 
illegally  obtained  evidence as a harmless  error,   even  when  the 
 
 
80. Id. at 1147 (citing State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1373 (R.I.  
1984); Duquette v. Godbout, 471 A.2d 1359, 1362 (R.I. 1984)). 
81. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 19, 22 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
82. Id. at 1149, 1152, 1155. 
83. Id. at 1152. 
84. Id. at 1156. The Court noted that officers needed only to obtain a 
warrant for Gonzalez’s arrest for the subsequent search to be valid and the 
evidence admissible; when presented with a valid arrest warrant, it would 
have been reasonable to expect Gonzalez or Ms. Gonzalez to open the door to 
the officers, and if they did not then the officers would have be justified in 
entering under the circumstances present here. Id. at 1147 n.9 (citing Payton 
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602–03 (1980); State v. O’Dell, 576 A.2d 425, 427 
(R.I. 1990)). 
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evidence against Gonzalez was overwhelming, where it could have 
directly influenced jurors as they decided whether or not a key 
eyewitness was credible.85 
The application of these standards ensures that law 
enforcement does not violate a suspect’s Fourth Amendment  
rights even when law enforcement is nearly certain that they have 
the proper suspect and that suspect is guilty of the crime of which 
he will be accused. Police are often in rapidly unfolding and 
dangerous situations where there is little to no time to consider 
options, and they need the flexibility to make decisions. In those 
cases, there are reasonable exceptions to the warrant requirement 
available to law enforcement, justifying a search or arrest, or to 
allow the judicial process to proceed when illegally obtained 
evidence would not have impacted jurors’ decision. However, this 
was not one of those situations, and the Court’s decision once  
again underscores the importance of the right to privacy– 
particularly privacy in one’s own home. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated the Superior  
Court’s denials of the defendant’s motions to suppress and 
remanded the case for a new trial.86 The Court reaffirmed that 
consent to warrantless searches must be freely and voluntarily 
given when assessed under the totality of the circumstances;87 
exigent circumstances must be based on real, immediate, and 
serious consequences, as opposed to generalized conjecture; and 
must be grounded in an emergency situation and not a planned 
arrest.88 Evidence that stems from an illegal arrest is not 
admissible if there are not intervening circumstances that would 
effectually attenuate the evidence obtained from the illegal 
arrest,89 and admission of illegally obtained evidence is not a 
harmless error where it lends credibility to and corroborates the 
statements of a primary witness.90 
 
 
85. Id. at 1158–59. 
86. Id. at 1159. 
87. Id. at 1149–50. 
88. Id. at 1154. 
89. Id. at 1156. 
90. Id. at 1158. 
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Contract Law.   S. Cty. Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon, 116 A.3d 
204 (R.I. 2015). Under the theory of quantum meruit, a 
subcontractor may recover the value of the services rendered to 
property owners, so long as the subcontractor proves each of the 
three elements of the claim. A subcontractor may not recover fees 
for its expert witness because such fees are not considered to be 
recoverable or taxable costs as a matter of law. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In 2010, Defendants Brian and Karen McMahon (Defendants) 
purchased approximately eleven acres of forested property on 
Block Island with the intention of building a 2,500-square-foot 
house and a barn on the property.1 The Defendants selected S. 
Heinz Construction & Design, Inc. (Heinz Construction) as the 
general contractor for the project.2 Heinz Construction and the 
Defendants agreed that Plaintiff, South County Post & Beam, Inc. 
(Plaintiff), a subcontractor that specialized in “timber frame 
design, fabrication, and installation,” would build the roof for the 
house and also design and build the timber frame for the barn.3   
In July 2010, Heinz Construction and Plaintiff signed  work  
orders, which described the scope of the work that Plaintiff was to 
perform on the house and the barn.4 In the following months, 
Plaintiff also performed work that was outside the scope of the 
work orders, including the construction of a tower and a deck on 
the roof of the house, but this additional work was never recorded 
in a change order.5 In May 2011, a billing dispute arose between 
the parties, and Plaintiff brought a civil action seeking damages 
for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.6 
In October 2013, a bench trial was held before Justice Kristen 
 
1. S. Cty. Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon, 116 A.3d 204, 207 (R.I. 2015). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
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E. Rodgers of the superior court.7 At trial, Plaintiff presented 
testimony from three witnesses: Kenneth Bouvier (Bouvier), 
Dennis Scott Heinz (Heinz), and Robert L. Brungraber, Ph.D. 
(Brungraber).8 Bouvier, Plaintiff’s founder and  president,  
testified that in October 2010, Plaintiff sent an invoice to Heinz 
Construction for the additional work performed on the roof of the 
house.9 After receiving two payments from Heinz Construction, 
Plaintiff was told that the Defendants would pay Plaintiff directly 
for its work in the future; however, Bouvier recalled receiving only 
one direct payment from the Defendants.10 
Heinz, Heinz Construction’s “principal,” testified that he 
routinely sought the Defendants’ review and approval of the work 
and change orders that Heinz Construction executed with Plaintiff 
throughout the construction process.11  Heinz  further  testified 
that he was aware of only the two payments from Heinz 
Construction to Plaintiff for the work Plaintiff had performed on 
Defendants’ property, and that he had asked the Defendants to 
directly pay Plaintiff on just one occasion.12 Following Heinz’s 
testimony, Plaintiff presented the testimony of its expert witness, 
Brungraber, a civil engineer in the field of heavy timber 
structures.13 Brungraber testified that he had “reviewed various 
engineering drawings by [P]laintiff as well as various work orders, 
change orders, purchase orders, and invoices.”14 Upon review of 
these items, Brungraber concluded that the amounts Plaintiff 
charged for each part of its work were “‘very reasonable.’”15 
 
7. Id. at 204, 208. 
8. Id. at 208. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. From July-September 2010, “Heinz Construction and [P]laintiff 
executed five change orders relating to the scope of the work for the barn.”   
Id. at 207. 
12. Id. at 208. “In the agreed statement of the facts, the parties stated 
that [P]laintiff had received only two payments from Heinz Construction for 
the work it had performed on [the] [D]efendants’ property: $20,000 paid on 
July 29, 2010, and $24,012.50 paid on August 28, 2010.” Id. 
13. Id. at 208, 209. 
14. Id. at 209. 
15. Id. Brungraber noted that the prices Plaintiff charged “while 
sometimes at the low end of the reasonable price range for each component, 
they were always within the range that he would have charged in the twenty 
years that he worked for a company that engaged in work similar to 
[P]laintiff’s work.” Id. 
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Defendant Brian McMahon (McMahon) testified on behalf of 
the Defendants.16 McMahon testified that Heinz requested that 
the Defendants directly pay Plaintiff $60,100 in September  
2010.17 McMahon added that this was the only time that he had 
directly paid Plaintiff, and that he believed that Heinz 
Construction would be responsible for payments to Plaintiff from 
that point onward.18 McMahon further testified that a few weeks 
after the payment, he was “‘shocked’” when he received an 
“‘accounting’” from Bouvier via email, which reflected over $30,000 
owed to Plaintiff.19 On November 22, 2010,  Bouvier  sent 
McMahon a direct request for final payment, provoking a billing 
dispute between the parties regarding the outstanding balance.20 
Following the bench trial, Justice Rodgers entered judgment 
for the Defendants on the breach of contract claim, and entered 
judgment for Plaintiff on the claim of unjust enrichment.21 The 
trial justice found that Plaintiff had established the  three 
elements of an unjust enrichment claim: (1) that Plaintiff 
conferred a benefit on Defendants valued at $41,549.45; (2) that 
Defendants had appreciated the benefit of Plaintiff’s work; and (3) 
that it would be unjust for Defendants to “‘retain the benefit 
without paying the value thereof.’”22 On October 15, 2013, final 
judgment was entered for Plaintiffs in the amount of $41,549.45 
plus costs, and Defendants appealed.23 Subsequently, Plaintiff 
filed an “Application for Taxation of Costs,” which the trial justice 
granted and Defendants appealed.24 After consolidating the 
Defendants’ appeals, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed 
the superior court’s judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for unjust 
enrichment but vacated and remanded the superior court’s order 
 
 
16. Id. at 208. 
17. Id. at 209. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. “Before trial, the  parties filed an agreed statement of facts,  
which included the parties’ agreement that [P]laintiff’s total unpaid invoices 
equaled $41,549.45.”  Id. at 208. 
23. Id. at 209. 
24. Id at 210. This application for costs filed  by Plaintiff “included the 
filing fee, the costs of four deposition transcripts, the service of one subpoena, 
and the fee for expert witness Brungraber.” Id. 
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to grant Plaintiff’s application for costs in its entirety.25 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the superior court’s judgment, the Supreme 
Court initially sought to determine whether Plaintiff was entitled 
to recovery under the theory of unjust enrichment.26 However, 
before addressing the arguments of the parties on appeal, the 
Court briefly compared unjust enrichment to quantum meruit.27 
The Court declared that in Rhode Island, in order to recover for 
unjust enrichment or quantum meruit, a claimant must prove: “(1) 
that he or she conferred a benefit upon the party from whom relief 
is sought; (2) that the recipient appreciated the benefit; and (3) 
that the recipient accepted the benefit under such circumstances 
that it would be inequitable for [the recipient] to retain the benefit 
without paying the value thereof.”28 The Court determined that 
although Plaintiff brought an action for unjust enrichment, 
Plaintiff “actually [sought] to recover the value of the services 
rendered for which [the] [D]efendants have thus far declined to 
pay, i.e., to recover in quantum meruit.”29  While Plaintiff styled 
its cause of action as one for unjust enrichment, Plaintiff may 
recover under the theory of quantum meruit by proving the same 
three elements.30 
Following this discussion, the Court addressed the 
Defendants’ challenge to the trial justice’s judgment that Plaintiff 
was entitled to recovery under the theory of unjust enrichment.31 
The Defendants argued that the third element of Plaintiff’s unjust 
enrichment claim was not proven, “arguing both that the trial 
justice failed to make any findings of fact specific to this third 
element,  and  that  the  [P]laintiff  failed  to  prove  [D]efendants’ 
 
 
25. Id. at 210, 216. 
26. Id. at 210. Unjust enrichment is defined as “[t]he retention of a 
benefit conferred by another, who offered no compensation, in circumstances 
where compensation is reasonably expected.” Id. (quoting Unjust Enrichment, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
27. Id. at 211. Quantum meruit is defined as “[a] claim or right of action 
for the reasonable value of services rendered.”  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
28. Id. at 210–11 (internal citations omitted). 
29. Id. at 211. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 212. 
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enrichment was unjust.”32 However, the Court rejected 
Defendants’ arguments and found that the trial justice rendered a 
“comprehensive decision from the bench,” in which the trial justice 
properly addressed each element of Plaintiff’s claim and supported 
her conclusions with sufficient factual evidence.33 Specifically, the 
Court stated that “the timing and the content of the emails 
exchanged between the parties and McMahon’s testimony that he 
was aware that [P]laintiff continued to perform work . . . even as 
the parties were discussing account and billing questions,” 
supported the trial justice’s findings.34  Accordingly,  the Court 
held that there was “competent evidence . . . in the record to 
support the trial justice’s conclusion that ‘it would be unjust for  
the [Defendants] to retain the benefit conferred by [Plaintiff] 
without paying the value thereof.’”35 
The Court then addressed the Defendants’ additional 
challenges to the trial justice’s conclusion.36 First, the Defendants 
argued that the trial justice erred in ruling that Plaintiff did not 
have to prove that it lacked an adequate remedy at law before 
finding that the Defendants were unjustly enriched.37 However, 
the Court reaffirmed that unjust enrichment “‘can stand alone as  
a cause action in its own right,’”38 and when such an action stands 
alone, “the presence or absence of an adequate remedy at law is 
simply one of the factors considered in the third element’s 
balancing of the equities and is not determinative of whether 
[P]laintiff can or will prevail as a matter of law.”39  Thus, the  
Court rejected the Defendants’ argument and declared that the 
elements of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit do not require 
that the Plaintiff prove that he or she lacks an adequate remedy  
at law.40 Secondly, the Defendants urged the court to consider the 
possible public policy consequences of affirming the trial justice’s 
 
 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 213. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. (quoting Dellagrotta v. Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d 101, 113 (R.I.  
2005)). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 214. 
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decision.41 Defendants argued that allowing the subcontractor to 
recover against the property owners here “would render every 
property owner a de facto party to subcontracts executed by the 
general.”42 The Court confirmed that it was aware of such policy 
considerations, but reemphasized that the third element requires  
a “fact-specific balancing process” to determine if a party is 
unjustly enriched.43 Here, the Court noted that given the 
undisputed facts of the case and the parties’ direct communication 
throughout the construction process, this decision would not result 
in the public policy concern raised by the Defendants.44 
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $41,549.45.45 
Finally, the Court addressed the Defendants’ second appeal 
challenging the trial justice’s order that granted the Plaintiff’s 
application for costs.46 Upon review of the superior court’s order, 
the Court sought to determine whether the Plaintiff’s expert 
witness fee was taxable as costs.47 The Defendants argued that  
the trial justice erred when she ruled that Brungraber’s fee could 
be taxed as a cost of the cause of action because “the expert’s fee 
was precluded as a recoverable cost by G.L. 1956  § 9-17-22.”48  
The Plaintiff contended that its application for costs was based on 
“§§ 9-22-5 and 9-22-18 and that, pursuant to these statutes, the 
trial justice simply exercised her discretion in allowing 
Brungraber’s fee as a recoverable cost.”49 The Court previously 
held that “‘[c]osts are normally considered the expenses of suing 
another party, including filing fees and fees to serve process. Fees 
to pay expert witnesses would not be included in this definition of 
costs.’”50 Conducting a de novo review of the statutory language, 
the Court ruled that pursuant to sections 9-22-5 and 9-22-18, the 
trial   justice   erred   by  including  Brungraber’s  expert   fee  as a 
 
 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 215 (internal citation omitted). 
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taxable cost.51 Accordingly, the Court vacated the superior court 
order granting the Plaintiff’s application for costs and remanded 
the application to the trial justice with “an instruction to enter a 
new order awarding the Plaintiff all costs for which it applied, 
except Brungraber’s expert witness fee.”52 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly recognized the 
importance of the third element of a claim for unjust enrichment. 
However, as the Court noted, this element cannot be proven 
merely by showing that a subcontractor has conferred a benefit 
upon a property owner.53 Instead, a court “‘must look at the 
equities of each case and decide whether it would be unjust for a 
party to retain the benefit conferred upon it without paying the 
value of such benefit.’”54  It is the primary role of the trial courts  
to examine the facts and balance the equities between the parties 
to determine what would be a just and unjust result.55 The Court 
gives great deference to the trial court’s determination and so long 
as there is competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings, 
then the Court will not substitute its view of the evidence.56 
Here, the Court found that there was a proper balancing of  
the equities by the trial justice. However, the facts of this case 
reveal that the scale tipped in favor of the subcontractor. Through 
an examination of the facts, the trial court determined that it 
would be an unjust result if the property owners retained the 
benefit conferred to them without paying the subcontractor the 
value of the work performed.57 By affirming the trial court’s 
decision, the Court: (1) protected the Plaintiff from being taken 
advantage of; (2) provided a remedy for Plaintiff’s damages by 
awarding the Plaintiff the value of its work performed; and (3) 
barred the Defendants from unjustly benefitting from Plaintiff’s 
work.  It is clear that through its conclusion, the Court seeks to 
 
 
51. Id. at 216. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 212. 
54. Id. (quoting R&B Elec. Co. v. Amco Constr. Co., 471 A.2d 1351, 1356 
(R.I.1984)). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 210. 
57. Id. at 213. 
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(hopefully) deter future property owners in Rhode Island, from 
unjustly benefitting from a subcontractor’s work without properly 
paying for the value of the services rendered to them. 
The Court concluded that the Plaintiff was entitled to  
recovery because it proved each of the three elements of its unjust 
enrichment claim. However, the Court ultimately ruled that 
Plaintiff should instead recover under the theory of quantum 
meruit because Plaintiff sought the value of the services it 
rendered to Defendants. While the theories of unjust enrichment 
and quantum meruit differ slightly, they each require Plaintiff to 
prove the same three elements as the Plaintiff proved in this case. 
Using the “fact-specific balancing process” it is possible that the 
Court could have reached a different outcome.58  Alternatively,   
the Court might have concluded that the facts of the case tipped 
the scale in favor of the property owners. Specifically, the Court 
noted that “the existence of a contract between Plaintiff and Heinz 
Construction is a factor that weigh[ed] against Plaintiff recovering 
the value of its work from Defendants.”59 Here, it seemed that the 
“only reason [P]laintiff [did] not attempt to collect the outstanding 
balance for its work on [D]efendants’ property under its contract 
with Heinz Construction [was] the undisputed fact that [P]laintiff 
want[ed] to maintain a good business relationship with Heinz 
Construction.”60 Due to the contractual relationship, the Court 
could have rejected Plaintiff’s claim, thereby leaving Plaintiff to 
seek the remaining balance from the general contractor. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a subcontractor is 
entitled to recover the value of the work performed under the 
theory of quantum meruit only if the subcontractor proves each of 
the three elements of the claim. The Court determined that the 
third, and most important element, must be proven using a fact- 
specific balancing of the equities to determine if it would be unjust 
for a party to retain the benefit conferred upon it without paying 
 
 
 
 
58. Id. at 214. 
59. Id. at 212. 
60. Id. 
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the value of such benefit. 
 
Brandon Ruggieri 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contract Law. Voccola v. Forte, 139 A.3d 404 (R.I. 2016). A 
transfer of properties from a transferor to a transferee for the 
release of mortgages on the properties is null and void without 
adequate consideration if the transferee was already obligated to 
release the mortgages under a prior settlement agreement. 
Without a finding that donative intent was present, an argument 
that a transfer constitutes a gift must fail. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In 2005, Edward E. Voccola1 sued his son, Stephen Voccola 
(Stephen), and his daughter, Barbara Voccola (Barbara), in 
Providence County Superior Court, seeking to revoke a purported 
gift of stock in a corporation.2 In March 2007, a Settlement 
Agreement was executed by Mr. Voccola and four of his children— 
Barbara, Stephen, Paul Voccola (Paul), and Patricia Forte 
(Patricia).3 The relevant part of the agreement stated: “[Patricia, 
Stephen, Paul, and Barbara] agree forthwith upon the signing of 
this agreement to discharge and/or release all mortgages and 
promissory notes which reference [Mr. Voccola], Jere Realty, Inc., 
Lakeview Realty, Inc., [CCI, WSI, and/or CVR].”4 On or about 
June 4, 2007, “three documents were signed purporting to be 
Waivers of Notice of Minutes of a Special Joint Meetings [sic] of 
 
 
1. The two consolidated actions on appeal in this case were commenced 
by Edward E. Voccola, who passed away on June 25, 2010, during the 
pendency of the case. Marvin Homonoff was the temporary custodian of the 
estate, but was later substituted by Barbara Voccola and Edward R. Voccola 
in their representative capacities. Voccola v. Forte, 139 A.3d 404 n.1 (R.I. 
2016). 
2. Id. at 407. The stock in question was from Redbrook Investments, 
Inc. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. (alterations in original). “Mr. Voccola was the sole shareholder of 
three Rhode Island corporations—Capital City Investments, Inc. (CCI), City 
View Realty, Inc. (CVR), and West Side Investments, Inc. (WSI). Id. Patricia 
was the President of all three corporations during the pendency of this case. 
Id. 
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the Stockholders and Board of Directors of [CCI, CVR, and WSI] 
respectively.”5 The waivers in question were allegedly sought to 
evidence that a meeting and vote took place on May 29, 2007, and 
were all purportedly signed by Mr. Voccola.6 In anticipation of the 
waivers to be signed, Patricia, as President of CCI, CVR, and WSI, 
signed warranty deeds conveying the real estate of those 
corporations to Red Fox Realty, LLC (Red Fox).7 The “signed” 
waivers indicated that the transfer of properties from Mr. 
Voccola’s companies to Red Fox was in exchange for Patricia 
assuming from Mr. Voccola two mortgages on the properties.8 
In response to these conveyances, Mr. Voccola brought suit 
against Patricia and Red Fox (collectively, Defendants) in  
Superior Court, alleging that his signature on the WSI waiver was 
falsified and that Patricia wrongfully transferred his properties.9 
Mr. Voccola also asserted that the transfer of the warranty deeds 
at issue in the case were void because they lacked adequate 
consideration.10 In July 2012, during a seven-day bench trial, the 
court heard from all five of Mr. Voccola’s children, two 
handwriting experts, and two additional witnesses who testified 
that they observed Mr. Voccola sign the property over to  
Patricia.11 The trial justice found that the Settlement Agreement 
from the previous case was the “product of mutuality of assent and 
was supported by adequate consideration,” holding that “[t]he 
mortgages should have been discharged effective as of the date of 
the Settlement Agreement” and that “any subsequent conveyance 
of  property  to  [Patricia],  which  was  performed  in  exchange for 
 
 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. Patricia was the owner of Red Fox Realty, Inc. Id. However, the 
Court noted that the Agreed Statement of Facts in the case indicated that 
“Red Fox was not officially organized as a corporation until June 1, 2007.” Id. 
n.3. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 407–08. In response, the Defendants filed a counterclaim for 
damages of $82,000 for a mortgage Patricia took out to assist Mr. Voccola in 
paying for criminal fines he faced in a matter unrelated to this suit. Id. at 
408. 
11. Id. at 408–11. The Agreed Statement of Facts provided that 
testimony of “discussions by and between conversations between [Mr. 
Voccola] and any of his children . . . shall not be deemed to be hearsay but 
shall be accepted into evidence . . . .”  Id. at 408 (first alteration in original). 
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[Patricia’s] release of mortgages on those properties, was done 
without consideration.”12 
The trial justice indicated that she gave little weight to 
Patricia’s evidence regarding the Settlement Agreement and  
found that the two eye witnesses were “biased” due to the 
relationship they had with Patricia.13 The trial justice accepted 
some of Stephen’s testimony about Mr. Voccola’s intent to recover 
the properties; however, she gave little weight to the other 
siblings’ testimony due to the “divisive nature” of their 
relationship.14 In regard to the handwriting specialists, the trial 
justice accepted the Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony and found that 
the Defendants’ expert was not credible.15 After analyzing the 
information before her, the trial justice determined that the 
signatures were not Mr. Voccola’s and held that the deeds, which 
transferred Mr. Voccola’s properties, were void.16 The trial justice 
also concluded that Patricia breached her fiduciary duties to CCI, 
CVR, and WSI for self-dealing and rejected Patricia’s argument 
that the conveyance of property was a gift because there was no 
evidence of donative intent.17 The Defendants then filed a timely 
notice of appeal. 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
At the outset, the Rhode Island Supreme Court made clear 
that the factual findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury are 
given “great weight,”18 and a significant amount of deference is 
given to the “[trial justice’s credibility]  determinations . . . .”19  
The Court first sought to determine the validity of the waivers 
 
12. Id. at 411 (alteration in original). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 412. 
15. Id. The trial justice indicated that the Defendants’ expert testimony 
was not credible because “he reached a conclusion on the validity of the 
signature before he prepared his report.” Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. In regard to the Patricia’s counterclaim, the trial justice found  
her testimony credible and that she was able to establish the damages she 
prayed for. Id. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on the  
decision of the counterclaim, which was later denied. Id. 
18. Id. at 412–13 (emphasis in original) (quoting Wellington Condo. 
Ass’n v. Wellington Cove Condo. Ass’n, 68 A.3d 594, 599 (R.I. 2013)). 
19. Id. at 413 (alteration in original) (quoting Banville v. Brennan, 84 
A.3d 424, 430 (R.I. 2014)). 
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and the validity of the transfer of property from Mr. Voccola’s 
businesses to Red Fox.20  In doing so, the Court recognized that  
the Defendants spent significant time arguing the signatures’ 
authenticity in their appellate argument but concluded that it was 
unnecessary to decide the genuineness of the signatures on appeal 
because Patricia’s agreement to release the mortgages for the 
conveyance of the properties was done without consideration.21 
In describing the fundamental principles of contract law, the 
Court explained that to determine whether sufficient 
consideration exists, it “employ[s] the bargained-for exchange 
test,”22 and that “[a] promise to carry out a preexisting contractual 
obligation owed to the promisee, or the performance of such a 
contractual duty, generally is not sufficient consideration . . . .”23 
Looking to the 2007 Settlement Agreement, the Court found that 
it was clear that Patricia was obligated to release the mortgages 
she held on the properties.24 The Court determined that because 
the Settlement Agreement was signed prior to the waivers, 
Patricia was already required to release the mortgages.25 Thus,  
the Court found Patricia’s subsequent transfer of property for 
releasing the mortgages lacked consideration because she was 
already legally obligated to release the mortgages under the 
Settlement Agreement.26 The Court rejected Patricia’s argument 
that because she was not a party in the 2005 lawsuit, she was “not 
bound” by the Settlement Agreement.27 The Court explained that 
although Patricia was not a party in the 2005 suit, she did in fact 
sign the Settlement Agreement and had an “interest in the 
resolution of the 2005 suit” because of her shareholder status in a 
company with a dispute that was resolved in the Settlement 
Agreement.28 The Court concluded that the  Settlement  
Agreement was a “valid and enforceable” contract and that the 
 
 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 414 (quoting DeAngelis v. DeAngelis, 923 A.2d 1274, 1279 (R.I. 
2007)). 
23. Id. (citing 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 153 at 533 (2011)). 
24. Id. (citing Rivera v. Gagnon, 847 A.2d 280, 284 (R.I. 2004)). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 414–15 (citing DeLuca v. City of Cranston, 22 A.3d 382, 384 
(R.I. 2011)). 
27. Id. at 415. 
28. Id. 
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three warranty deeds were null and void because they lacked 
adequate consideration.29 
Next, the Court considered the claim that Mr. Voccola’s 
transfer of properties was a gift to Patricia.30 Patricia argued that 
the trial justice improperly looked to Mr. Voccola’s actions after  
the signing of the waivers instead of his present intent at the time 
of the alleged gift and that adequate consideration was not given 
to Mr. Voccola’s statements prior to the signings.31 The Court 
explained that donative intent is essential to the existence of a gift 
and that it is proper to look at subsequent acts if it were unclear 
what the donor’s intention was at the time of the alleged gift.32 
The Court reasoned that the “gift” at issue did not resemble the 
typical gift that a parent gives a child; rather, the act resembled a 
business conveyance of properties from “three corporations to one 
corporation.”33 The Court reiterated that it gives great deference 
to the trial justice’s determinations and concluded it was unclear 
what Mr. Voccola’s donative intent was at the time he allegedly 
signed the waivers.34 By looking at Mr. Voccola’s subsequent acts, 
the Court determined that a gift was not intended.35 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court faced the challenge of 
settling a long-standing family dispute between Mr. Voccola and 
his five children.36 In doing so, the Court was tasked with 
determining whether Mr. Voccola’s corporations were rightfully 
transferred to the Defendants.37 The Court had to examine the 
issue of whether the waivers and transfer of the properties were 
valid.38 It was interesting that the Court spent significant time in 
its opinion recapping the testimony given by each witness at trial, 
 
29. Id. (citing DeLuca, 22 A.3d at 384). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 416 (citing Ferer v. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co., 732 N.W.2d 667, 
674 (Neb. 2007)). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 417 (citing Ferer, 732 N.W.2d at 674). 
35. Id. The Court then accepted the trial justice’s findings for Patricia’s 
counterclaim for $82,000.  Id. at 419. 
36. Id. at 407. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 413. 
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but ultimately relied little on that testimony for its holding. The 
Court simply looked to see if Patricia was bound by the previous 
Settlement Agreement to determine whether there was adequate 
consideration for the subsequent transfer of properties.39 Finding 
that Patricia was bound under the earlier Settlement Agreement 
to release Mr. Voccola from the mortgages on those properties, the 
Court persuasively resolved the issue by applying a basic principle 
of contract law: “when a party performs an obligation owed under 
a preexisting contract, the law ordinarily will regard a demand by 
that party for additional benefits as void for lack of 
consideration.”40 Thus, the Court’s in depth overview of the 
testimony from trial seemed futile. 
Moreover, the Court recapitulated the trial court’s decision by 
examining some of its important findings.41 In doing so, the Court 
stated that the “trial justice . . . found that Patricia, as President 
of CCI, CVR, and WSI, breached her fiduciary duties by engaging 
in self-dealing when she transferred the properties at issue to her 
own company for no consideration.”42 The Court, however, left the 
discussion of fiduciary duty at that. Being that the case involved 
the transfer of properties between corporations, it was  
conspicuous that the Court did not elaborate more on the trial 
justice’s finding that Patricia breached her fiduciary duty. The 
issue of the genuineness of the signatures and the lack of 
consideration seemed to be directly related to Patricia’s role as 
President of those companies. Arguably, the Court could have 
elaborated more on this finding to clarify whether a breach of a 
fiduciary duty occurred. 
Lastly, the Court explored the Defendants’ claim that the 
transfer of properties was a gift from Mr. Voccola.43 In resolving 
this issue, the Court focused on donative intent and the delivery 
requirement.44 The Court recognized that Mr. Voccola’s valid 
signatures on the waivers would have helped support  an 
argument for donative intent; however, the Court accepted  the 
trial justice’s findings that the testimony was not credible and 
 
39. Id. at 414. 
40. Id. (citing 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 153 at 535 (2011)). 
41. Id. at 408. 
42. Id. at 412. 
43. Id. at 415. 
44. Id. at 416. 
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held that no donative intent was found.45 Although it can be 
argued that the Court could have further examined the signature 
issue in regard to donative intent before coming to its conclusion, 
the Court reiterated its precedent in giving significant deference  
to the trial justice’s findings.46 To further demonstrate that 
deference, the Court accepted the trial justice’s findings on 
Patricia’s $82,000 counterclaim.47 The Court, in looking at both  
the findings and the evidence, consistently relied on the trial 
justice’s determinations and found no error.48 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld a trial justice’s 
decision finding that the transfer of the three properties from the 
Plaintiff to the Defendants for the release of mortgages on the 
properties was executed without adequate consideration because 
one of the Defendants was already obligated to release the 
mortgages under a prior Settlement Agreement. The Court also 
found that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s 
determination that the transfer of the properties was not a gift 
because no clear donative intent was present. Lastly, the Court 
accepted the trial justice’s findings that the Defendant’s 
counterclaim for damages was proper. 
 
Tyler Bischoff 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45. Id. at 417. 
46. See id. at 417–18. 
47. Id. at 418. 
48. Id. at 419. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criminal Law. State v. Breton, 138 A.3d 800 (R.I. 2016). On a 
motion for a new trial, a trial court justice must analyze the 
evidence in front of him to determine if he would reach a different 
conclusion than the jury, and in doing so, the trial justice has the 
discretion to find that a witness is credible, even though a witness’s 
testimony may be inconsistent at times. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On October 25, 2011, a masked assailant stabbed Dilicia Lora 
(Lora) as she was leaving her apartment to go to work.1 Lora 
suffered several lacerations, leaving her face permanently scarred.2 
Lora identified her attacker as the Defendant, Jose Breton (Breton), 
after pulling his mask up to his nose and recognizing the bottom 
half of his face.3 When she arrived at the hospital, Lora told her 
doctors about Breton’s past abusive and threatening behavior 
toward her, and that she did not report this abuse to police out of 
fear of retaliation from Breton.4 
The day after the attack, Lora explained to police that she 
identified Breton as the attacker because she was able to recognize 
a portion of the attacker’s face and the particular ski mask worn by 
the attacker, which belonged to Breton, in addition to the fact that 
Breton was the only person who had threatened Lora prior to the 
attack.5 At that meeting, Lora also told police about the 
tumultuous, two-year relationship she shared with Breton.6 
 
1. State v. Breton, 138 A.3d 800, 802 (R.I. 2016). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. Lora told her family that “Pappi” had attacked her immediately 
after the attack; Breton also went by the name “Pappi Valdez.” Id. at 801, 802. 
4. Id. at 802. 
5. Id. Lora told police that Breton had told her that if she did not stay 
with him, Breton would “kill [her]”, “take [her] eyes out,” or “leave [her] 
paralyzed.”  Id. (alterations in original). 
6. Id. at 801–02. At one point in the relationship, Lora left Rhode Island 
to stay with her mother in the Dominican Republic to get away from Breton. 
Id. at 801. When Breton traveled to the Dominican Republic as an attempt to 
win back her favor by offering to partake in counseling, Lora refused, and 
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In May 2010, police responded to a domestic incident between 
Breton, Lora, and Lora’s daughter, Jani Tolentino (Tolentino), 
where Breton hit and pushed Tolentino after an argument.7 When 
police responded to this incident, Lora told police that she did not 
know Breton’s real name and that they had only known each other 
for a few months, when in fact, the two had been dating for two 
years.8 At trial, Lora indicated that she was not truthful with the 
police on this particular occasion because she was afraid of Breton.9 
The State charged Breton with one count of assault with a 
dangerous weapon and one count of simple assault on Lora.10 
Breton  was  also  charged  with  one  count  of  simple  assault  on 
Tolentino, stemming from the May 2010 incident.11 
At trial, Breton offered two alibi witnesses who suggested that 
he was in New York City from 3:30 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. on the day of 
the attack.12 Breton’s mother, Ana Cruz, testified that she picked 
Breton up on the night of October 24, 2011, and dropped him off in 
Manhattan with another family member, Femije Tairi (Tairi), on 
her way to a family funeral in Virginia.13 Tairi testified that she 
met Breton in Manhattan around 3:30 a.m. on October 25, 2011, 
and traveled with him to her apartment in Brooklyn after Breton’s 
mother left to continue driving to the funeral.14 Tairi said that she 
talked with Breton for about two hours, until 6:00 a.m., when 
another family member visited the apartment to grieve.15 Tairi 
testified that Breton stayed at her residence in Brooklyn until 
around 10:00 p.m. on October 25, 2011, when Cruz picked Breton 
up on the drive home from the funeral and returned him to Rhode 
Island.16 
The jury convicted Breton on the two counts of assault against 
 
 
Breton traveled back to Rhode Island. Id. Lora eventually moved back to 
Rhode Island in 2011, and though she worked with the mother of Breton’s 
child, Lora attempted to avoid him.  Id. at 801–02. 
7. Id. at 801. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 802–03. 
13. Id. at 802. 
14. Id. at 802–03. 
15. Id. at 803. 
16. Id. 
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Lora but reached a verdict of acquittal for the third count of assault 
against Tolentino.17 Breton then moved for a new trial, challenging 
that the verdict was “against the weight of the evidence” because 
Lora’s testimony, specifically her statement that she could identify 
her attacker in a short period of time in a dimly lit stairway, was 
not credible.18 Breton also argued that the State was unable to 
demonstrate doubt of his alibi after the testimony of both of his alibi 
witnesses.19 
After considering the testimony, the trial justice found both 
Lora and Tolentino to be credible witnesses, though there were 
some questions about Lora’s ability to identify Breton during the 
attack.20 On the other hand, the trial justice had some doubts about 
the testimony of the alibi witnesses, leading him to question their 
credibility.21 After weighing the credibility of all of the witnesses 
and the relevant evidence, the trial justice determined that he could 
not come to a different conclusion than the jury, and therefore 
denied Breton’s motion for a new trial.22 On appeal, Breton argued 
that the trial justice “misconstrued” evidence when he found Lora 
to be more credible than either of Breton’s alibi witnesses.23 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that 
it would overturn the trial justice’s decision to deny Defendant’s 
motion for a new trial only if the decision was clearly erroneous or 
“the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material and relevant 
evidence . . . .”24 The Court took into account the role of the trial 
justice in determining if a new trial is appropriate, which was to act 
as a “superjuror” and “(1) consider the evidence in light of the jury 
charge, (2) independently assess the credibility of the witnesses and 
the weight of the evidence, and then (3) determine whether he or 
she would have reached a result different from that reached by the 
 
17. Id. at 801. 
18. Id. at 803. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 804. 
21. Id. Specifically, the trial justice questioned the timing of a family 
gathering in New York at 6:00 a.m., and its relationship to the timing of the 
alleged attack. Id. 
22. Id. at 801, 805. 
23. Id. at 801. 
24. Id. at 803–04 (quoting Battle v. State, 125 A.3d 130, 132 (R.I. 2015)). 
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jury.”25 
The Court focused its analysis on the trial justice’s examination 
of the witnesses’ credibility.26 Specifically, the Court considered 
the fact that the trial justice took into account several issues with 
Lora’s identification of her attacker, including the poor lighting, 
short period of time, Lora’s inability to identify the weapon in the 
attack, Lora’s prior reluctance to identify the victim in the May 
2010 incident, and the elapsed time since the October 2011 
incident.27 Additionally, the Court considered the trial justice’s 
assessment of Breton’s alibi witnesses.28 
After reviewing the analysis of the evidence by the trial justice, 
the Court determined that the trial justice “satisfied his 
obligations” in his role as a “superjuror” when he denied Breton’s 
motion for a new trial because he examined all of the evidence, 
made credibility determinations, and decided that he would not 
have come to a conclusion contrary to the jury’s conclusion.29 
Additionally, the Court concluded that even though there may have 
been some inconsistency in Lora and Tolentino’s testimony, the 
trial justice acted within his discretion to find these witnesses 
credible.30 
COMMENTARY 
In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the 
principle that when considering a motion for a new trial, a trial 
justice should examine all of the evidence, make credibility 
determinations about the witnesses, and grant a motion for a new 
trial only if after making these considerations, the trial justice 
would have come to a different conclusion than the jury about the 
verdict.31 Though there were some questions in this case about the 
credibility of the State’s main witness, Lora, the trial justice was 
within his discretion to determine her testimony to be credible.32 
Though the Court will overturn a decision on a motion for a 
 
 
25. Id. at 803 (quoting State v. Offley, 131 A.3d 663, 674 (R.I. 2016)). 
26. Id. at 804. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 803, 805. 
30. Id. at 805. 
31. Id. at 803. 
32. Id. at 805. 
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new trial if the trial justice misconstrued relevant evidence, the 
Court indicates that the trial justice’s analysis of the credibility of 
witnesses is discretionary, and therefore a defendant faces a high 
bar to overturn the decision.33 It is important that the Court gives 
the trial justice this broad range of discretion to make credibility 
determinations in criminal cases, and specifically motions for a new 
trial, because the trial justice has the opportunity to observe the 
witnesses live at trial. Indeed, the Court specifically noted that the 
trial justice considered the witnesses’ attitudes, body language, and 
demeanor in his credibility determination.34 If the Court were to 
follow a different standard of review, such as a de novo instead of 
“clearly erroneous,” it would undermine the importance of the trial 
justice’s observation of a live witness to assess body language as 
well as oral testimony. The trial justice is in a much better position 
that the appellate court to determine credibility, which, in this case, 
was essential to proving the State’s case. Therefore, the Court will 
defer to the trial courts with these determinations unless there is 
clear error by the trial justice.35 
CONCLUSION 
A trial justice has the discretion to make credibility 
determinations and may find a witness credible even though 
testimony may present some inconsistencies. The Court, on review 
of a motion for a new trial in a criminal case, will give broad 
discretion to these credibility determinations by the trial justice. 
 
Kelsey A. Hayward 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33. Id. at 803–04. 
34. Id. at 804. 
35. Id. at 803. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criminal Law. State v. Burgess, 138 A.3d 195 (R.I. 2016). A first-
time informant’s tip that does not include a statement  against 
interest, which serves as the basis for the informant’s knowledge 
of criminal activity or predictive detail, is not sufficient to 
establish probable cause to arrest a suspect. If the informant’s tip 
does not establish probable cause on its own, police must conduct 
an independent investigation to corroborate the tip to establish 
probable cause before making an arrest. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On October 26, 2011, during a routine traffic stop, Officer 
Brian Macera realized the passenger in the vehicle had an 
outstanding warrant for his arrest.1 To avoid  arrest,  the 
passenger told Macera that a “clean-shaven, African American 
male with short-cropped hair and a thin build was distributing 
crack cocaine in the vicinity of Providence and Cranston.”2 The 
passenger-now-informant also told the officer the man, nicknamed 
“CJ,” drove a blue Mercury with Rhode Island license plates and 
that he would be at the Royal Buffet restaurant in Cranston 
around 4:00 p.m.3 
After receiving this information and contacting the Rhode 
Island State Police High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task 
Force (task force), Macera and several members of the task force 
formed a police perimeter around the shopping plaza in which the 
Royal  Buffet  was  located;  the   informant   was  also  present  to 
 
 
1. State v. Burgess, 138 A.3d 195, 196 (R.I. 2016). 
2. Id. at 197. The Court was troubled by the fact that police neither 
arrested the informant pursuant to the outstanding warrant for this arrest, 
nor charged him with any crime.  Id. at 198 n.6. 
3. Id. at 197. The evidence is unclear whether the informant told 
Macera that CJ was at the Royal Buffet or that CJ would arrive at the 
restaurant soon. During the suppression hearing, Macera testified that the 
informant told him CJ was presently at the restaurant; however, at trial, 
Macera testified that the informant called CJ around 3:00 p.m. and then told 
Macera CJ would be at the Royal Buffet close to 4:00 p.m.  Id. n.3. 
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provide visual confirmation of the suspect.4 Neither Macera nor 
any member of the task force attempted to find a blue Mercury in 
the parking lot, claiming there were too many vehicles in the lot.5 
The Defendant, who matched the informant’s physical description, 
walked out of the restaurant, and the informant identified him as 
CJ.6 Macera and the team “surrounded” the Defendant, had him 
put his hands on a vehicle, and conducted a pat-down search.7 
During the pat-down search, Macera felt an unidentifiable bulge  
in the Defendant’s front pocket, removed the object, and 
discovered sixty-two dollars in cash.8 After Macera read the 
Defendant his Miranda rights and explained that the Defendant 
was suspected of selling drugs, the Defendant initially denied 
possessing any drugs.9 After Macera observed that the Defendant 
appeared nervous and smelled of burnt marijuana, the Defendant 
admitted to smoking marijuana earlier that day, and Macera told 
the Defendant a K-9 unit was on its way.10 In response, the 
Defendant said, “[i]t’s in my pocket.”11 Macera then searched the 
Defendant and found two bags of crack cocaine in the waistband of 
Defendant’s jacket.12 After Macera discovered the crack cocaine, 
the Defendant identified his vehicle as a blue Chevrolet Impala 
with Rhode Island license plates.13 
Charged with one count of possession of cocaine, the 
Defendant moved to suppress the two bags of crack cocaine as well 
as all statements made to Macera, arguing his arrest was invalid 
because Macera lacked probable cause at the time of arrest and  
the search of his jacket violated both the state and federal 
constitutions.14 The trial justice denied the Defendant’s motion to 
suppress, finding police had probable cause to arrest the 
Defendant because Macera testified that the Defendant smelled of 
 
 
 
4. Id. at 197. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 197–98. 
9. Id. at 198. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
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marijuana, appeared nervous, and stated, “[i]ts in my pocket.”15 
The trial justice also relied on police “surveillance” of the Royal 
Buffet before the police apprehended the Defendant and the  
match between Defendant’s physical appearance and the 
informant’s description of CJ.16 At trial, a jury convicted the 
Defendant of the charged crime; thereafter, the Defendant 
appealed the trial justice’s denial of the motion to suppress.17 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon reviewing the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court deferred to the trial justice’s 
findings of fact and reviewed the issue of probable cause de novo.18 
The State conceded the Defendant was under arrest from the 
moment the police surrounded him outside the restaurant.19 The 
Court emphasized that “[a] valid arrest must be supported by 
probable cause at its inception[,]” and information obtained after 
an initial arrest cannot be used to show probable cause.20 The 
Court looked to the evidence the trial justice relied upon to find 
probable cause and found the only pre-arrest evidence that could 
support probable cause was the informant’s tip, the “surveillance” 
of the shopping plaza, the Defendant leaving the Royal Buffet, and 
the similarity between the Defendant’s appearance and the 
informant’s description.21 The Court held these  facts  alone did 
not support probable cause for the Defendant’s arrest.22 
First, the Court stated probable cause exists when the  
officer’s knowledge of the circumstances is based on reasonably 
trustworthy information and is sufficient for a reasonably cautious 
person to believe the suspect has committed an offense.23 The 
Court examined the reliability and potential bias of the tip based 
on the totality of the circumstances.24 Here, the Court found the 
informant’s  tip  to  be  unreliable  because  the  police  were  not 
 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. (citing State v. Chum, 54 A.3d 455, 460 (R.I. 2012)). 
19. Id. at 199. 
20. Id. (citing State v. Ortiz, 824 A.2d 473, 480 (R.I. 2003)). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. (citing Chum, 54 A.3d at 462). 
24. Id. at 200 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). 
  
 
 
762  ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:759 
 
familiar with the informant, and the informant’s tip did  not 
include any statements against his interest or serve as the basis 
for his or her knowledge of the crime.25 Although the existence of 
these factors increases the likelihood the informant is being 
truthful, the Court stated that these factors are not conclusive on 
the issue of reliability.26 The State argued that the informant had 
an interest in being truthful because he was in police custody at 
the time he or she gave the tip.27 However, the Court rejected this 
argument because the informant did not make any statements 
admitting involvement in a crime.28 Additionally, the Court found 
the informant unreliable because he did not tell police the basis  
for his knowledge, which could have included facts such as him 
purchasing cocaine from the Defendant or his involvement in drug 
dealing with the Defendant.29 Lastly, the Court found the 
informant’s accurate description of the Defendant’s physical 
appearance, vehicle, and location under cut the tip’s reliability 
because it did not describe the illegal activity.30 The State argued 
the tip contained predictive information that the Defendant would 
be at the Royal Buffet around 4:00 p.m.;31 however, the Court 
found that, even if this were true, knowledge about the 
Defendant’s physical appearance and future location had no 
bearing on the informant’s claim that the Defendant was in 
possession of crack cocaine.32 
 
25.  Id. at 200, 201 (citing State v. Read, 416 A.2d 684, 689 (R.I. 1980)).  
The Court distinguished this informant from an informant who provided 
reliable information to police for six months. Id. at 200–01 (citing Draper v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 309, 312–13, 313 (1959)). 
26. Id. at 200 (citing Draper, 358 U.S. at 309, 312–13, 313). 
27. Id. at 201. 
28. Id. The Court distinguished this informant’s statement from an 
informant’s statement that admitted to police that the informant bought 
marijuana from a certain address.  Id. (citing Read, 416 A.2d at 689). 
29. Id. at 201–02 (citations omitted) (comparing this informant’s tip to 
informants’ statements in six other cases where the basis of those informants’ 
knowledge was his or her involvement in the crime). The basis of knowledge 
can be derived from legal as well as illegal interaction with the suspect, but 
the Court highlights that the informant’s statement against penal interest is 
closely tied to his basis of knowledge and provides case examples where the 
basis of knowledge stemmed from illegal involvement with the suspect. Id. at 
201. 
30. Id. at 202. 
31. Id. at 203. 
32. Id. (comparing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 309-10 (1959), 
United  States  v.  Miller,  925  F.2d  695,  697  (4th  Cir.  1991),  and  State v. 
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Next, the Court analyzed whether, even if the informant’s tip 
was unreliable on its own, independent police investigation 
corroborated the tip to establish probable cause.33 The Court 
determined the police did not sufficiently corroborate the 
informant’s tip to establish probable cause because the 
investigation only consisted of creating a perimeter around the 
shopping plaza and confirming the Defendant matched the 
informant’s description.34 The police failed to corroborate the 
informant’s description of the Defendant’s vehicle either by 
searching the parking lot, claiming that the parking lot was too 
large, or by conducting a records check.35 Based on these findings, 
the Court found police efforts insufficient to corroborate the 
informant’s tip to establish probable cause.36 
Finally, the Court concluded that the Defendant’s arrest 
lacked probable cause because the circumstances were not 
sufficient to cause a reasonable person with Macera’s knowledge  
at the time of arrest to believe Defendant committed a crime.37 
Therefore, the Court held the Defendant’s arrest was invalid, and 
the trial court should have granted the Defendant’s motion to 
suppress his statements to the police.38 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court set out a test to determine 
when an individual’s right to be protected from unlawful arrest 
and subsequent seizure of evidence can be outweighed by law 
enforcement’s interest in using information gathered from 
informants to find and arrest suspected criminals.39 While an 
informant’s tip can be helpful to police, the Court emphasized the 
importance of examining the totality of the circumstances to 
determine if the information is reliable and the basis for the 
informant’s knowledge, as well as police efforts to corroborate the 
 
 
Keohane, 814 A.2d 327, 330 (R.I. 2003)). 
33. Id. (citations omitted). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 204–05 (examining Draper, 358 U.S. 309-13, United States v. 
Tyler, 238 F.3d 1036, 1038–39 (8th Cir. 2001), and Miller, 925 F.2d 699–700). 
38. Id. at 205. 
39. Id. at 200. 
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informant’s tip, before making an arrest.40 To maintain the  
fluidity of probable cause, the Court considered all relevant factors 
in determining the reliability of the informant’s tip, stating no 
factor to be conclusive on its own.41 
The Court expressed concern with allowing a first-time 
informant’s physical description of another person in conjunction 
with a statement that the person is involved in unlawful activity, 
unconfirmed by independent police investigation, to establish 
probable cause.42 If the facts here were enough to establish 
probable cause, a person with minimal, easily obtained knowledge 
about another person could theoretically send police to arrest 
nearly anyone against whom they had a personal vendetta. The 
doctrine of probable cause aims to prevent this exact type of arrest 
by requiring a police officer’s knowledge of the  circumstances, 
prior to arrest, to be based on “reasonably trustworthy 
information” and “sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution” to believe the suspect committed a crime.43 
On the other hand, the Court also has an interest in allowing 
police officers to use an informant’s tip to arrest suspected 
criminals so long as the tip is reasonably reliable. The Court 
discussed circumstances in which the informant’s tip could be 
sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause, such as if the 
police are familiar with the informant, if the informant makes a 
statement against his or her interest or gives the basis for his or 
her knowledge, and if the description of the suspect is highly 
detailed.44 In this case, the Court found the informant’s tip lacked 
all of these factors, concluding that the police lacked probable 
cause at the time of the Defendant’s arrest.45 
The Court’s holding does not deny officers the ability to use a 
potentially unreliable tip, but provides police officers the 
opportunity  to  test  the reliability  of an  informant’s  tip through 
 
 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 204 (finding no other case where probable cause found in 
similar circumstances). 
43. Id. at 199 (quoting State v. Chum, 54 A.3d 455, 462 (R.I. 2012)). 
44. Id. at 200–03. 
45. Id. at 200–03 (majority opinion), 205 (Robinson, J., concurring) 
(finding the key factor to be that the informant did not advise police of the 
basis of his or her assertion). 
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their own investigation before making an arrest.46 In this case,  
the Court acknowledged that the State would have had a stronger 
argument that the informant’s information was reliable had the 
officers taken further steps to verify the reliability of the 
informant’s tip, such as, at a minimum, checking the parking lot 
for a vehicle matching the informant’s description.47 The Court’s 
holding encourages police officers to do their due diligence before 
relying on an unreliable tip. 
In sum, the Court’s analysis and holding emphasized the 
importance of examining the reliability of an informant’s tip under 
the totality of the circumstances to establish probable cause prior 
to arresting a suspect.48 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held an informant’s tip is 
not sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause if the 
informant is a first-time informer, gives no basis for his or her 
knowledge, makes no statements against interest, and gives 
insufficient detail of the Defendant’s appearance and activities. 
However, an informant’s tip can be corroborated with independent 
police investigation to test the accuracy of the informant’s 
information. 
Samantha Armstrong 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46. Id. at 200, 203 (majority opinion). 
47. Id. at 203. The Court appears generally unhappy with the police’s 
behavior because the police also failed to execute the warrant for the 
informant’s arrest in exchange for the tip.  Id. at 198 n.6. 
48. Id. at 205. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criminal Law. State v. Davis, 131 A.3d 679 (R.I. 2016). An 
objection made in a conference with a trial justice may adequately 
preserve the record for appeal, even if no objection is made 
contemporaneously during the trial. An opening statement is not 
so prejudicial as to require a limiting instruction where the trial 
justice took steps to inform the jury during the trial that 
statements from counsel are not evidence. Giving a jury 
instruction regarding eyewitness testimony is within the trial 
justice’s discretion and is only reviewable for abuse. Objections 
made during motions in limine must be renewed 
contemporaneously during the trial in order to be properly 
preserved for appeal. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Dominique Gay was murdered while walking with two of his 
friends, Dean Robinson and Wilson Andujar, on March 20, 2009.1 
Gay had a child with Crystal Dutra, and after the end of their 
relationship, Dutra began a relationship with Miguel Davis 
(Defendant).2 Gay began to harass the Defendant in various ways 
between 2007 and 2009, including challenging him to fights.3 
On the day of the murder, Andujar testified that he was 
walking, with Robinson on his right and Gay on his left, to 
Robinson’s house after eating at a restaurant.4 As the  three 
walked towards an alley, Andujar heard the sound of gravel 
coming from his left.5 Andujar looked and saw the Defendant 
pointing a gun at the group.6 Andujar heard the first shot and 
attempted to run away, but he slipped and then heard a second 
 
 
 
1. State v. Davis, 131 A.3d 679, 682 (R.I. 2016). 
2. Id. at 682–83. 
3. Id. at 683. 
4. Id. at 684. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
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shot.7 
Andujar testified that he saw the Defendant wielding a black 
handgun and wearing a hoodie with the hood pulled over part of 
his head and a bandana that covered his face “from the tip of his 
nose passed his chin.”8 Andujar had known the Defendant “for a 
couple of weeks” three years prior to the shooting when they were 
in school together.9 Andujar further testified that he did not 
immediately recognize the Defendant, but that it had later  
“clicked in [his] head who [he] just saw.”10  When  questioned at 
the police station, Andujar told police he did not know who the 
shooter was, but he later testified he feared retaliation if he 
disclosed this knowledge.11 Three years after the shooting, and 
after seeing a news video online of the Defendant being arraigned 
for Gay’s murder, Andujar identified the Defendant as Gay’s 
shooter to the police.12 
In the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor informed the 
jurors that they would be hearing from Robinson, and that he 
would testify that: 1) he saw the Defendant and knew it was him 
from the moment he saw him, and 2) he informed Dutra that the 
Defendant was the shooter.13 Robinson was also expected to tell 
the jury that in November 2012, he ran into the Defendant who 
told him to stop talking to the police.14 The same day that 
Robinson was supposed to testify, his attorney informed the court 
that Robinson would invoke his Fifth Amendment rights.15 The 
Defendant did not move for a mistrial when this occurred.16 
During the trial, the State called Kevin Santiago to testify 
regarding the Defendant’s access to guns based on what the 
Defendant had  confided in him.17    Santiago  testified  that  while 
 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 685. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 687–88. 
14. Id. at 688. 
15. Id. Robinson’s attorney advised him to invoke his rights, perhaps 
because Robinson was with Andujar and Gay that morning for the purpose of 
finding a way to smoke marijuana, and they even purchased a cigar for that 
purpose before going to the restaurant.  Id. at 684. 
16. Id. at 688. 
17. Id. at 686. 
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the grandfather of the Defendant’s girlfriend (Lisa) was out of 
town, Lisa and the Defendant had used his home for their 
“liaisons.”18 While his girlfriend was in the bathroom, the 
Defendant discovered a few guns, including a 9 mm handgun.19 
Santiago also testified that the Defendant confessed to him that  
he had murdered Gay.20 The State offered testimony from Lisa’s 
aunt that she had checked on the home while the grandfather was 
away and found no handgun under the mattress where it was 
kept.21 
At the end of the State’s case, the Defendant moved for a 
limiting instruction to be given to the jury that would require the 
jury to disregard anything the State said regarding Robinson in  
its opening statement, or in the alternative, that the Defendant be 
allowed to mention Robinson’s absence from the State’s case in his 
closing.22 “Because Robinson was unavailable as a matter of law,” 
the trial justice denied both of these motions.23 After jury 
instructions were given, both parties were called for a conference 
to express any concerns regarding the instructions given.24 The 
Defendant did not renew his objection at this conference.25 
The Defendant filed an appeal alleging reversible error by the 
trial justice for not giving the jury a limiting instruction with 
regard to the State’s opening statement or instructions regarding 
eyewitness testimony. The Defendant also argued his motion for a 
new trial should have been granted. 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
As an initial matter, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought 
to determine if the Defendant made an adequate objection to the 
State’s opening argument.26 The Court held that the Defendant 
adequately preserved the record when the Defendant requested 
the  limiting  instructions  during  a  charging  conference  the day 
 
18. Id. 
19. Id. Forensic evidence showed that the Defendant had been shot with 
two 9 mm bullets. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 687. 
22. Id. at 690. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 691. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
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before the jury was instructed, reasoning that to deny this would 
be “elevating form over substance.”27 Because the  Defendant 
failed only to renew the objection after the trial justice had 
instructed the jury, the Court held that the record was adequately 
preserved.28 
The jury instructions “need only [to] adequately cover[] the 
law.”29 “[A]n erroneous charge warrants reversal only if it can be 
shown that the jury ‘could have been misled’ to the resultant 
prejudice of the complaining party.”30 Because the State made its 
opening statement in good faith, believing that Robinson would 
testify, the Court only addressed whether the opening statement 
was “so prejudicial that the trial justice was required to give 
specific limiting instructions.”31 The Court held that the limiting 
instruction was not needed because the trial justice repeatedly 
reminded the jury that anything the attorneys said was not to be 
considered evidence.32 
The Defendant also wanted the jury to be read a list of factors 
to consider when evaluating eyewitness testimony because of how 
unreliable the Defendant believed Andujar’s testimony  was.33  
The Court noted that it had previously held that judges are not 
permitted to comment on evidence unless done so in an impartial 
way; however, it had approved jury instructions regarding the 
reliability of eyewitnesses in past cases.34 Because of this, the 
Court held that whether to give a jury instruction regarding the 
reliability of eyewitness testimony remains within the discretion  
of the trial justice and will only be reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.35 Here, that discretion was not abused because the 
Defendant did not present evidence of the problematic nature of 
eyewitness testimony until appeal, and despite the problems with 
this   particular   witness’s   testimony,36    the   witness   knew the 
 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 689 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Long, 61 
A.3d 439, 445 (R.I. 2013)). 
30. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Long, 61 A.3d at 445). 
31. Id. at 692–93. 
32. Id. at 693. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 694. 
35. Id. at 696. 
36. The Court listed a variety of reasons why this witness’s testimony 
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Defendant before the night of the murder.37 Despite not requiring 
trial justices to give specific jury instructions regarding  
eyewitness testimony, the Court noted that the “better practice” 
would be for courts to give “more comprehensive instructions  
when eyewitness testimony is an issue.”38 
Concerning the admittance of evidence regarding the 
Defendant’s access to guns, the Defendant filed pretrial motions to 
exclude this evidence because Lisa’s grandfather was no longer 
alive to testify as to what kind of guns he owned, and the weapon 
used in the murder was never found.39 The trial justice admitted 
this evidence because access to guns is admissible evidence, even  
if it is not the exact gun that was used in the crime.40 Because the 
Defendant did not contemporaneously object during the trial, and 
because the trial justice did not give a final ruling on the evidence, 
the Court held that the Defendant did not properly preserve the 
record for review.41 Similarly, the Defendant did not properly 
preserve the admittance of a photograph of Gay with his family 
because the Defendant did not contemporaneously object when the 
photograph was admitted into evidence, but rather only objected  
in his motion in limine.42 
Finally, the Court held that the trial justice did not err by 
denying the Defendant’s motion for a new trial because the 
Defendant met his burden to “(1) consider the evidence in light of 
the jury charge, (2) independently assess the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and then (3) determine 
 
 
was “problematic,” including: 
the assailant was in disguise, held a gun, the only eyewitness 
testified that he ran as soon as he saw the weapon and heard it 
discharge, the eyewitness did not identify this [D]efendant for more 
than three years, and the first identification was made just days 
after the only eyewitness saw a video of [D]efendant being arraigned 
for this crime. 
Id. at 696–97. 
37. Id. at 693, 697. 
38. Id. at 697. For examples of what a “more comprehensive instruction” 
would be, the Court notes two cases: State v. Austin, 114 A.3d 87, 92–93 (R.I. 
2015) and State v. Figuereo, 31 A.3d 1283, 1290–91 (R.I. 2011). 
39. Davis, 131 A.3d at 697. 
40. Id.  The trial justice relied on State v. Rios, 996 A.2d 635, 639 (R.I. 
2010). 
41. Id. at 701, 702. 
42. Id. at 703. 
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whether he or she would have reached a result different from that 
reached by the jury.”43 The trial justice denied the motion based 
on the jury finding that Santiago’s testimony regarding the 
Defendant’s confession was believable.44 The trial justice also 
found the witness credible and noted that the Defendant would  
not be able to avoid conviction based on this testimony.45 
Furthermore, Santiago’s testimony was corroborated by forensic 
evidence and Dutra’s testimony, which supplied the motive.46 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Supreme Court seems to set forth two contrary 
standards regarding preserving evidence for appeal. On the one 
hand, the Court rejected favoring “form over substance” when it 
rejected the idea of requiring a contemporaneous objection in  
order to preserve the record after counsel had made his objection 
known during a conference. On the other hand, the Court would 
not review the Defendant’s motions that were made in limine 
without contemporaneous objection.  In essence, the Court chose  
to elevate form over substance—a position it explicitly rejected 
earlier in its own decision. From the Court’s decision, it is not  
clear when lack of a renewed contemporaneous objection may be 
overcome.  However, it does open the door for counsel to argue  
that giving weight to “form over substance” would have more of a 
detrimental effect than simply hearing the issue, in spite of the 
issue not being properly preserved. 
Concerning giving instructions on eyewitness testimony, the 
Court merges its prior holdings in order to develop the rule that it 
is within the trial justice’s discretion to give a jury instruction on 
eyewitness testimony; however, the Court does not provide any 
guidance on when declining to give such an instruction may be 
deemed an abuse of discretion under review. This is particularly 
important in the case at bar where the eyewitness testimony was 
especially problematic, but the instruction was not given. It raises 
the question of when the giving of an instruction, or lack thereof, 
would  ever  be  deemed  an  abuse  of  discretion.    Unfortunately, 
 
 
43. Id. at 704, 705. 
44. Id. at 704. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
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there is no clear answer. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an objection made 
in a conference with a trial justice may adequately preserve the 
record for appeal, even if no objection is made contemporaneously 
during the trial; however, objections made in motions in limine 
must be renewed contemporaneously during the trial in order to 
be properly preserved. An opening statement is not so prejudicial 
as to require a limiting instruction where the trial justice took 
steps to inform the jury during the trial that statements from 
counsel are not evidence. Giving a jury instruction regarding 
eyewitness testimony is within the trial justice’s discretion and is 
reviewable only for abuse. 
 
Katelyn E. Kalmbach 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criminal Law. State v. Florez, 138 A.3d 789  (R.I.  2016).  A 
Rhode Island Superior Court justice has the authority to allow the 
State to impeach a witness with his prior statement and not to 
admit parts of the complainant’s father’s witness statement into 
evidence. Furthermore, a defendant who fails to challenge jury 
instructions and a verdict sheet at appeal will not fall within the 
raise-or-waive rule, and an untimely motion for a new trial should 
not be considered by a trial justice. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On August 1, 2010, Ricardo Florez (Florez) engaged in sexual 
contact with a boy under the age of fourteen,1  Joshua.2  The 
assault occurred in a McDonalds restaurant in Pawtucket when 
Joshua, Joshua’s nephew, and Joshua’s father, Glenn, were on 
their way to a Red Sox Game.3 Florez approached Joshua when 
Joshua was alone at a table in McDonalds and started a “one- 
sided” conversation with him; Joshua was afraid of being rude by 
not responding.4 Once Glenn returned, Joshua stated that he was 
going to the bathroom.5 While Joshua was in the bathroom 
washing his hands, Florez came out of the stall with his pants 
down, walked over to Joshua, and grabbed Joshua’s penis over his 
clothes.6 Florez then let Joshua walk out, and Joshua told Glenn 
what happened.7 Glenn called the police, but Florez had fled by  
the time the police arrived.8 
On  August  5,  2010,  Joshua  and  Glenn  went  to  the police 
 
 
 
1. State v. Florez, 138 A.3d 789, 792 (R.I. 2016). 
2. The superior court used pseudonyms to protect the  complainant and 
his father.  Id. at 792 n.3. 
3. Id. at 792. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 793. 
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department to identify Florez and provide a statement.9 At this 
point, Joshua told the police that a second touching had occurred, 
when “[Florez] grabbed [his] hand and made [Joshua] touch his 
exposed penis.”10 Glenn also made a statement, which mainly 
contained what Joshua told him had happened.11 
On March 31, 2014, the superior court found Florez guilty of 
one count of second-degree child molestation sexual assault and 
later sentenced Florez to twenty years imprisonment, eight years 
to serve and the remaining as probation.12 Florez appealed this 
decision on multiple issues; Florez asserted that the trial justice 
erred in denying his motion for a new trial, both the trial justice’s 
jury charge and verdict sheet were flawed, the trial justice erred 
when the State was allowed to improperly refresh Joshua’s 
recollection, and that the trial justice erred by not allowing certain 
parts of Glenn’s witness statement into evidence.13 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the trial court’s denial of Florez’s motion for a 
new trial, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first turned to a 
procedural problem with the motion.14 Under Rule 33 of the 
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for a new 
trial “shall be made within ten (10) days after the verdict or 
finding of guilty or within such further time as the court may fix 
during the ten day period.”15 The jury returned a guilty verdict in 
Florez’s case on May 31, 2014; however, Florez did not file his 
motion until the date of the hearing,16 April 14, 2014, four days 
late.17 The Court considered the fact that during the hearing, the 
trial justice issued a warning to Florez that he “would suggest  
that   [Florez]   file   it   today,”   because   the   State   mistakenly 
 
 
9. Id. at 792–93. 
10. Id. at 793. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 791–792. 
13. Id. at 792. 
14. Id. at 794. 
15. Id.; see also SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 33 (2002). 
16. After the jury returned its verdict on March 31, 2014, finding Florez 
guilty, Florez’s counsel scheduled a hearing in anticipation for filing a motion 
for a new trial. Florez, 138 A.3d at 794 n.5. The hearing was originally 
scheduled for April 7, 2014 but it did not occur until April 14, 2014. Id. 
17. Id. at 794. 
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represented to Florez that the deadline was April 14, 2014.18 
Although the justice issued the warning and Florez was 
misinformed, the Court reiterated its previous holding that “[t]he 
time limit set forth in Rule 33, is jurisdictional and cannot be 
waived.”19 Further, to decide if the warning would  allow  for 
Florez to file at that time, the Court looked again at Rule 33, 
which “specifically provides that any further time for filing a 
motion for a new trial must be fixed by the trial justice within the 
ten-day period.”20 Therefore, the motion was untimely because it 
was filed past the date provide in Rule 33, and the trial justice 
could not fix a new date after that date had passed.21 
The Court briefly considered the merits of Florez’s motion for 
a new trial and found that it was “devoid of any merit.”22 Florez 
argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new 
trial because of specific “shortcomings” of Joshua’s testimony that 
were acknowledged by the trial justice and because the footage 
from the surveillance tape showed Florez leaving the bathroom 
before Joshua, contradicting Joshua’s testimony.23 However, 
Florez’s argument did not pass the Court’s standard of review for  
a motion for a new trial, which “‘accord[s] great weight to a trial 
justice’s ruling on [such a motion] if he or she has articulated 
sufficient reasoning in support of the ruling.’”24 The Court 
acknowledged that a trial justice “commits clear error when he or 
she completely overlooks testimony which is materially 
contradictory to the testimony on which the justice based his or 
her determination . . . .”25 However, the Court found that clear 
error did not occur in Florez’s case because the trial justice 
recognized that Joshua’s testimony was neither “perfect nor  
crystal clear” but still found his testimony to be credible and 
trustworthy    considering    Joshua’s     difficulties     as     a  child 
 
18. Id. 
19. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Champion, 873 A.2d 92, 
94 (R.I. 2005)). 
20. Id. (emphasis in original). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 793 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Kizekai, 19 A.3d 
583, 589 (R.I. 2011)). 
25. Id. at 795 (quoting King v. Huntress, Inc., 94 A.3d 467, 495 (R.I. 
2014)). 
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understanding what happened to him.26 
Next, the Court addressed Florez’s claim that the jury 
instructions and verdict sheet, which returned a non-unanimous 
guilty verdict, went against the ruling in State v. Saluter when the 
trial justice failed to specifically state to the jury that it was 
required to unanimously find that Florez committed one, either, or 
both  of  the sexual contacts.27 Florez  contended  that the trial 
justice made the verdict sheet unclear because there was a 
possibility that the jury found that Florez touched Joshua’s penis 
over his pants, or Florez forced Joshua to touch Florez’s penis, or 
both, or the jury was split over both.28 The Court commented that 
Florez attempted to make a duplicity complaint,29 but the Court 
has “consistently” held that the correct way to attack a duplicitous 
complaint is to file a motion to dismiss, which Florez failed to do.30 
Florez sought to establish his duplicity claim through asserting 
error in the jury instructions and verdict form; however, the 
Court concluded that his attempt failed because it was subject to 
the Court’s “raise or waive rule.”31 The Court concluded that 
Florez did not make an objection during trial either to the jury 
verdict or instructions, and further, that Florez agreed when the 
trial justice explained how he planned to deal with the potential 
Saluter  problem.32 The   Court   further   contended  that  the 
exceptions to the raise-or-waive rule would not apply to Florez 
because the exceptions do not apply unless “basic constitutional 
rights are concerned.”33 When examining the three-part test to 
the exception, the Court found that even if the asserted error was 
more than a harmless error, it was not a novel issue that “counsel 
could not reasonably have known during the trial.”34 
 
26. Id. 
27. Id. (citing State v. Saluter, 715 A.2d 1250, 1254–55 (R.I. 1998)). 
28. Id. 
29. Duplicity “refers to the joining of two or more offenses, however 
numerous, in a single count of an indictment.” Id. (quoting Saluter, 715 A.2d 
at 1253). 
30. Id. at 795–96 (citing SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2), (3)). 
31. Id. “[A] litigant cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on 
appeal if it was not raised before the trial court.” Id. (quoting State v. Bido, 
941 A.2d 822, 829 (R.I. 2008)). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 796 (quoting Bido, 941 A.2d at 829). 
34. Id. (quoting Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 878 (R.I. 
2001)). 
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Moreover, when reviewing the trial justice’s evidentiary 
rulings, the Court stated that it would not overrule the trial 
justice’s decisions on evidentiary rulings unless that decision was 
an abuse of discretion and prejudicial to Florez.35 During  the  
trial, when Joshua was asked if he had ever touched Florez or if 
there was any other touching besides Florez touching Joshua’s 
penis over his pants, Joshua answered “[n]o.”36  Florez argued  
that the trial justice erred when he allowed the State to use 
Joshua’s witness statement to “refresh [Joshua’s] recollection” of 
the second touching.37  However, due to the trial justice’s ruling   
on Florez’s objection, the Court contended that Joshua’s statement 
was allowed under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Rhode Island Rules of 
evidence as opposed to refreshing Joshua’s recollection.38 When  
the defense council objected to using Joshua’s witness statement, 
the trial justice overruled, stating that “[i]f he says no then he 
could impeach him with his own statement assuming that . . . 
statement is inconsistent or if he says I’m not sure I don’t 
remember why can’t he refresh his recollection with his own 
statement about something that he just cant recall on  the 
stand.”39 The Court found that this clearly allowed for the trial 
court to permit Joshua’s prior witness statement because the  
State used these two inconsistent statements to impeach Joshua 
as a witness, which was permissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(A).40 
Further, it was within the trial justice’s discretion to impeach 
Joshua with his prior statement, making Florez’s argument fail.41 
Finally, Florez argued that the trial justice erred when 
Glenn’s witness statement about Joshua’s interview with the 
police, “I then found out that the male tried to touch [Joshua’s] 
penis and the male tried to have [Joshua] touch his penis,” was 
improperly prevented from being used at trial.42 Florez argued 
that the fact that Glenn used the word “tried” would have cast 
 
35. Id. at 793 (citing State v. Pitts, 990 A.2d 185, 189 (R.I. 2010)). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 797 (alteration in original). 
38. Rule 801(d)(1)(A) allows a prior inconsistent statement to be 
admitted into evidence if the two statements are “sufficiently” inconsistent. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 798. 
42. Id. (alterations in original) (emphases omitted). 
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doubt upon his guilt and that it was a contradictory statement to 
Glenn’s testimony in trial.43 Florez challenged that he was 
wrongly prevented from using Glenn’s witness statement during 
the cross-examination of Glenn and during Officer Slack’s 
testimony.44 First, the Court found that Florez was not prevented 
from using Glenn’s witness statement during cross-examination, 
but the trial justice merely “corrected defense counsel’s form of the 
question.”45 The Court further found that Florez decided not to 
question Glenn about this statement and instead saved the 
question for Officer Slack.46 
In regards to the questioning of Officer Slack about Glenn’s 
witness statement, after the State objected to its use during  
Officer Slack’s testimony, defense counsel argued that “I’m not 
even offering it for the truth of the matter asserted[;] merely these 
words appear in this document.”47 The objection was sustained, 
and defense counsel reiterated his argument.48 The Court could 
not find a basis for Florez’s argument under any rule of law.49    
The Court suggested that Florez was possibly trying to advance an 
argument under 801(d)(1)(A), as a prior inconsistent statement, 
but the Court made clear that Florez did not make such an 
argument, and therefore that argument was waived.50 Thus, the 
Court found that the trial justice did not err in prohibiting Glenn’s 
witness statement from being used during trial.51 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court gave great deference to the 
lower court and strong emphasis to the importance of adhering to 
statutory constraints when reviewing the issues asserted by 
Florez. The bulk of the issues were easily struck down by the 
procedural  problems  they  encompassed.   The  motion  for  a new 
 
 
43. Id. Glenn stated at trial that he did not learn much from Joshua’s 
interview with the police. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 799. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. (alteration in original). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. (citing State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 828–29 (R.I. 2008)). 
51. Id. at 800. 
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trial was “untimely” and “beyond [the Court’s] review.”52 Florez 
waived his claim of duplicity by failing to file a motion to dismiss 
and failing to comply with the raise-or-waive rule by not objecting 
to the jury instructions and the verdict form during trial.53 
Further, Florez was not prevented from using Glen’s prior 
statement when questioning him during trial, his counsel was 
simply asked to rephrase the question; when Florez was prevented 
from using Glen’s witness testimony when questioning Officer 
Slack it was because defense counsel did not raise an actual 
exception to hearsay under the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.54 
Most of the issues raised by Florez on appeal were barred because 
they had not been properly dealt with during trial, and the Court 
took a strict stance with these deficiencies. 
Further, the Court’s holding emphasized the great deference 
that is given to the lower courts’ decisions. It is important to 
maintain the finality of trial court decisions, but it is equally 
important that justice be properly administered and prejudicial or 
material mistakes not be made at trial. The Court sought to 
achieve an appropriate balance of finality and justice by being 
strict with the procedural issues but still addressing the merits of 
the claim even though it was not required to do so. 
While in this case the Court may have seemed very firm and 
even harsh when upholding the trial justice’s decision, because of 
procedural standards and deference, it was partially attributable 
to the facts in this case. The facts of this case raised a perfect 
trifecta of factors that lead the Court to affirm the lower court’s 
decision. The issues consisted of procedural defects, meritless 
arguments, and trial court deference (partially due to the sensitive 
and complicated matter of child molestation). All of these factors 
created a situational stance of firmness by the Court. It does not 
appear that the Court will always approach these issues with the 
firmness that it did in this case, as the Court divulged into further 
analysis in order to determine if the claims had merit or if 
exceptions would apply to the claims. The Court correctly  
balanced both sides, but it was the facts of the case and actions, or 
lack there of, taken at trial that lead to affirming the trial court’s 
 
 
52. Id. at 794. 
53. Id. at 796–97. 
54. Id. at 799. 
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decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a motion for a  
new trial that is filed fourteen days after a verdict is untimely,  
and therefore the trial justice should not have considered it. The 
Court also held that Florez’s challenge that the jury instructions 
and verdict sheet were duplicitous did not fall within  the 
exception of the raise-or-waive rule and that it was within the  
trial justice’s discretion to impeach a witness with his prior 
statement. 
 
Katherine Bishop 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criminal Law. State v. Fry, 130 A.3d 812 (R.I. 2016). The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court held that a reference to an off-the-record 
objection is insufficient to properly preserve the issue for appellate 
review. Second, an instruction explaining that second-degree 
murder must be committed willfully, prohibits the jury from 
concluding it could be committed accidently. Third, it is not an 
abuse of discretion for the court to allow posing yes-or-no questions 
to a witness struggling to recall his or her memory. Fourth, a 
witness can discuss his or her testimony with the party calling that 
witness while under a general sequestration order unless under a 
specific instruction not to speak to an attorney. Finally, a video 
depicting a disturbing crime scene is not unfairly prejudicial as long 
as it is probative, even if there is a less prejudicial video available. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Camden Fry was born to Kimberly and Timothy (Tim) Fry, on 
May 6, 2001.1 Camden had behavioral issues when she was very 
young that continued when she started school.2 On one occasion, 
while Tim was away on business Kimberly told Tim that Camden 
had a “really bad crying episode” and that Camden had “punch[ed] 
[Kimberly] and hit[] her and that [Kimberly] had to sit on her” to 
restrain her.3 
Almost two years later, before Camden finished second grade, 
the Frys made a number of changes in an effort to alleviate 
Camden’s behavioral issues.4 The family began treatment with a 
therapist, Wendy Phillips (Phillips), and Camden was diagnosed 
with   Attention   Deficit   Hyperactivity   Disorder   (ADHD)   and 
 
1. State v. Fry, 130 A.3d 812, 816 (R.I. 2016). 
2. Id. Her parents noticed that she often fussed when finishing one 
activity and then transitioning to another. Once Camden started school, she 
had a hard time academically, and continued to struggle when transitioning 
between activities. Id. Her behavior became an issue, especially for Kimberly. 
See id. 
3. Id. (fourth alteration in original). 
4. Id. at 816–17. 
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prescribed medication.5 
However, Camden’s behavior had taken a toll on Kimberly.6 In 
a session with their family therapist, Kimberly indicated she was 
suffering from mental health issues including “depression, 
insomnia, anxiety, and panic attacks.”7 Kimberly began to feel like 
Camden’s tirades “lasted longer for her than for Tim,” forcing 
Kimberly to block the sound with her hands if the tantrum lasted 
longer than twenty minutes.8 During a therapy session on July 28, 
2009, Kimberly told Phillips “she blamed Camden for her 
depression” and revealed that she felt inadequate and “hopeless.”9 
Phillips recommended that Kimberly see an individual therapist, 
but Kimberly never did.10 
Less than two weeks later, on August 10, 2009, Tim reported 
that Kimberly told him she “wished that Camden wasn’t around 
because it was so much easier when it was just the two of [them].”11 
At 5:50 that evening, Tim left Kimberly and Camden—who were 
sitting next to each other on the couch, watching television—to play 
hockey.12 Later that night, Kimberly called Tim and told him that 
Camden had a “two-hour crying fit,” but that Camden had gone to 
bed.13 Tim stated that Kimberly “sounded a little groggy,” but that 
this was not unusual because she took Clonazepam or Benadryl to 
help her sleep at night.14 
When Tim arrived home, he found Kimberly falling asleep on 
the couch and Camden in her bed under the covers.15 The next 
morning, Tim walked into Camden’s bedroom to wake her.16 When 
he approached the bed, he noticed she was in the same position as 
the night before and her eyes were opened.17 Tim pulled back the 
covers, removed her stuffed animal, and turned her onto her back; 
 
5. Id. at 817. The medication seemed to help with Camden’s behavioral 
issues, but tended to wear off in the evening. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 818. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
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Camden’s body was “ice cold and stiff,” and Tim knew she was 
dead.18 Tim cried out for Kimberly, who “crawled into the room on 
her hands and knees,” still groggy from the night before.19 
Tim called 911, and while being interviewed at their home, 
Kimberly told a responding officer that Camden gave her a hard 
time taking a bath.20 Kimberly reported that Camden fell on the 
floor, and had to be pulled into her bedroom,21 but after that, they 
“watched television and read books . . . until . . . she put her to 
bed.”22 However, Kimberly’s “condition began to deteriorate,” and 
it occurred to Tim that “she must have taken some kind of 
medication.”23 Upon the discovery of several empty bottles of 
prescription medication, an ambulance was called for Kimberly.24 
The next day, Tim was visiting Kimberly at the hospital when 
she told him that “she had a battle with Camden [and] that Camden 
had been kicking and punching her and biting her.”25 Kimberly 
told Tim that she sat on top of Camden and “put her hand over 
Camden’s nose and mouth to make her stop screaming,” and 
Kimberly told Tim, “I’m so sorry, I’m so sorry.”26 Kimberly’s ICU 
nurse also reported hearing Kimberly say “I’m her mother. I was 
supposed to protect her but I couldn’t protect her from me.”27 
At the trial, the defense submitted proposed jury instructions 
that included an instruction on accident and voluntary 
manslaughter due to diminished capacity.28 In camera, the trial 
justice rejected the defense’s request for a diminished capacity 
instruction, but the conversation was not recorded and there was 
no record of an objection to the instruction ruling by the defense.29 
After the jury was charged, the defense counsel objected that 
accident was “just briefly” discussed but did not object to the lack of 
an  instruction  on  voluntary  manslaughter  due  to  diminished 
 
 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 819. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
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capacity.30 
While the jury was deliberating, they asked the trial court, 
“[d]oes there have to be mental competency for there to be intent?”31 
After conferring with prosecution and defense, the trial court 
responded, “[a] defendant’s competency to stand trial is a legal 
determination made before trial and is not an issue before you. Do 
not confuse ‘mental competency’ with the defendant’s state of mind 
or intent. Please refer to the jury instruction on DEFENDANT’S 
INTENT.”32 After this was submitted to the jury, the defense 
admitted he had not objected to the lack of a diminished capacity 
instruction when the jury was charged but requested that it be 
given at that time.33 Before this could be considered further, the 
jury reached a verdict; it found Kimberly guilty of second-degree 
murder.34 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The defense raised several issues on appeal. First, the defense 
argued that the jury instructions were deficient because there was 
no instruction given on voluntary manslaughter due to diminished 
capacity, and the trial justice’s accident instruction was 
inadequate.35 Second, the State was allowed to incorrectly impeach 
a witness’s credibility and impermissibly used leading questions 
during the testimony of a witness.36 Third, the State’s witness 
violated a sequestration order, and the remedial measures allowed 
by the trial court were insufficient.37 Fourth, the defense argued 
that a video, which was over seven minutes long, was admitted even 
though it was unfairly prejudicial to the defense.38 
A. Diminished Capacity 
The defense argued that there was sufficient evidence to 
support a verdict for voluntary manslaughter due to diminished 
 
 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 820. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
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capacity and that the trial justice’s refusal was in error.39 Rule 30 
of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure “requires only 
that objections be made before the jury retires to deliberate.”40 
Further, “an objection must be made on the record and in a manner 
that permits th[e] [Supreme] Court to conduct appropriate 
appellate review.”41 Here, the defense uses sections of the 
transcript that indicate he requested a diminished capacity 
instruction in an off-the-record conference.42 Yet, at best, the Court 
found that the record was ambiguous to whether the defense 
objected to a refusal or simply requested the trial justice include a 
diminished capacity instruction in the jury charge.43 Thus, the 
Court ruled that the defense’s objection in an off-the-record 
conference was insufficient to properly preserve an issue for 
review.44 
B. Accident 
Next, the defense contended that there was sufficient evidence 
presented at trial to allow an instruction on accident, and its 
omission was an error by the trial justice.45 Dr. Elizabeth Laposata 
testified at trial for the defense, regarding Camden’s death.46 Dr. 
Laposata testified that Camden’s injures could have been caused by 
an attempted restraint; that once Camden lost consciousness, chest 
compressions alone could have deprived her of oxygen; and 
sometimes restraints are maintained after a loss of consciousness 
 
39. Id. at 821. The State responded with two arguments. First, that the 
defense failed to object before the jury retired to deliberate. Id. Second, that 
there was insufficient evidence to support Kimberly’s diminished capacity at 
the time of the murder, so a diminished capacity instruction was not justified. 
Id. 
40. Id. (emphasis in original). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 822 (citing State v. Anderson, 752 A.2d 946, 951 (R.I. 2000)). 
Defense counsel also argued that an opportunity to object to the jury charge 
was renewed when the jury asked a question about the mental competency and 
intent of Kimberly during deliberation. Id. However, the Court rejected this 
argument as well, stating that while the trial justice has an obligation to clarify 
juror confusion with supplemental instructions, juror confusion does not allow 
“the addition of another instruction entirely.” Id. (citing State v. Gomes 590 
A.2d 391, 394 (R.I. 1991)). 
45. Id. at 822–23. 
46. Id. at 823. 
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to ensure the restraint has been effective.47 Based on this 
information, the defense asked for an instruction on accident, but 
the trial justice refused that specific instruction and instead 
provided an alternate instruction on accident in two separate 
areas.48 
The Court found that these instructions properly explained to 
the jury that they could not find Kimberly guilty of second-degree 
murder if the death was an accident.49 Specifically, the Court 
approved of the instructions that “second degree murder must be 
committed willfully and that, if the death were accidental, then it 
could not be willful.”50 Further, the Court concluded that because 
little evidence existed upon which a jury conclude that Camden’s 
death was an accident, “a more elaborate instruction was [not] 
necessary.”51 
C. Improper Impeachment 
The next issue on appeal was the nine instances the defense 
claims the prosecutor was allowed to “dictate the testimony” of the 
family therapist, Phillips.52 However, the defense only objected to 
two of the nine instances of error, so the Court dismissed the appeal 
for seven of the nine unobjected-to-instances.53 Of the two 
remaining objections, the Court ruled these were not objections 
based on improper impeachment of Phillips’s credibility.54 
In the first objection, the defense said, “I think it is 
inappropriate that the witness read from the transcript. I think 
she should be allowed to simply testify to her memory.”55 The Court 
decided this objection was closer to an improper refreshment of the 
witness’s recollection than improper impeachment.56 
The second objection occurred after the State told Phillips to 
review her notes to which the defense said, “Judge, again, I’m 
simply going to have to object.  I have no objection to this going in 
 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 824. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 825. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
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full.”57 However, the Court interpreted this as using the rule of 
completeness as grounds for the objection.58 The Court ruled the 
objections failed to call forth the justice’s attention “with sufficient 
particularity”59 to the issue at appeal, so the issues were “deemed 
waived and not preserved for our review.”60 
D. Leading Questions 
Forty-five questions were listed by the defense as leading 
during the direct examination of Phillips, but the defense only 
objected to one such question at trial.61 Thus, the Court ruled the 
other forty-four objections were not preserved for appellate 
review.62 The only remaining objection arose when Phillips was 
referencing her therapy notes and the prosecutor asked, “[w]hy 
don’t you continue with the next seven typed lines. Do you ever 
reference Tim and a difficulty with Tim; yes or no?”63 The defense 
objected, stating that this was a leading question; the State 
responded by asking the trial justice to consider the witness as 
hostile.64 The trial justice overruled the objection, giving the State 
some flexibility to phrase yes-or-no questions but did not explicitly 
rule on whether or not he found the witness hostile.65 Phillips 
testified to a lack of memory in some instances and needed 
correction from the prosecutor when her testimony strayed from her 
therapy notes on occasion.66 So, the Court ruled it could not find 
that the trial justice abused his discretion in allowing flexibility to 
pose yes-or-no questions.67 
 
 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
60. Id. (citation omitted). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 826. On appeal, defense counsel asserted that the cumulative 
effect of the leading questions made them prejudicial. Id. n.7. But, the Court 
stated that the defense’s argument was substantially undermined because the 
defense failed to object to the leading questions. Id. n.7. The Court’s view was 
the interest of judicial economy and promoting fairer and more efficient trial 
proceedings by giving opposing counsel a chance to respond.  Id. n.7. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 826. 
65. Id. at 826–27. 
66. Id. at 827. 
67. Id. 
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E. Violation of the Sequestration Order 
The defense also contended that the trial justice’s refusal to 
pass the case, after the prosecutor discussed testimony with Dr. 
William Cox, was in error, and that the remedial measures offered 
by the trial justice were deficient.68 
The parties jointly requested and were granted a general 
sequestration order prohibiting witnesses from hearing each other’s 
testimony after opening statements.69 At the conclusion of Dr. 
Cox’s testimony, the trial justice told Dr. Cox, “[p]lease don’t discuss 
the case with anyone else. All witnesses for this trial are 
sequestered.”70 During a lunch break, the prosecutor spoke with 
Dr. Cox about two issues: the first was to correct Dr. Cox’s memory 
of viewing photographs of the murder scene, and the second was 
about potential cross-examination of Dr. Cox’s failure to dissect the 
hyoid bone.71 While the trial justice did not consider the 
prosecutor’s actions improper, he allowed the defense to question 
Dr. Cox and suggest that he “may have violated the [c]ourt’s 
order.”72 The defense was also allowed to ask a question that would 
imply that Dr. Cox altered his testimony after consulting the 
prosecutor.73 
The Court found the discussion between the State’s attorney 
and Dr. Cox did not violate the sequestration order.74 In coming to 
this conclusion, the Court stated that when a witness testifies over 
the course of several days, the witness and the party calling the 
witness frequently discuss testimony.75  The Court also found that 
a specific instruction not to discuss testimony with the prosecutor 
“would only be granted in extraordinary circumstances,” so the trial 
justice’s order could not have meant to encompass more than typical 
 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. The trial justice conceded that he could have been clearer when 
instructing Dr. Cox of his sequestration order and could have specifically 
informed him not to speak to the State’s attorney. Id. 
72. Id. (alteration in original). 
73. Id. However, the trial justice did not allow defense counsel to ask 
whether the discussion violated the Court’s order because “he did not want the 
question to insinuate that there had been a violation of the sequestration order 
when he did not determine there had been one in the first instance  . . . .” Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 829. 
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trial practices.76 Accordingly, the Court held that the trial justice’s 
remedial measure eliminated any potential prejudice from the 
communication with the prosecutor.77 
F. Admission of the Video 
Finally, the defense argued that a seven-minute video, showing 
the police walking through the Fry’s home and depicting Camden’s 
body, was unfairly prejudicial to the jury.78 The defense argued 
that the video was “minimally probative because the layout of the 
home was not contested,” the video did not show anything that was 
not shown in other exhibits, and it “inflamed [the jury’s] passions 
against [Kimberly].”79 
The video showed the bathroom, the bedroom, and a three-and- 
a-half-minute focus on Camden’s body in her bed.80 The Court 
ruled that the video should be included as evidence for several 
reasons.81 First, the video added additional probative value 
because it showed different perspectives than other photographs.82 
Second, it showed the pathway of the struggle between Kimberly 
and Camden from the bathroom to the bedroom, “where the final 
struggle allegedly occurred”.83 Third, the video showed the stuffed 
animal close to Camden’s body, which corroborated Tim’s story.84 
Finally, the Court acknowledged that an image of a deceased eight- 
year-old is “disturbing,” but “crime scene [portrayals] of murder 
victims . . . are unquestionably relevant” to the State’s burden to 
prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.85 Despite 
the existence of a longer, less-prejudicial video, the Court ruled that 
the State has no obligation “to prove its case in the least prejudicial 
way possible,” and it was up to the State to decide what video to 
use.86 Because there was some probative value to the depiction of 
Camden’s body and her home and because the evidence was not 
 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 830. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 831. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
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offered, “solely to inflame the passions of the jury,” it was not an 
abuse of discretion to admit the video.87 
COMMENTARY 
The admission of the seven-minute video was, understandably, 
a contentious issue for the Court on appeal.88 Not only is the 
subject matter one that inherently stirs emotions, but the 
admission or rejection of the evidence is contingent on a sliding 
scale that weighs concepts like “probative value” and “unfair 
prejudice.”89  While the dissent’s description of the video describes 
a chilling walkthrough of the Fry’s home and Camden’s body,90 
there is enormous leeway given to admitting evidence that might 
be unfairly prejudicial.91 The majority states that excluding 
evidence “must be exercised sparingly,”92 that “only evidence that 
is marginally relevant and enormously prejudicial . . . must be 
excluded,”93 and the video must be offered “solely to inflame the 
passions of the jury[.]”94 Given such a high bar to exclude evidence, 
the Court properly affirmed the admission of the video, even though 
there was a long focus on Camden’s body. Although reasonable 
minds could argue that this errs too far on the side of admitting 
questionable evidence, it is consistent with a liberal policy of 
allowing marginally pertinent information. 
The affirmation of the accident instruction is also a source of 
disagreement.95 The Court seems to weigh heavily the minimal 
evidence presented by the defense to establish accident.96 Further, 
the Court indicates a correlation in the emphasis of an instruction 
based on how much evidence supported that conclusion at trial.97 
However, saying what an act is not, does not always adequately 
convey what the act is. A reasonable jury could have been confused 
 
87. Id. 
88. See id. at 832 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
89. Id. at 830 (majority opinion). 
90. Id. at 832–33 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
91. See id. at 830 (majority opinion) (citing State v. Hak, 963 A.2d 921, 
928 (R.I. 2009); State v. Patel, 949 A.2d 401, 412–13 (R.I. 2008); State v. Carter, 
744 A.2d 839, 847 (R.I. 2000)). 
92. Id. (quoting Hak, 963 A.2d at 928). 
93. Id. (quoting Patel, 949 A.2d at 412–13). 
94. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Carter, 744 A.2d at 847). 
95. See id. at 833 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
96. See id. at 824 (majority opinion). 
97. See id. 
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by that instruction or miss the implication. Based on the question 
submitted by the jury during deliberations, there was clearly some 
confusion about Kimberly’s mentality.98 Perhaps, as the dissent 
argues, a more specific instruction about accident would have 
assisted the jury.99 
Finally, the decision regarding the violation of the 
sequestration order seems like a liberal interpretation of the order. 
The witness was told by the trial justice, “[p]lease don’t discuss the 
case with anyone else. All witnesses for this trial are 
sequestered.”100 It is understandable that a witness would wish to 
discuss their testimony with the party that called the witness, but 
the order from the Superior Court was unequivocal.101 The case 
should not have been discussed with anyone else. The Court’s 
justification that this practice is commonplace does not excuse the 
prosecutor’s action; it only weakens the Superior Court’s order. Of 
course, people are entitled to a fair trial—not a perfect trial—but 
caution is merited when trial justices are put in the unenviable 
position of fashioning remedial measures for parties on the spot. 
Further, it puts the appellate court in the position of weighing how 
potentially unfair one decision was, and now must decide whether 
the countering, unfair decision was appropriately unfair. This is an 
area ripe for varying degrees of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a reference to an 
off-the-record objection is insufficient to preserve that issue for 
appeal.102 The Court also held that explaining that willful intent  
is required to commit an act shows that it cannot be committed by 
accident.103 The Court established that when a witness has issues 
recalling information, some leeway in the form of yes-or-no 
questions is not an abuse of discretion.104 The Court also held that 
it is not a violation of a general sequestration order for a witness to 
speak with the party calling him or her, unless specifically told not 
 
98. See id. at 819. 
99. Id. at 835 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
100. Id. at 827 (majority opinion). 
101. See id. 
102. Id. at 822. 
103. Id. at 824. 
104. Id. at 827. 
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to by the trial justice.105 The Court concluded that a disturbing 
video is not unfairly prejudicial as long as it has some probative 
value, even if there is another video available that is less 
disturbing.106 
 
Andrew Lentz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 831. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criminal Law. State v. Gaudreau, 139 A.3d 433 (R.I. 2016). 
When deciding whether to introduce into evidence a police 
interrogation containing no inculpatory statements that is 
recorded on videotape, a Rhode Island trial justice must weigh the 
low probative value of the recorded comments from the officers 
against the prejudicial impact to the defendant. If the evidence is 
erroneously admitted, it is harmless error unless there is proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error contributed to the 
verdict. On a motion for a new trial, the trial justice must 
determine that the evidence is sufficient to conclude guilt beyond  
a reasonable doubt. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
During a blizzard on March 2, 2009, Physique Gym in 
Pawtucket was consumed in flames in the early morning hours.1 
Upon arrival, the Pawtucket Fire Department reported that the 
fire was “code red, fully involved.”2 The next day, after the fire  
was contained, “a scarf and fanny pack wrapped inside a charred 
‘puffy type’ winter coat and a set of keys to the premises that was 
‘still in the lock’” were found “[o]utside the building, near an 
entryway . . . .”3 That same day, a certified, accelerant-detection, 
canine handler assisted the investigation, whose canine alerted to 
four areas that contained traces of “flammable  liquids . . . .”4  
Upon excavation, two areas contained “burned paper towels and 
the melted remains of what appeared to be a thirty-gallon 
Rubbermaid-type barrel” with a strong gasoline-like odor, “one cap 
from a gas can, and rubber mats covering the floor.”5 Two other 
areas  were  found  to  have  “irregular  and  ‘very  significant burn 
 
1. State v. Gaudreau, 139 A.3d 433, 436 (R.I. 2016). 
2. Id.  Code red means that it was “an actual confirmed fire” and “more 
progressed than you would normally expect . . . .” Id. 
3. Id. at 439. 
4. Id. The   “flammable   liquids . . .   [were] carbon-based,  gasolines, 
kerosenes, [and] diesel fuels.” Id. 
5. Id. 
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pattern[s]’ . . . consistent with ‘flammable liquid being poured out 
of a container and then ignited.’”6 The fire inspector “later  
testified that it was his opinion that, to a reasonable degree of 
scientific certainty, there were four separate areas of origin for the 
fire and the cause was an intentional act of fire setting.”7 
Three witnesses were questioned about the fire.8 The  
property owner, George Gardinar, said that “he leased the  
property to [Gary] Gaudreau for use as a gym and that [Mr. 
Gardinar] had allowed his insurance policy on the building  to 
lapse a few years earlier.9 Paul Richard, a snow-plow driver, 
reported that “he had seen Gaudreau at the Physique Gym . . . 
with his car backed up to an open door . . . with the trunk open, at 
approximately 1:45 a.m.” and “that he was familiar with 
Gaudreau and with his car because he was a member of Physique 
Gym.”10 “About [fifteen] minutes later, Mr. Richard recalled  
seeing Gaudreau in his car at the intersection of Newport and 
Columbus Avenues; indeed, he recalled flashing his lights for 
Gaudreau to go through the intersection.”11 “Karen Kane-Taylor, 
who worked for [Gaudreau] at the gym . . . identified the puffy 
jacket and scarf that were found at the scene as belonging to 
[Gaudreau]” and later testified that “in the weeks leading up to  
the fire, it seemed to her that products that were sold at the gym, 
such as protein bars, drinks, water, and magazines, were  not 
being replenished.”12 
The gym’s proprietor of twenty-three years, Gaudreau, called 
to report a breaking and entering at his home at 3:50 a.m. on 
March 2, 2009, a mere ten minutes after the Pawtucket Fire 
Department arrived to the scene of the fire at the Physique  
Gym.13 The officer who reported to Gaudreau’s home noted “only 
one set of tire marks on the snow-covered driveway,” footprints in 
the snow “leading from the garage to the back porch,” “a broken 
Plexiglas window, with glass on the ground, both outside and 
inside the door” near the back door of the home, and that the hood 
 
6. Id. (alteration in original). 
7. Id. at 438–39. 
8. Id. at 437, 438, 441. 
9. Id. at 437. 
10. Id. at 438. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 441. 
13. Id. at 436, 441. 
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of Gaudreau’s car was cold.14 Gaudreau reported to the  officer 
that “he had left his house at approximately 1:30 a.m. and drove 
around for a couple of hours because he was unable to sleep” and 
that “he returned home at approximately 3:40 a.m. or 3:50 a.m. 
and called the police about the break-in.”15 The only thing that  
was missing from the home was a fanny pack that contained, 
among other things, Gaudreau’s keys to the gym.16 Gaudreau 
surmised that “whoever had broken in came through the rear 
window, became spooked by the alarm, and grabbed the fanny 
pack before leaving through the same window.”17 
The lead detective called Gaudreau later that morning around 
7:00 a.m. and asked that Gaudreau report to the police station to 
talk about the fire and the breaking and entering.18 Gaudreau 
provided essentially the same story to the detective, and the 
detective released him.19 Following Mr. Richard’s statement,  
which was given to the detective after Gaudreau’s first visit to the 
police station, that he had seen Gaudreau when he was out 
plowing the snow, the detective called Gaudreau back in around 
noon.20 This second interview, during which Gaudreau waived his 
Miranda rights, was videotaped, and Gaudreau’s story explaining 
his whereabouts and actions remained  consistent, 
notwithstanding the fact that the detective accused that “the jig 
[was] up,” Gaudreau “set the building on fire, that there was a 
witness who knew him, . . . Gaudreau was lying” and was making 
“false statements to the police, that he made up the ‘cockamamie’ 
story about his house being broken into, and that they were sure 
they would find his fanny pack at the gym.”21 The detectives told 
“Gaudreau that he would be charged with first-degree arson, a 
capital offense,” and asked if Gaudreau had anything to say, to 
which Gaudreau replied that he did not; Gaudreau was placed 
under arrest.22 
 
14. Id. at 436–37. 
15. Id. at 437. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 437, 438. 
19. Id. at 438. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. At the time of this interrogation, the fire investigation had yet to 
turn up the charred remains of the jacket and fanny pack.  Id. at 439. 
22. Id. at 439. 
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“After Gaudreau was arrested, the detectives brought him to 
the cellblock to process him and to seize his clothing, so that they 
could be tested for accelerants” and found that Gaudreau had 
“large sores on his lower legs and slight injuries to his hands,” 
which Gaudreau said was a rash.23 Medical personnel informed 
the detectives after treating Gaudreau for these injuries that the 
sores were second-degree burns, and Gaudreau later testified that 
“he had burned his legs at home in the early morning hours of 
March 1, 2009, the night before the gym fire, when an oil lamp he 
was filling spilled and caught fire” and explained that he initially 
lied because he was concerned that if he said that he burned 
himself, the police would think that he set fire to his gym.24 The 
only physical evidence linking Gaudreau to the gym-fire scene was 
“[b]urned matter and charred debris in tissues in a bathroom 
wastebasket . . . seized from Gaudreau’s home.”25 
Gaudreau’s first trial26 began on July 2, 2009 for charges of 
first-degree arson27 and Gaudreau “sought, in limine, to suppress 
the videotaped interrogation on the grounds that comments by the 
detectives on the tape were irrelevant and highly prejudicial and 
constituted inadmissible testimony concerning witness 
credibility.”28 After an argument that lasted two days, “[t]he trial 
justice denied defendant’s motion to suppress, but ordered that 
two lines at the end of the tape—about the veracity of the 
snowplow driver—be redacted,” and cautionary instructions were 
given to the jury before the video was  played.29  Gaudreau’s 
second trial began in September 2013, and “[t]he parties agreed 
that the evidentiary rulings from the first trial would constitute 
the law of the case and that the exhibits marked as full in the first 
trial  would  be  admitted  as  full  exhibits  in  the  second  trial”; 
 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 439, 441. 
25. Id. at 439. 
26. The “trial ended in a mistrial because the jury was unable to reach a 
verdict.”  Id. at 441. 
27. Gaudreau was charged with two counts: first-degree arson and 
knowingly making a false statement of a crime in violation of R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 11-32-2. Id. at 440. However, “[t]he trial justice  severed  the two 
counts for trial and proceeded on the arson charge to ensure that defendant 
was not prejudiced by the state’s allegations that he made a false claim to the 
police when he reported the breaking and entering at his home.” Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
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however, the defendant “did not reassert his request for a 
cautionary instruction.”30 “[T]he jury returned a guilty verdict for 
first-degree arson,” and the defendant moved for a new trial,  
which was denied.31 
Gaudreau timely appealed, raising two issues: 
First, that the first trial justice abused his discretion 
when he refused to exclude or redact the video-taped 
interrogation . . . because the detectives’ statements 
expressing disbelief in his story were both irrelevant and 
inadmissible comments on defendant’s credibility . . . [and 
that] any possible relevance was substantially  
outweighed by its enormously prejudicial impact because 
the jury repeatedly heard the detectives call defendant a 
liar; second, that “the trial justice erred in denying 
[Gaudreau’s] motion for a new trial because there was no 
evidence linking him to the fire and, in particular, no 
evidence of an accelerant on his clothing, in his house, or 
in his car.”32 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the trial justice’s decision, the Supreme Court 
sought to determine whether the videotape evidence was 
improperly admitted and if it was, whether this was an abuse of 
discretion constituting reversible error.33  The  issue  regarding 
how to analyze evidence of a videotape where the defendant does 
not challenge the statements that he made, but rather that the 
detectives’ comments were irrelevant and highly prejudicial was a 
novel issue to the Supreme Court.34 Several organizations in 
Rhode Island have either adopted or recommended that police 
departments implement rules requiring that all police 
interrogations be audio or video recorded, and the Supreme Court 
was “faced with new issues that are associated with those 
recordings.”35      The   Supreme  Court   outlined   a comprehensive 
 
30. Id. at 441. 
31. Id. at 442. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 443. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 443–44 (citing Task Force to Investigate & Develop Policies & 
Procedures   for   Electronically   Recording   Custodial   Interrogations, Final 
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overview of various jurisdictions and how each handles evidence of 
this nature.36 The opinions ranged from those that consider a 
detective’s statements on credibility to be absolutely prohibited,37 
to those jurisdictions that do not allow it, but consider that it is  
not reversible error if there is a wealth of other evidence against 
the defendant,38 and finally to those that consider that the “police 
officer’s statements have probative value for providing context 
even where the defendant, as here, made no inculpatory 
statements and had not changed his story.”39 
The Court opined that the appropriate approach for this type 
of evidence is to conduct “a balancing test and carefully weigh[]  
the low probative value of the recorded comments from the officers 
against the prejudicial impact to defendant.”40 In so doing, the 
Court determined that because 
the majority of the video and transcript . . . [were] 
dominated by the comments of the two detectives, with 
defendant occasionally responding in the negative [and 
b]ecause of the paucity of relevant or useful responses to 
be gleaned from defendant’s consistent explanation of 
events and assertion of innocence, those officers’ 
comments cannot be said to have had any contextual 
value.41 
Further, the Court held that the comments were prejudicial to 
Gaudreau and “[t]he fact that the jury viewed a videotape of the 
very detective  sitting  on the  witness stand telling defendant that 
 
Report (Feb. 1, 2012, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/wp- 
content/uploads/2016/05/RI-Task-Force-Report_Recording.pdf)). 
36. Id. at 444–47. 
37. Id.  at 444–45  (citing State  v.  Elnicki,  105  P.3d 1222,  1229 (Kan. 
2005)). 
38. Id. at 446 (citing State v. Demery, 30 P.3d 1278, 1285 (Wash. 2001)). 
39.   Id. (citing Dubria v. Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1001–03 (9th Cir. 2000)   
(“no violation to fundamental due process, even though California law would 
have required that the tapes be redacted, because not every trial error 
constitutes a failure to observe fundamental fairness and because trial judge 
gave two specific instructions that cured prejudice”); State v. Willis, 75 A.3d 
1068, 1078 (N.H. 2013) (“finding that probative value was not outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice because the officer’s comments were in the 
form of questions rather than accusations, and provided context for the 
defendant’s responses”)). 
40. Id. at 449. 
41. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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he was a liar compounded the danger that the jury might have 
been prejudiced against defendant” and that it was “far more 
prejudicial to him than anything said by his interrogators.”42 
However, in light of the “tapestry of factual evidence and bearing 
in mind the conduct, tone, and length of this particular 
interrogation,” the Court concluded “that the passions of the jury 
would [not] have been ‘so inflame[d] . . . as to prevent their calm 
and dispassionate examination of the evidence.’”43 However, the 
Court cautioned “that there is a real concern that these types of 
interrogations have the potential to lead to  substantial  
prejudice44 . . . and trial justices should be alert to the danger of 
potential abuse, such as the introduction of  manufactured 
evidence that would not be admitted at trial.”45 
On Gaudreau’s appeal of the dismissal of his motion for a new 
trial, the Court stated that “[a]s long as the trial justice has . . . 
articulated adequate reasons for denying the motion, his or her 
decision will be given great weight and left undisturbed unless the 
trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence or 
otherwise was clearly wrong.”46 In making her decision to deny 
Gaudreau’s motion for a new trial, the trial justice found that 
though the police investigation was not perfect, the officers were 
credible and that Gaudreau’s “version of events leading up to the 
time when [the officer] arrived at [his] home ‘lacked believability’ 
and made no sense.”47 Moreover, the eyewitness testimony of Mr. 
Richard, the snowplow driver, was credible, as were the 
testimonies from Mr. Gardinar, the lessor of the gym,48 and Karen 
Kane-Taylor.49 The trial justice also “found that the burns 
discovered on [Gaudreau’s] legs ‘and [his] ludicrous explanation of 
 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 449, 450 (quoting State v. Gomes, 764 A.2d 125, 136 (R.I. 
2001)). 
44. Id. at 450 (citing Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14, 28 (Ky. 
2005)). 
45. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 730 A.2d 513, 521 n.5 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1999)). 
46. Id. at 451 (quoting State v. Phannavong, 21 A.3d 321, 325 (R.I. 
2011)). 
47. Id. 
48. Furthermore, the Court held that Mr. Gardinar “had no motive to 
burn his property because he had allowed the insurance on the building to 
lapse.” Id. 
49. Id. at 452. 
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how he sustained them may have been some of the strongest items 
of evidence against [him].’”50 The Court held that “the trial justice 
more than met her obligations [when she] . . . consider[ed] the 
evidence in light of the jury charge, independently assess[ed] the 
credibility of the witnesses, . . . determine[d] that she agreed with 
the jury’s ultimate verdict,” and affirmed that decision by denying 
Gaudreau’s motion to dismiss.51 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly acknowledged that 
videotaped interrogations admitted against a defendant have 
potential to lead to substantial prejudice;52 however, it remains 
somewhat unclear if the Court made a bright line decision on a  
test for future, similar evidentiary issues. Because the Court held 
that the trial justice should have conducted a balancing test to 
weigh the probative value against the prejudicial impact, it seems 
that there is a possible scenario where videotaped interrogations 
containing no inculpatory evidence is admissible. The Court did 
place weight on the fact that Gaudreau’s explanations and 
assertions remained consistent in the face of the interrogation. 
Therefore, perhaps if another defendant’s story changed 
throughout the course of the interrogation, this could be grounds 
under the Court’s decision that such videotaped interrogations are 
admissible. 
Additionally, the Court held that the trial justice did not 
commit reversible error by admitting this videotaped interrogation 
in light of the overwhelming evidence against Gaudreau.53 
However, it is arguable that the other evidence is not 
overwhelming. If Gaudreau’s story is taken  as true, it explains  
his whereabouts and actions, and the only remaining evidence 
linking Gaudreau to the fire is the fact that he operates the gym. 
There is no physical evidence that definitively linked Gaudreau to 
the fire. According to the Court in its confirmation of the trial 
justice’s decision, the unreliableness and far-fetched aspects of 
Gaudreau’s  story  were  too  intertwined  with  the  overwhelming 
 
 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 450. 
53. Id. at 448, 449, 450. 
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aspects of the other evidence that tipped the scale in favor of the 
fact that the impermissible evidence did not overbear the minds of 
the jurors.54 However, it is also arguable that the videotaped 
recording may have helped Gaudreau because it showed that he 
remained consistent in his explanations, even in the face of 
continuous and pointed accusations and questions. 
The Court, in upholding the trial justice’s denial  of 
Gaudreau’s motion for a new trial, reaffirmed that a new trial will 
only be granted if evidence was overlooked  or  clearly wrong.55  
The trial justice listed at least seven reasons56 why she agreed  
that the jury reached the correct verdict. Because this was the 
second, full jury trial for Gaudreau, and all the evidentiary issues 
had been settled during the first trial, it is reasonable that the 
verdict should not be disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that when deciding 
whether to introduce into evidence a police interrogation 
containing no inculpatory statements that is recorded on 
videotape, a trial justice must weigh the low probative value of the 
recorded comments from the officers against the prejudicial  
impact to the defendant. If the evidence is erroneously admitted,  
it is harmless error unless there is proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error contributed to the verdict. The Court 
determined this based on an exhaustive review of jurisdictions’ 
practices and reasoning alongside those with which it agreed. 
 
Molly R. Hamlin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54. Id. at 449. 
55. Id. at 451. 
56. Id. at 451–52. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criminal Law. Tempest v. State, 141 A.3d 677 (R.I. 2016). A 
twenty-two-year-old murder conviction is vacated based on 
evidence that the State withheld witness statements from the 
defense, constituting a Brady violation. The State’s decision to 
withhold the evidence was deliberate, which under Rhode Island 
law, guaranteed the defendant a new trial regardless of the 
materiality of the suppressed evidence. Although the lower court 
granted the new trial based on two Brady violations and a due 
process violation, the Court only addressed one Brady claim, 
concluding that affirming one ground was dispositive of the case. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On April 22, 1992, a jury convicted Raymond “Beaver” 
Tempest, Jr. (Tempest) for the February 19, 1982 murder of 
Doreen Picard (Picard), and he was subsequently sentenced to 
eighty-five years in prison.1 Picard and Susan Laferte (Laferte) 
were both found brutally beaten in the basement of their home, 
located at 409 Providence Street, Woonsocket, Rhode Island.2 
Tragically, twenty-two-year-old Picard succumbed to her injuries 
and was pronounced dead within an hour of being  found.3 
Although Laferte ultimately survived the attack, she was unable 
to recall any details of that day, and no one has ever been charged 
for her assault.4 
Laferte and her husband owned the triplex apartment 
building in which the attack took place.5 Laferte and her husband 
lived on the first floor with their two young children, and Picard 
lived  on  the  third  floor  with  her  boyfriend.6     Douglas  Heath 
 
1.  Tempest v. State (Tempest III), 141 A.3d 677, 679, 681 (R.I. 2016).   
See State v. Tempest (Tempest I), 651 A.2d 1198 (R.I. 1995) for the 
affirmation of Tempest’s conviction. 
2. Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 680. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 680 n.3. 
5. Tempest I, 651 A.2d at 1203. 
6. Id. 
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(“Heath”) and his wife lived on the second floor, along with  
Heath’s fifteen-year-old stepdaughter, Lisa LaDue (LaDue).7 On 
the day of the murder, LaDue returned home at approximately 
3:20 p.m. and noticed a “big maroon car” in the driveway near the 
cellar bulkhead.8 After entering the apartment through the 
backdoor, LaDue encountered Laferte’s three-year-old daughter, 
Nicole, who was crying and said that her mother was “downstairs 
sick.”9  LaDue thought Nicole was merely seeking attention, so   
she went upstairs to wait for Heath to come home.10 
Approximately ten minutes later, Heath returned home and also 
met a crying Nicole, who indicated that her mother was in the 
basement “lying down.”11 When Heath entered the basement, he 
found the unrecognizable bodies of Picard and Laferte, one in a 
sitting position between the washer and dryer, and one face down 
in a “puddle of blood.”12 Horrified, Heath called out for LaDue to 
make sure she was safe, and then called the police.13 LaDue later 
testified that the maroon car was no longer present when the 
victims were found and that an ambulance had parked in its 
place.14 
Evidence presented in Tempest’s trial revealed that he knew 
Laferte prior to the attack and may have been having an 
extramarital relationship with her.15 Prior to the attack, Laferte 
and Tempest had arranged to mate their dogs, agreeing that 
Tempest would have his pick of the litter, and Laferte would keep 
the remaining puppies.16 Tempest promised his puppy to his 
friend, John Allard (Allard).17 On the day of the attack, Tempest 
and Allard went to Laferte’s apartment to retrieve the puppy and 
left  “without  incident”  at  approximately  1:45  p.m.18   Tempest’s 
 
7. Id. 
8. Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 679. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 680. 
12. Id. 
13. Tempest I, 651 A.2d 1198, 1203 (R.I. 1995). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. Laferte acknowledged that she was involved in an affair at the 
time of her attack, but due to her memory loss, was unable to verify that the 
affair was with Tempest.  Id. at 1203 n.1. 
16. Id. at 1204. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. Laferte’s  sister,  Carol  Rivet,  was  present  during  the  puppy 
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former sister-in-law, Sherri Richards, who lived with Allard and 
watched Tempest’s children on the day of the murder, testified 
that Tempest returned to her house between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m., 
left shortly thereafter to meet his brother-in-law, Robert Monteiro 
(“Monteiro”), and subsequently returned to Richards’s apartment 
between 4:30 and 4:45 p.m. with Monteiro.19 
Donna Carrier (Carrier) was one of four witnesses who 
testified that Tempest confessed to killing Picard.20 Carrier 
testified that Tempest was upset with Laferte because she “was 
going to tell [his wife] something and he and [his wife] had just 
gotten back together.”21 Carrier also testified that Tempest 
explained that Picard “‘came down the stairs at the wrong time, 
saw him hitting [Laferte]’ and that ‘[h]e couldn’t let her get away 
and had to do her, too.’”22 Carrier also gave numerous statements 
before trial indicating that she lived in the same apartment 
complex as Tempest on the day of the murder.23 This was later 
proven false, as Tempest lived on Phoebe Street on the day of the 
murder, and only moved to Winter Street, where Carrier lived 
with her boyfriend, John Guarino (Guarino), the following year.24 
After his conviction, Tempest first filed for postconviction 
relief on April 8, 2004, with a request to test physical evidence.25 
From that time until 2015, Tempest continued his quest for 
postconviction relief, to no avail.26  In April of 2015, Tempest filed 
a second petition for postconviction relief, which is the subject of 
 
 
exchange. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Tempest III, 141 A.3d 677, 680 (R.I. 2016). The three  other  
witnesses were: John Guarino, Carrier’s boyfriend; Ronald Vaz, an 
acquaintance with whom Tempest snorted cocaine; and Lorette Rivard, a 
prostitute that Tempest “part[ied] [with] one night in January, 1989.” Id. 
(first alteration in original). The trial justice noted that these four witnesses 
were not “a parade of MDs or [s]umma [c]um [l]audes,” but the court “must 
take the witnesses as they come.” Id. at 681 (alterations in original) (quoting 
Tempest I, 651 A.2d at 1218). 
21. Id. at 680 (alterations in original). 
22. Id. (alterations in original). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 684. 
25. Id. at 681. The physical evidence Tempest sought included “hair 
recovered from both victims of the attack, as well as fingernail clippings from 
Picard.” Id. 
26. Id. 
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this appeal.27 In response to that petition, Tempest was granted a 
postconviction relief hearing (PCR hearing), which took place over 
several weeks.28 The hearing justice ultimately  vacated  
Tempest’s conviction and granted a new trial, based on three 
distinct grounds: two Brady29 violations and one due process 
violation.30 The State opposed the hearing justice’s opinion on all 
three grounds, and petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court granted.31 
The first Brady violation was based on the prosecution’s 
suppression of Carrier’s statements seventeen days before trial.32 
Throughout pretrial interviews and hearings,33 Carrier’s 
testimony was that Tempest’s brother, Gordon Tempest (Gordon), 
a detective in the Woonsocket Police Department, did not know 
about Tempest’s involvement in the murder, and Gordon would  
not protect Tempest if he found out.34   However, seventeen days 
 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, 
irrespective of good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). Later cases have 
expanded the Brady standard to include impeachment material in addition to 
exculpatory evidence.  See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). 
30. Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 681. See Tempest v. State (Tempest II), No. 
PM20041896, 2015 WL 4389908 (R.I. Super. July 13, 2015) for the hearing 
justice’s opinion. 
31. Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 682. 
32. Id. at 682. The second Brady violation was based on John McMann 
Jr.’s (“McMann”) statements to the Woonsocket Police Department during 
Tempest’s trial. Id. Richards testified that she saw Tempest in McMann’s 
maroon car on the day of the murder. Id. at 689 (Suttell, C.J., concurring). 
When McMann learned of this testimony as the trial was ongoing, he went to 
the Woonsocket Police Department to inform the police that he never lent his 
car to anyone on the day of the murder, and, therefore, his car could not have 
been present at the murder scene. Id. at 690. Tempest argued, and the 
hearing justice agreed, that the prosecution’s failure to inform the defense 
that McMann and Kevin had told the Woonsocket Police Department that 
they did not lend the car to Monteiro constituted a Brady violation. Id. at  
690. The due process violation resulted from improper police practices and 
witness coaching during interviews with both Richards and LaDue. Tempest 
II, 2015 WL 4389908 at *21–22. 
33. Carrier gave her first statement to Woonsocket police in February, 
1987, and subsequently testified in a grand jury hearing on November 30, 
1990, at Tempest’s bail hearing in June, 1991, and at trial in April, 1992. 
Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 684. 
34. Id. 
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before the trial began, Carrier made two novel statements to the 
former prosecutor: 
(1) that [Gordon] . . . hid the murder weapon (a pipe) in a 
closet on the first floor at 409 Providence Street in an 
effort to conceal it so as to protect his brother; and (2) 
that, on the day of the murder, Tempest’s children were 
“excited” about getting a puppy.35 
The former prosecutor did not reveal Carrier’s statements to 
the defense but instead included a note in the file stating: “more 
new info re: GT [Gordon Tempest] putting pipe in closet + dog for 
the kids—too late—don’t volunteer new info—will cause big 
problems.”36 Tempest argued, and the  hearing  justice  agreed, 
that this failure to disclose violated both Brady and Rhode  
Island’s Wyche standard, which guarantees a new trial when a 
prosecutor deliberately fails to disclose any evidence,  even 
evidence that would not meet Brady’s material exculpatory 
requirement.37 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Court affirmed the hearing justice’s grant of a new trial 
based on the Carrier statements Brady violation.38 In reasoning 
that any one of the three grounds upon which the hearing justice 
granted a new trial would lead the Court to affirm its decision, the 
Court did not reach the other two grounds.39 The Court affirmed 
the hearing justice’s determination that the Carrier statements 
constituted a Brady violation, which was sufficient to affirm the 
hearing justice’s ruling granting Tempest’s new trial.40 
 
 
35. Id. at 682 (footnote omitted). Carrier had never before indicated that 
she had seen Tempest’s children on the day of the murder, or that she knew 
about his arrangement to obtain a puppy from Laferte. Id. 
36. Id. (alteration in original). 
37. Id. at 683; see also State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907, 910 (R.I.  1986) 
(“When the failure to disclose is deliberate, this court will not concern itself 
with the degree of harm caused to the defendant by the prosecution’s 
misconduct; we shall simply grant the defendant a new trial.”). 
38. Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 683. Justice Indeglia wrote for the Court, 
with Chief Justice Suttell concurring in part and dissenting in part, and 
Justice Goldberg dissenting. Id. at 679, 687 (Suttell, C.J., concurring), 698 
(Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
39. Id. at 683 (majority opinion). 
40. Id. 
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Under Brady, a new trial must be granted if the prosecution 
withheld material exculpatory evidence from the defense.41 If the 
evidence was deliberately withheld, Rhode Island’s Wyche 
standard provides that the defendant is entitled to a new trial, 
regardless of the materiality of the evidence.42 The prosecution’s 
suppression is deliberate when “it makes ‘a considered decision to 
suppress . . . for the purpose of obstructing’ or where it fails ‘to 
disclose evidence whose high value to the defense could not have 
escaped . . . [its] attention.’”43 
The Court held that the hearing justice applied  the proper 
test for a Brady violation.44 The hearing justice determined that 
the former prosecutor’s rationale for suppressing the Carrier 
statements was that “it would lead to a continuance and to 
headaches.”45 The hearing justice found that this “considered 
decision to suppress” was a deliberate suppression, and under 
Wyche, it must result in a new trial.46 The Court held that the 
hearing justice made no clear error in determining that the former 
prosecutor deliberately withheld the Carrier statements, and thus 
it affirmed the ruling granting a new trial.47 
The Court then conducted its own analysis of the evidence, 
and concluded that the “high value” of the Carrier statements 
“could not have escaped the former prosecutor’s attention,” 
thereby satisfying the Wyche test.48 
A. Carrier’s Pretrial Statements About Gordon’s Involvement 
The State argued that the Carrier statements indicating that 
Gordon hid the murder weapon were not actually new evidence, 
but merely cumulative of other evidence that had already been 
given to the defense.49 The Court easily dismissed this argument 
because the hearing justice found that the former prosecutor had 
 
41. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963); see also DeCiantis v. 
State, 24 A.3d 557, 570 (R.I. 2011). 
42. State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907, 910 (R.I. 1986). 
43. Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 683 (alterations in original) (quoting United 
States v. Keough, 391 F.2d 138, 146 (2nd Cir. 1968)). 
44. Id. at 683. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 684. 
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identified the statements as “new” in his note, and the  Court 
found no clear error in this finding.50 
In Carrier’s first statement to police in 1987, she stated that 
Gordon did not know about Tempest’s involvement in the murder, 
and Tempest told her that if Gordon ever found out, he would turn 
Tempest in to police.51 During her grand jury testimony in 1990, 
Carrier indicated that Tempest’s father, the High Sheriff of 
Providence, had knowledge and helped cover up Tempest’s 
involvement, but Gordon had no knowledge of Tempest’s role in  
the murder.52 At Tempest’s bail hearing in April, 1991, Carrier 
testified that “if [Tempest] told his brother, Gord[on], Gord[on] 
would go to the police and tell them what they knew, and that the 
murder weapon was not there, it wasn’t available, and that all 
fingerprints were taken care of.”53 During a statement to police in 
August, 1991, Carrier stated that “[Tempest] said, ‘I won’t get 
caught, my father and brother won’t let me get caught. The 
weapon’s been all taken care of, he said.’”54 The Court conceded 
that Carrier’s previous statements were “vague” with respect to 
Gordon’s involvement, but they never directly implicated Gordon 
in covering up Tempest’s crime.55 
The Court held that Carrier’s pretrial statement in March, 
1992, was a “dramatic” change from her previous statements; 
Carrier flip-flopped from denying Gordon’s knowledge or 
involvement to directly implicating him in concealing the murder 
weapon.56 At the PCR hearing, the former prosecutor recalled  
that “Carrier told him in March 1992—mere days before trial— 
that ‘Gordon Tempest had put the pipe in the closet’ at 409 
Providence Street, where it was ultimately found by police.”57 
Given the significant change in her statement, the Court deemed 
Carrier’s pretrial statement about Gordon to be a “significant 
modification,” and thus, the Court disagreed with the State’s  
claim that it was not new information.58 
 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 684–85. 
54. Id. at 685. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
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The State then argued that even if the statements were new 
evidence, they were not exculpatory evidence because they only 
further implicated Tempest in the crime, and therefore is not a 
Brady violation.59 The Court dismissed this argument on the 
grounds that Carrier’s inconsistent statements could have been 
used by the defense to impeach her credibility.60 The Court held 
that “facially inculpatory evidence can be used to impeach a 
witness,” and impeachment evidence constitutes Brady  
evidence.61 Thus, even absent a finding of deliberate failure to 
disclose under the Wyche standard, the State’s suppression of the 
Carrier statements about Gordon’s involvement establish a Brady 
violation warranting a new trial.62 
B. Carrier’s Pretrial Statements About Tempest’s Children 
The Court similarly dismissed the State’s argument that 
Carrier’s statement about Tempest’s children being excited about 
getting a puppy on the morning of the murder was not new 
information.63 Carrier’s grand-jury testimony indicated that 
Tempest planned to retrieve a puppy from “either Doreen Picard  
or Sue Laferte” on February 19, 1982, but she had never indicated 
that she had seen Tempest’s children that day, or that they were 
excited about the puppy.64 The Court held  that this statement  
had “impeachment value” because it would further discredit 
Carrier’s assertion that she saw Tempest on the day of the 
murder.65 Carrier was under the false belief that she lived in the 
same apartment complex as Tempest on Winter Street on the day 
of the murder.66 Additionally, it was “undisputed that John  
Allard, a friend of Tempest, was to be the recipient of the puppy,” 
not Tempest’s children.67 Given that Carrier had never before 
mentioned   seeing   Tempest’s   children   on   that   morning, this 
 
 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 n.21 (1999)); see 
also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). 
62. Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 685. 
63. Id. at 686. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
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statement was new evidence.68 
The State next argued that the statement was not material, 
and does not amount to a Brady violation.69 The Court reiterated 
its Wyche standard and held that the State’s deliberate 
suppression of evidence entitled Tempest to a new trial, regardless 
of materiality.70 Furthermore, the Court held that even absent a 
finding of deliberate failure to disclose under Wyche, this 
statement was material exculpatory evidence sufficient to 
establish a Brady violation.71 Much like Carrier’s inconsistent 
statements about Gordon’s involvement, this statement could  
have been used to “impeach Carrier’s testimony even further.”72 
The Court held that because there was no physical evidence in the 
case, witness credibility was paramount to the State’s case.73 If  
the defense had the opportunity to further impeach Carrier, “there 
is, at the very least, a reasonable probability—one ‘sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome’—that the verdict against 
Tempest would have been different.”74 Even though the defense 
had already impeached Carrier’s testimony by proving that 
Tempest did not live on Winter Street until 1983, the Court held 
that “whether the defense would have actually used the 
statements is not relevant to our analysis—the bottom line is that 
it should have been defense counsel’s choice to make.”75 
COMMENTARY 
Doreen Picard’s murder, which went unsolved for ten years 
and was the subject of a botched police investigation and probable 
cover-up,  serves  as  a  black  mark  in  Rhode  Island  history.76 
 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 687 (citing Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1006 (2016)). 
75. Id. 
76. See id. at 680 (“[E]ven the state described [the case] as a ‘chao[tic],’ 
‘disorder[ly],’ and ‘disast[rous]’ nine-year investigation by the Woonsocket 
police department[.]”) (alteration in original). “[The case] ranks as one of the 
most infamous crimes committed in this state during the last century. The 
fact that no arrest was made for several years was a festering sore in the 
community, compounded by a cover-up by sworn police officers.” Id. at 698 
(Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
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Finding the Rhode Island Supreme Court divided on this decision 
is not surprising, given the extreme intricacies of the case, which 
have developed over the thirty-four years since Picard was 
murdered. While the majority was satisfied that the suppressed 
Carrier statements constituted a Brady violation,77 the 
concurrence and dissent both disagreed with the standard 
employed; the dissent would have reversed the hearing justice’s 
ruling altogether,78 and the concurrence would have remanded on 
the Carrier issue, but ultimately agreed with the ruling based on 
the McMann statements Brady violation.79 
The concurrence, not satisfied by the Carrier statements, 
moved on to the other Brady violation: the McMann statements 
about the maroon car.80 The Chief Justice found that this issue 
was indeed a Brady violation, and he would have affirmed the 
lower court’s holding on that  ground.81  However,  Justice 
Goldberg held that the hearing justice abused his discretion in 
denying the State’s laches defense, and she would have reversed 
on the McMann statements as well.82 The dissent then addressed 
the due process violation to complete the review of the issues on 
appeal.83 While the dissent agreed that the majority need not 
consider the McMann evidence, given that it affirmed the decision 
below, the dissent believed that the majority should have 
considered the due process claim, so that the trial court would 
have instructions on that issue on retrial.84 Justice Goldberg 
predicted that without the Supreme Court’s instruction on the due 
process violation, the issue will likely be back before the Court 
when the case goes to trial once again.85 Eschewing the  
inefficiency of this likely occurrence, Justice Goldberg addressed 
 
77. Id. at 687 (majority opinion). 
78. Id. at 717 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
79. Id. at 688 (Suttell, C.J., concurring). 
80. Id. at 689. 
81. Id. at 698. 
82.  Id. at 717–18 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).  Justice Goldberg believed  
that Tempest did not meet his burden of proving that his defense team did  
not know that Monteiro did not own or borrow the maroon car on the day of 
the murder. Furthermore, it seems that Tempest could have  easily  
discovered this information and did not need to wait until 2013, twenty-one 
years after his conviction, to bring forth the claim. Id. 
83. Id. at 730. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
  
 
 
812  ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:802 
 
the due process violation and put forth her own opinion as to how 
to treat the testimony of the witnesses coached by the Woonsocket 
Police Department.86 
A. Wyche Standard 
The concurrence and dissent agreed that the hearing justice 
and the majority omitted a vital part of the Wyche standard.87 
Under the Wyche standard for deliberate nondisclosure, the 
prosecution must have either (1) made “a considered decision to 
suppress . . . for the [very] purpose of obstructing,” or, 
alternatively, (2) “fail[ed] to disclose evidence whose high value to 
the defense could not have escaped . . . [its] attention.”88 The 
concurrence concluded that the hearing justice made no 
determination of fact regarding the former prosecutor’s purpose 
for suppressing the evidence, and the case could be remanded for 
such a determination on that issue.89 The dissent believed that  
the hearing justice made no factual determination as to why the 
former prosecutor withheld the Carrier statements and applied 
the wrong legal test (omitting “for the very purpose of obstructing” 
from the analysis), constituting clear error. Conducting her own 
analysis, Justice Goldberg found that the prosecution’s 
suppression satisfied neither prong of the Wyche standard, and 
thus, Carrier’s statements must be analyzed under the Brady 
material exculpatory standard.90 
B. Materiality 
The striking difference between the Court’s and the dissent’s 
recitation of the facts leads one to question the objectivity of 
materiality. The Court reasoned that Carrier was “arguably the 
most credible” of the four witnesses who testified that Tempest 
confessed     to     killing     Picard,91      while     the     dissent   was 
 
 
86. Id. at 732. 
87. Id. at 688 (Suttell, C.J., concurring), 706 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
88. Id. at 706 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (alterations in original). 
89. Id. at 688 (Suttell, C.J., concurring). Although the Chief Justice 
disagreed with the Court’s Wyche standard and would have remanded on that 
issue, he ultimately concurred in the opinion because he affirmed the hearing 
justice’s opinion based on the McMann statement Brady claim. Id. 
90. Id. at 707, 710, 714 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
91. Id. at 686–87 (majority opinion). 
  
 
2017] SURVEY SECTION 813 
 
“convince[d] . . . that Carrier was the least credible witness offered 
by the state.”92 The Court compared Carrier to the other three 
witnesses, including a drug user and a prostitute, and found her to 
be more credible,93 but the dissent reasoned that Carrier was the 
only witness “demonstrated to have fabricated prior testimony.”94 
Clearly, the Court and dissent viewed Carrier’s testimony very 
differently, making it impossible to agree on its materiality. 
Whether the Court should make determinations of materiality 
was also at issue.95 Justice Goldberg admonished the Court for 
making findings of credibility, but also put forth her own opinion 
that Carrier was the least credible witness, and asserted that the 
withheld statements were merely cumulative impeachment 
evidence.96 The dissent pointed out that the trial justice “pressed 
Carrier to admit that, contrary to what she told the grand jury,” 
she could not have seen Tempest on the day of the murder,  
because “she and Tempest were not neighbors on the day of the 
murder[.]”97 Ultimately, it is difficult to imagine the additional 
value of impeachment evidence for a witness who admitted on the 
stand that she was “mistaken” and did not see Tempest on the day 
of the murder.98 Had the hearing justice made a determination of 
fact with respect to the materiality of Carrier’s statements, the 
Court would not have to speculate as it did. 
C. Due Process Violation 
The due process violation resulted from improper police 
practices and witness coaching during interviews with both 
Richards and LaDue.99   The hearing justice found that “the  police 
 
 
92. Id. at 714 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
93. Id. at 680 (majority opinion). 
94. Id. at 714 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. (“For one thing, this type of credibility assessment is reserved for 
the hearing justice, not the members of this Court. The hearing justice made 
no such credibility determination in the relevant two-and-a-half pages of his 
decision, and the majority should not have ventured onto this forbidden 
terrain. In any event, my reading of the trial transcript convinces me that 
Carrier was the least credible witness offered by the state.”). 
97. Id. at 703. 
98. See id. 
99. Tempest  II,  No.  PM20041896,  2015  WL  4389908,  at  *21–22 (R.I. 
Super. July 13, 2015). 
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fed witnesses information in an effort to move the  case  against 
Mr. Tempest forward,” and employed a variety of “suggestive 
interview techniques.”100 The hearing justice highlighted the 
police’s ten interviews with Richards, whose account “shifted in 
lockstep with the State’s theory of the case.”101 Throughout her 
interviews, and as the State learned more information, Richards 
would appear to “develop[] hypermnesia—suddenly remembering 
Mr. Tempest’s return and vividly recalling the sight of him 
standing by Mr. Monteiro’s car on the day of the murder.”102 
Ultimately, the hearing justice determined that “[r]egardless of 
whether police intended to interfere with the witnesses’ 
recollection of events here, the taint of improper police procedure 
so poisoned the well that Mr. Tempest’s conviction cannot 
stand.”103 
“In refusing to address this claim, the majority leaves a  
gaping hole rather than a clear mandate on remand.”104 There is 
no legal error in the Court’s decision not to address the witness 
coaching claim, but there is practical error. When Tempest’s new 
trial comes about, he will surely object to the admissibility of 
LaDue’s and Richards’s testimonies with respect to the maroon 
car, claiming that the police coached the witnesses. The PCR 
hearing justice found that “the presentation of this faulty 
testimony at trial prejudiced Mr. Tempest,” and resulted in a due 
process violation.105 However, the dissent points out that the 
hearing justice’s ruling on the evidence has no bearing on the 
admissibility of the “faulty” evidence in Tempest’s upcoming new 
trial, and thus, the State may present the same evidence against 
Tempest once again.106 
Without addressing the admissibility of this evidence, the 
issue will arise in Tempest’s new trial, and quite possibly return 
before the Supreme Court. Unquestionably, there has been a 
miscarriage of justice in this case.   Doreen Picard was mercilessly 
 
100. Id. at *21, *24. 
101. Id. at *26. 
102. Id. at *54. 
103. Id. at *58 (citing Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 9 (1956)). 
104. Tempest III, 141 A.3d 677, 730 (R.I. 2016) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
105. Tempest II, 2015 WL 4389908, at *59. 
106. Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 731 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (“A PCR 
hearing justice has no authority to address the admissibility of evidence in a 
retrial[.]”). 
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killed at a young age, and her family did not see justice until ten 
years later. The Woonsocket Police Department botched the crime 
scene investigation and coached witnesses. Tempest was  not  
given a fair trial because the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence 
to the defense. From any angle, this case has lingered too long,  
and the Court should have seized any chance that it could to bring 
a resolution. Without answering the due process  question, 
Tempest will either face another unfair trial, or else must wait for 
the Court to decide the question of admissibility on appeal. 
The Court pointed out that it could affirm the hearing  
justice’s opinion based on any one of the three issues on appeal.107 
Consequently, one is left to wonder why the Court chose to  
analyze the Carrier statements as its “one issue” instead of the 
McMann statements or the witness coaching. Given that the 
witness coaching claim is the only claim to have significance in the 
new trial, the Court could have killed the metaphorical two birds 
with one stone by addressing it: affirm the decision and give the 
new trial justice direction about the admissibility of the evidence. 
The Court missed an opportunity to help put an end to this case, 
and all but guaranteed that it would revisit this issue in near the 
future. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court 
justice’s order to vacate Tempest’s twenty-four-year-old murder 
conviction and granted a new trial. The Court held that the State 
deliberately suppressed Donna Carrier’s statements, which were 
material evidence, violating both Brady and Rhode Island’s more 
defendant-friendly Wyche standard. 
Jennifer Lisi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107. Id. at 682 (majority opinion). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Family Law. Hogan v. McAndrew, 131 A.3d 717 (R.I. 2016). 
Under chapter 14.1 of title 15 of the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, before the Family Court may 
decline jurisdiction on the grounds that Rhode Island is an 
inconvenient forum, the Family Court must engage in a two-step 
inquiry. First, the hearing justice must determine whether it 
would be appropriate for another state to exercise jurisdiction, and 
in making that determination, the court must allow the parties to 
submit evidence and weigh eight different factors set out in 
section 15-14.1-19. If the court determines that another 
appropriate forum exists, they must then consider whether the 
current state would be an inconvenient forum under the 
circumstances of that particular case. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Valerie M. Hogan (Hogan) and Philip A. McAndrew 
(McAndrew) are parents to P., born in 1999, C., born in 2000, and 
E., born in 2004.1 Both Hogan and McAndrew are dual citizens of 
Ireland and the United States and were granted a divorce in the 
Rhode Island Family Court in 2008.2 A property settlement 
involving both parties established that Hogan and McAndrew 
agreed to share joint custody of their three children, but that 
Hogan was to have physical custody.3 The agreement included a 
forum-selection clause, consented to by both parties, in which all 
future custody disputes would fall under the jurisdiction of the 
Rhode  Island  Family Court  and  chapter  14.1  of  title  15  of the 
 
 
1. Hogan v. McAndrew, 131 A.3d 717, 719 (R.I. 2016). The  Rhode 
Island Supreme Court honored McAndrew’s request to keep the children’s 
names private and to refer to them only by their first initials.  Id. n.2. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. The property agreement stipulated that Hogan was allowed to 
move the children to Ireland in 2009 and that McAndrew was to exercise 
visitation with them both in Ireland and the U.S. Id. The agreement was 
transformed into a final judgment of divorce entered by consent of both 
parties.  Id. at 720. 
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Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(UCCJEA).4 In 2009, Hogan relocated the children to Ireland; 
McAndrew frequently visited the children in Ireland, and the 
children visited him for two weeks every summer in Rhode  
Island.5 During their visit to Rhode Island in the summer of 2014, 
the two oldest children alleged to McAndrew that Hogan had 
subjected them to physical and emotional abuse and that the Irish 
Child and Family Agency (TULSA) had become involved with the 
family after a report of abuse by P. to his school counselors.6 
On July 9, 2014, McAndrew filed in the Rhode Island Family 
Court an “ex parte, emergency motion to modify the custody and 
placement [agreement][,]” “a motion for an in-camera interview of 
the children[,]” and a motion for an order that would require 
Hogan “to submit to a mental health evaluation[;]” the ex parte, 
emergency motion was granted.7 On July 16, Hogan sought to 
vacate the ex parte order8 and dismiss the case, claiming that the 
Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction given the fact that 
all three children had been living in Ireland for more than five 
years.9 At the hearing to vacate the ex parte order on July 17, the 
issues of subject matter jurisdiction and forum non conveniens 
were postponed for hearing until September 12.10 Prior to the 
September 12 Family Court date, Hogan attempted to maintain 
jurisdiction in the High Court of Ireland.11 The High Court of 
Ireland granted McAndrew’s motion to stay the special summons 
on September 9, declaring that Hogan could continue her action 
only if Rhode Island rejected jurisdiction.12 
At the hearings in the Family Court on September 12 and 15 
of  2014,  the  parties  were  able  to  present  evidence  on  the 
 
 
4. Id. at 719–20. 
5. Id. at 720. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. The motions alleged that P. and C. did not want to return to 
Ireland. Id. 
8. The ex parte order was vacated on July 17.  Id at 720 n.3. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 720–21. At the hearing, the parties reached an agreement in 
which P. would stay in Rhode Island with McAndrew and attend school there 
in the fall, and C. was to extend her visit, subsequently returning to Ireland 
in late August.  Id. at 720 n.3. 
11. Id. at 721. 
12. Id. 
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jurisdiction issue.13 Elicited from the testimony  were  the 
following facts: Except for visits to their father, the children 
resided in Ireland from January of 2009, until July of 2014 with 
their mother;14 McAndrew spent multiple weeks with his children 
each year, most of that time being in Ireland; the children 
attended Irish schools since their move to Ireland in 2009;15 the 
family received services from TULSA; and all of the family’s then- 
current medical doctors, therapists, and social workers were from 
Ireland.16 McAndrew asserted in his testimony that he would not 
have agreed to allow the children to go to Ireland without the 
agreement, asserting that the Rhode Island Family Court would 
maintain jurisdiction because he believed that Ireland does not 
recognize the joint custody rights of a divorced father.17 
Regarding the parties’ financial situations, the court 
determined that McAndrew was a physician in a medical practice 
and received a biweekly stipend of $5,500 regardless of whether or 
not he worked during those weeks.18 Hogan, on the other hand, is 
a per diem nurse at a local hospital and received wages eight  
times lower than those of McAndrew.19 Hogan receives no paid 
vacation time and is not paid unless she works, whereas 
McAndrew receives four weeks of vacation time each year and is 
paid regardless.20 McAndrew also testified regarding the multiple 
witnesses in Rhode Island who could speak to the relationship he 
has with his children, that he would pay the travel expenses for 
“any witness who would travel to Rhode Island to testify in Family 
Court[,]” and that testimony could be provided via 
teleconference.21 Hogan asserted that she  had  difficulties 
securing  childcare  when  she  had  to  travel  to  Rhode  Island for 
 
 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. With the exception of P. being enrolled in school in Rhode Island in 
August of 2014. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 721 (majority opinion), 730 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting). 
19. Id. at 722. (majority opinion). McAndrew also testified to the fair 
market value of his home, the rental income he received every month, as well 
as the $400,000 in his 401(k) and the $25,000 in various investment accounts. 
Id. at 721 (majority opinion), 730 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting). 
20. Id. at 721, 722 (majority opinion). 
21. Id. at 721–22. 
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court dates.22 The hearing justice decided that the Family Court 
had exclusive jurisdiction under the UCCJEA but concluded that 
Ireland was a more appropriate forum on the ground of forum non 
conveniens.23 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal, “McAndrew argue[d] that the hearing justice 
abused her discretion by not giving proper weight to the mutually 
agreed upon forum-selection clause” and other additional factors 
that should be considered under the UCCJEA.24 A trial  justice 
has abused her discretion when ‘“a material factor deserving 
significant weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied 
upon, or when all proper and no improper factors are assessed, but 
the court makes a serious mistake in weighing them.’”25 To 
determine if any factors were ignored, improperly relied upon, or 
weighed incorrectly, the Court itself went through the two-part 
test laid out in section 15-14.1-19.26 Under the UCCJEA, the  
lower court must first determine whether it would be “‘appropriate 
for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction,’” and is to 
analyze and weigh eight factors laid out in the statute in making 
that determination.27 If the lower court concludes that a more 
appropriate forum exists, it then must consider whether the 
current forum would be inconvenient under the circumstances.28 
The Court discussed each of the eight factors and how the 
 
22. Id. at 722. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. (quoting Indep. Oil and Chem. Workers of Quincy, Inc. v. Procter 
& Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1988)). 
26. Id. at 724. 
27. Id. at 723; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-14.1-19 (West, Westlaw 
through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). The eight factors include: (1) whether there 
has been domestic violence in the relationship and what state could best 
protect the parties from future domestic violence; (2) how long the child has 
been residing outside the state; (3) the distance between the current court  
and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction; (4) the financial 
circumstances of the two parties; (5) “any agreement of the parties as to 
which state should assume jurisdiction”; (6) the nature of the relevant 
evidence and the location of that evidence, including the testimony of the 
child(ren); (7) each court’s ability to resolve the case quickly and the different 
procedures necessary to present the evidence; and (8) how familiar each court 
is to the facts and issues in the case.  Hogan, 131 A.3d at 723–24. 
28. Id. at 724. 
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hearing justice applied them before moving on to discuss the 
reasons why it believed certain factors should have been weighed 
differently.29 The Court took issue with the way in which the fifth 
factor was applied and made a point to discuss the high value that 
is conferred upon final judgments entered into by consent.30 This, 
coupled with the fact that McAndrew would not have reached an 
agreement with Hogan absent the forum-selection clause, left the 
Court to believe this factor was not weighed heavily enough in the 
hearing justice’s analysis.31 
The other factor that the Court thought was weighed 
incorrectly regarded the ability of the Irish courts to decide the 
issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the 
evidence in the proposed forum.32 The lack of evidence presented 
both to the Family Court and the Rhode Island Supreme Court, 
regarding the procedures necessary to present evidence in Irish 
courts, as well as the parties’ inability to provide a clear 
understanding to the courts about whether the Irish system would 
recognize an American, joint-custody agreement, led the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court to determine that the Family Court 
improperly determined that the seventh factor weighed equally in 
favor of Rhode Island and Ireland.33 Finally, the Court also 
determined that the hearing justice did not consider the “interplay 
among the factors” or other “material evidence” that had bearing 
on the weight certain factors should have been given.34 
The Court made the determination that several factors were 
weighed incorrectly during the first step of the inquiry, but it also 
went on to explain that it is a two-part test, and to decline 
jurisdiction, the lower court needed to make a separate finding 
that Rhode Island was an inconvenient forum.35 To properly have 
declined jurisdiction, the hearing justice would have had to make 
“an independent finding that Rhode Island was ‘significantly 
inconvenient and [that] the ends of justice would be better served 
 
 
29. Id. at 725, 726. 
30. Id. at 726. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 727 (citing Indep. Oil and Chem. Workers of Quincy, Inc. v. 
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir.1988)). 
34. Id. at 728. 
35. Id. 
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if the action were brought and tried in another forum.’”36 The 
Court did not go on to make the second analysis itself, but rather, 
held that the hearing justice abused her discretion in executing 
both steps of the two-part analysis.37 
COMMENTARY 
The Court stated early in its opinion that abuse occurs only 
“‘when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored, 
when an improper factor is relied upon,’” or when the lower court 
makes a serious mistake in weighing the multiple factors.38 While 
the Court did a wonderful job in explaining what the eight factors 
are and what evidence should be used in evaluating them, the 
Court seemed to do their own factor-by-factor analysis in reaching 
their decision. While this provided a better understanding of the 
factors and what they entail, the Court was not in the position to 
do their own factor analysis and make a decision based on that 
analysis. Chief Justice Suttell said it best when he stated, “the 
issue is not whether I would have reached a different result than 
[the trial justice] did; the issue is whether she abused her 
discretion in so doing.”39 
It seems as though the Court is opening up the floodgates to 
allow every parent whose case has been dismissed for forum non 
conveniens under the UCCJEA to appeal to the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court in hopes that the justices will do their own 
analysis, and if they decide differently, overturn the lower court’s 
decision because they believe the factors should be weighed 
differently. For a judge’s decision to be overturned for abuse of 
discretion there needs to be a serious mistake in the way in which 
the various factors were weighed,40 and although the justices here 
may have weighed the various factors differently, the hearing 
justice considered all of the statutory factors and weighed them in 
a way in which was fair, reasonable, and well within her 
discretion. 
 
36. Id. at 728–729 (alteration in original) (quoting Kedy v. A.W. 
Chesterton Co., 946 A.2d 1171, 1178 (R.I. 2008)). 
37. Id. at 729. 
38. Id. at 722 (quoting Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d at 929). 
39. Id. at 732 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting) (citing S. Cty. Post & Beam, Inc., 
v. McMahon, 116 A.3d 204, 210 (R.I. 2015)). 
40. Id. at 722 (majority opinion). 
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The Court did determine that the seventh factor was weighed 
improperly due to a lack of evidence, but this determination is 
different than the one required in the reviewing court’s role. The 
determination that the factor was weighed incorrectly could have 
been a valid one, but that was not one of the determinations 
necessary in deciding whether or not there was an abuse of 
discretion. The mistake in weighing the seventh factor,  while 
valid, was not a serious mistake that was “of such a magnitude as 
to constitute an abuse of discretion in her ultimate conclusion that 
Ireland was the more appropriate forum.”41 Here, the factors 
weighed slightly in favor of maintaining jurisdiction in the Rhode 
Island Family Court, but that determination was the hearing 
justice’s determination to make, not the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court justices’. “‘[W]e shall not substitute our view of  the  
evidence for [that of the hearing justice] even though a contrary 
conclusion could have been reached.’”42 
Another problem that arises is the lack of direction given to 
the second reason for overturning the lower court’s decision. The 
Court made the correct decision in enforcing the necessary, second 
step of the inquiry that the UCCJEA lays out: the requirement 
that the hearing justice determine that Rhode Island is an 
inconvenient forum.43 However, in  making that determination  
and sending the case back down to the Family Court, the Court 
failed to lay out what exactly it expected from the analysis and 
what they believed was necessary in making that determination. 
Chief Justice Suttell shed some light on that topic in his dissent,44 
but the Court failed to address that issue. This could seem 
unimportant, however, the Court has already done its own 
analysis for the first issue, and the gap in law left open in the 
Court’s opinion leaves the opportunity for this case to again come 
before the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The justices should 
review decisions from the lower courts, not re-decide them based 
on their own factual opinions. 
 
 
 
41. See id. at 731 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting). 
42. Id. at 732 (alteration in original) (quoting JPL Livery Servs., Inc. v. 
R.I. Dept. of Admin., 88 A.3d 1134, 1142 (R.I.2014)). 
43. See id. at 728 (majority opinion). 
44. Id. at 732 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that in order to 
dismiss a case and relinquish jurisdiction based on forum non 
conveniens the hearing justice must make two determinations. 
First, the lower court must determine whether there is a court in 
another jurisdiction that could be appropriate and use the eight 
factors laid out in section 15-14.1-19 to make that determination. 
If the court concludes that another jurisdiction could be 
appropriate, it must then make a second, independent 
determination that the current forum would be  inconvenient 
under the circumstances of that case. Only if both of those 
determinations are made in the affirmative may the court choose 
to relinquish jurisdiction to that of another. 
Kaylin M. Pelletier 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Family Law. In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774 (R.I. 2016). The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court reversed an adjudication of delinquency on 
two counts of first-degree child molestation because the 
complainants’ testimony that their penises were “in” and “inside” 
the respondent’s “butt” was insufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that sexual penetration of the respondent’s anal 
opening took place. An adjudication of delinquency on the lesser 
charge of second-degree child molestation was directed to be 
entered on remand because the trial justice’s adjudication of 
delinquency on the greater offense necessarily included an 
adjudication of delinquency on the lesser-included offense. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In August of 2011, B.H., then thirteen years old, sexually 
molested two of his friends, twin, eleven year old brothers Kevin 
and Henry, during a sleepover at the twins’ grandparents’ house.1 
In August of 2012, delinquency papers were filed with the family 
court, alleging that B.H. committed first and second-degree child 
molestation.2 At trial, Kevin and Henry both testified that during 
the sleepover, B.H. asked both of them to put their penises “in 
[B.H.’s] butt,” and the twins complied because B.H. had  
threatened to tell their grandmother that the twins were doing 
“something” or “trying to do something.”3 Neither Kevin  nor 
Henry could recall the specifics of the incident, but when asked 
whether or not their penises went “inside of [B.H.],” the twins 
answered in the affirmative.4 Kevin and Henry testified that B.H. 
had asked them to put his penis into their “butts” but they both 
refused.5 Henry testified that B.H. characterized the incident as 
“[a]n experiment to see if we wanted to be gay,”6  and that B.H. 
 
1. In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774, 777 (R.I. 2016). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 777, 778. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 778. 
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had placed his penis on Henry’s body.7 
After the State had closed its case, B.H. moved to dismiss the 
petitions arguing that, with respect to the first-degree child 
molestation charges, an essential element of the charged offense, 
sexual penetration, was not established because the testimony of 
the twins that they placed their penises “in” and “inside” B.H.’s 
“butt” was insufficient evidence that sexual penetration took 
place.8 B.H. also argued that if the State found that sexual 
penetration did take place, the State was required to prove that 
B.H. had “acted with the intent for sexual arousal or sexual 
gratification,” and no such finding was made.9 The trial justice 
denied the motion, and concluded that the evidence was indeed 
sufficient to establish the element of sexual penetration and 
explained that, “[i]n or outside the butt is certainly where the anal 
opening is located. This Court does not expect a child . . . to 
describe a horrific act . . . with such specificity and adult language 
that it mirrors the language of the statute.”10  The trial justice  
also rejected B.H.’s argument that the State was required to prove 
that B.H. had acted with the intent of sexual arousal or sexual 
gratification, but explained that even if the State was required to 
prove this, it had based on the testimony of the twins, which 
revealed that B.H. desired to penetrate the boys.11 The  trial 
justice concluded that the State had met its burden of proving that 
B.H. had committed first-degree child molestation upon the twins, 
and B.H. was adjudged delinquent on those charges, which he 
timely appealed.12 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court had to 
determine “whether legally competent evidence exist[ed] therein  
to support the findings made by the family court trial justice,”13 
and also whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the 
 
 
7. Id. (alteration in original). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 779. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”14 
Ultimately, the Court agreed with B.H. that the testimony of both 
Kevin and Henry, which revealed that the twins put their penises 
“in” and “inside” B.H.’s “butt,” was insufficient evidence to show 
sexual penetration.15 In reaching that decision, the Court looked  
to the definition of “sexual penetration,” found in the statute,16 to 
determine whether or not the twins’ testimony that their penises 
were “inside [B.H.’s] butt” was sufficient to establish “anal 
intercourse or any other intrusion” under the meaning of the 
statute.17 Because the terms “sexual intercourse” and “anal 
intercourse” are not defined in the language of the statute, the 
court looked to various definitions for these terms.18 The Court  
also had to define the term “butt,” since this was the term used by 
the twins, and the term “anus” since this is the area subject to 
sexual penetration during anal intercourse.19 After considering 
those definitions, the Court determined that “[t]he words  
[buttocks and anus] are not synonyms as they describe entirely 
different parts of the anatomy.”20 
The Court explained that the General Assembly, when 
enacting the chapter of the general laws relating to sexual assault, 
 
 
14. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
319 (1979)). 
15. Id. at 780. 
16. Id.; see also R.I. GEN LAWS ANN. § 11-37-1(8) (West, Westlaw through 
Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.).  The statute reads as follows: 
Sexual penetration’” means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, 
and anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, by any 
part of a person’s body or by any object into the genital or anal 
openings of another person’s body, or the victim’s own body upon the 
accused’s instruction, but emission of semen is not required. 
§ 11-37-1(8). 
17. In re B.H., 138 A.3d at 780. 
18. Id. The Court defined “sexual intercourse” as intercourse that 
“involves penetration of the vagina by the penis,” and anal intercourse was 
defined as “penetration of the anal opening by a penis.” Id. (internal citations 
omitted). 
19. Id. The Court defined “butt” as “[t]he prominence formed by the 
gluteal muscles of either side,” and “anus” as “[t]he lower opening of the 
digestive tract. It is associated with the anal sphincter and lies in the cleft 
between the buttocks, through which fecal matter is extruded.” Id. (internal 
citations omitted). 
20. Id. at 781 (quoting Downey v. State, 726 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2000)). 
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distinguished the terms “buttocks” and “anus.”21 Under section 11-
37-1(8), “sexual penetration” includes intrusions into the anal 
opening,22 while section 11-37-1(7) defines “sexual contact” as “the 
intentional touching of the victim’s or accused’s intimate parts, 
clothed or unclothed, if that intentional touching can be  
reasonably construed as intended by the accused to be for the 
purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or assault.”23  After  
making that distinction, the Court looked at its decision in State v. 
McDonald, where it held that “precise and specific testimony is 
necessary to support [an act of sexual penetration] and that to 
infer penetration from the complainant’s testimony would be to 
draw an inference that could scarcely justify a finding of [sexual] 
penetration beyond a reasonable doubt.”24  Based on the holding  
in McDonald, the Court held that the twins’ testimony was not 
precise and specific enough to support a finding of sexual 
penetration.25 The State had the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that sexual penetration had occurred, and the 
State failed to do so since it only elicited testimony concerning 
B.H.’s “butt.”26 The use of the term “butt” rendered the twins’ 
testimony too imprecise and vague to determine whether or not 
sexual penetration had occurred.27 Therefore, the State failed to 
prove the sexual penetration element of first-degree child 
molestation beyond a reasonable doubt.28 
Next, the Court had to decide whether or not the  
adjudications of delinquency should be reversed and the petitions 
dismissed.29 In answering this question, the Court looked to a 
prior decision, State v. Silvia, where it held that “[a]s a matter of 
law, second-degree child molestation is a lesser-included offense of 
 
 
21. Id. 
22. Id.; see also R.I. GEN LAWS ANN. § 11-37-1(8) (West, Westlaw through 
Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
23. In re B.H., 138 A.3d at 781; see also § 11-37-1(7). 
24. In re B.H., 138 A.3d at 781 (quoting 602 A.2d 923, 925 (R.I. 1992)). 
25. Id. at 782. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. The Court explained, “[a]n intrusion into the space between a 
person’s buttocks, while perhaps a necessary step on the path to intrusion of 
the anal opening, is not, in itself, an intrusion into the anal opening. Id. 
(quoting Downey v. State, 726 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)). 
28. Id. at 783. 
29. Id. 
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first-degree child molestation.”30 The Court also explained that 
this jurisdiction follows the common law rule that once a person 
has been charged with an offense that contains a lesser-included 
offense, the accused is put on notice that they are being charged 
with the lesser-included crime as well.31 Therefore, the Court 
reached the conclusion that the first-degree child molestation 
charge necessarily carried with it a charge of the lesser-included 
offense of second-degree child molestation.32 Since B.H.  was  
found delinquent on the first-degree child molestation charge, the 
Court reasoned that the trial justice found all of the elements of 
second-degree child molestation had been met.33 B.H. argued that 
the State had failed to prove the elements of second-degree child 
molestation because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that B.H. acted with the purpose of sexual arousal or 
gratification.34 The Court disagreed and held that the evidence 
was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that B.H. had acted with the requisite  
purpose.35  The matter was then remanded to the family court  
with directions to enter an adjudication of delinquency on the 
lesser-included offense of second-degree child molestation and for 
resentencing since the State had already proved the elements of 
the  lesser-included  charge  of  second-degree  child molestation–a 
 
30. Id. (citing 798 A.2d 419, 424–25 (R.I. 2002)). 
31. Id. at 784; see also R.I. GEN LAWS ANN. § 12-17-14 (West, Westlaw 
through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.).  The statute reads as follows: 
[w]henever any person is tried upon an indictment, information or 
complaint and the court or jury, as the case may be, shall not be 
satisfied that he or she is guilty of the whole offense, but shall be 
satisfied that he or she is guilty of so much of the offense as shall 
substantially amount to an offense of a lower nature, or that the 
defendant did not complete the offense charged, but that he or she 
was guilty only of an attempt to commit the offense as the case may 
be, and the court shall proceed to sentence the person for the offense 
of which he or she shall be so found guilt, notwithstanding that the 
court had to otherwise jurisdiction of the offense. 
§ 12-17-14. 
32. In re B.H., 138 A.3d at 784. 
33. Id. at 785. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. The evidence that the Court relied on was the twins’ testimony 
that B.H. had asked them to penetrate his “butt,” B.H.’s desire to switch roles 
with the twins, and the fact that B.H. touched the twins’ private parts. Id. 
The Court also relied on the testimony of the twins’ mother who said that 
B.H. seemed to enjoy the incident. Id. 
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charge that B.H. was put on notice of when he was charged with 
first-degree child molestation.36 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court departed from its own “well-
settled law,” when it remanded this matter to the family court 
with directions to enter an adjudication of delinquency on  the 
lesser-included offense of second-degree child molestation.37 The 
Court relied on R.I. Gen. Laws sections 12-17-14 and 11-37-9 in 
holding that second-degree child molestation is a lesser- included 
offense of fist-degree child molestation of which B.H. was put on 
notice.38 The dissent concluded that although it agreed  with the 
Court, it had no authority to direct an entry of delinquency 
charges on the lesser-included offense.39 In drafting the language 
of sections 12-17-14 and 11-37-9, the dissent opined that the 
General Assembly was referring to the trial court and not this 
Court.40 
In reaching its decision, the Court also relied on a prior 
case, State v. Eiseman.41 There, the Court found that it had the 
power to reverse a conviction and order the entry of judgment on a 
lesser-included offense, but it had never “availed itself of the 
opportunity to adopt this practice.”42 Nevertheless, the Court 
determined that it would exercise that power in Eiseman, because 
the defendant had conceded that the State had proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the lesser-include offense, 
and therefore, there was no danger of prejudice to the defendant  
in  ordering  the Superior Court  to enter  judgment.43  The dissent 
 
36. Id. at 786. 
37. Id.  at  788–89  (Flaherty,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and dissenting in 
part). 
38. Id. at 787. 
39. Id. at 788. 
40. Id. (emphasis added). 
41. Id. State v. Eiseman addressed how the Court was going to resolve a 
similar predicament since the defendant had been convicted of the greater 
crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine; the Court agreed that 
the defendant was actually guilty of the lesser-included crime of possession 
consistent with personal use. Id. (citing 461 A.2d 369, 372 (R.I. 1983)), 
abrogated in part on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 
(1990). 
42. Id. (citing Eiseman, 461 A.2d at 372). 
43. Id. 
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pointed out, very persuasively, that the rationale in which the 
Court relied on in Eiseman, was limited to the particular facts of 
that case.44 Here, B.H. has not admitted culpability and he would 
be prejudiced on remand.45 The prejudice stems from the fact that 
the sole issue presented at trial was the issue of first-degree child 
molestation.46 There were no arguments made during trial that 
the trial justice should make a finding of second-degree sexual 
assault,47 and there were no arguments made on appeal that B.H. 
could be adjudicated as delinquent because he committed an act of 
second-degree child molestation.48 
The Court’s decision here, as the dissent points out, “greatly 
expand[ed] the holding enunciated by this Court in Eiseman.”49 
The dissent could not find another case in which this Court 
employed the Eiseman analysis, and moreover, none of the cases 
cited in Eiseman relied on the Court’s ability to wield the power it 
did here, sua sponte.50 There is no harm in remanding the case to 
the family court with instructions to dismiss because the State did 
not prove the necessary elements of the charge.51   After doing so, 
B.H. can then be charged with second-degree child molestation  
and the relevant inquiry would be on whether or not the necessary 
elements of second-degree child molestation had been satisfied. 
Because nothing was ever mentioned during the family court trial 
or during appeal about an adjudication of delinquency based on an 
act of second-degree child molestation, the Court did not have the 
authority to raise this issue sua sponte and order the family court 
to enter adjudications of delinquency on this lesser-included 
charge. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the State had 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that B.H.  had 
committed acts of first-degree child molestation because the twins’ 
 
 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 787. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 789. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
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testimony was too vague and imprecise to be considered a 
description of sexual penetration–an essential element of the 
charge. The Court further held that the first-degree child 
molestation charge carried with it the lesser-included charge of 
second-degree child molestation and the State presented sufficient 
evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a  
reasonable doubt that B.H. had acted with the purpose of sexual 
arousal or gratification–an essential element of the charge. The 
case was remanded to the family court with directions to enter 
adjudications of delinquency on the lesser-included charge of 
second-degree child molestation and for resentencing. 
Matthew Gustaitis 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government. Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1 (R.I.  2015).  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court held the Mayor and the City Council 
of Central Falls were entitled to indemnification and attorneys’ 
fees because they were acting within the scope of their official 
capacities when challenging the constitutionality of the Financial 
Stability Act. Though the Act was ultimately found to be 
constitutional, at the time of filing their suit, the Mayor and City 
Council were acting within the scope of their official duties, which 
included an oath to support the constitution and laws of Rhode 
Island and the Constitution of the United States. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On May 18, 2010, Mayor Moreau and the City Council of 
Central Falls petitioned, under a municipal receivership statute, 
for a judicially-appointed receiver to assist with the city’s financial 
problems.1 As a result of this petition, Central  Falls’s  credit 
rating was reduced to “junk-bond” status, and state officials were 
informed this would adversely impact how financial rating 
agencies would view debt financing to other Rhode Island 
municipalities.2 Determining that a municipality’s petition for 
judicial receivership threatened the financial well-being of other 
municipalities statewide, the General Assembly passed “An Act 
Relating to Cities and Towns-Providing Financial Stability” to 
amend section 45-9 in order to establish a state-controlled 
mechanism to address financial adversity in troubled 
municipalities.3 Prohibited from filing for a judicially-appointed 
receiver under this new legislation, the Mayor and City Council of 
Central Falls dismissed their previous motion and filed for the 
 
1. Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 570 (R.I. 2011). 
2. Id. at 571. 
3. Id. at 569, 571. Under the Financial Stability Act, the Director of 
Revenue has the authority to appoint a permanent Receiver to a municipality 
requesting aide in restoring financial stability. Id. at 569. Signed into law on 
June, 11, 2010, the Act was made retroactive to May 15, 2010.  Id. at 571. 
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Receivership from the State Department of Revenue.4 On July 16, 
2010, the Director of the Department of Revenue appointed retired 
Superior Court Justice, Mark A. Pfeiffer, as the first Receiver for 
the City of Central Falls.5 
On July 19, 2010, pursuant to the Act,6 the Receiver wrote to 
the Mayor that he had assumed the duties and functions of the 
Office of Mayor, limiting the Mayor to serve in an advisory 
capacity.7 On August, 4, 2010, the City Council  passed  a 
resolution to authorize the hiring of legal counsel to provide 
guidance in addressing the Receiver’s recent assumption of 
powers.8 The Receiver rescinded this resolution by letter, citing  
his authority to “[a]lter or rescind any action or decision of any 
municipal officer” under the Act.9 On September 20, 2010, the  
City Council passed a resolution to file a legal action to challenge 
the constitutionality of the Act.10 On September 22, 2010, that 
resolution was met with another rescission by the Receiver along 
with a letter declaring that the City Council was “directed to serve 
solely in an ‘advisory’ capacity.”11 The following day, the Receiver 
filed a verified complaint with the Providence County Superior 
Court, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief  
against the Mayor and City Council.12 The Mayor and City  
Council responded by filing their own cause of action  on 
September 27, and these cases were consolidated in superior 
court.13 Ultimately, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the 
Act as constitutional and remanded this case for adjudication on 
the remaining issues that are now on appeal.14 Upon remand, the 
superior court held: the Receiver was entitled to reimbursement 
 
4. Id. 
5. Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1, 5 (R.I. 2015). 
6. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-7(c) (Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. 
Sess.) (“Upon the appointment of a receiver, the receiver shall have the right 
to exercise the powers of the elected officials under the general laws . . . the 
powers of the receiver shall be superior to and supersede the powers of the 
elected officials . . . .”). 
7. Flanders, 15 A.3d at 572. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. (alteration in original). 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1, 5 (R.I. 2015). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
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for his attorneys’ fees under the Act;15 the Mayor was not entitled 
to indemnification by Central Falls as he was “acting beyond the 
narrow scope of his official or public duties” when he engaged in 
this litigation;16 and the City Council’s attorney, Attorney 
Goldberg, was not entitled to attorneys’ fees from Central Falls 
because his “representation of the City Council was in 
contravention of the Financial Stability Act.”17 The Mayor and 
City Council appealed the Providence Superior Court’s three 
holdings. 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A. Reimbursement of the Receiver 
Upon review of the hearing justice’s ruling to grant the 
Receiver’s motion for reimbursement of attorneys’ fees, the Court 
reversed and granted summary judgment in favor of the Mayor 
and City Council.18 The Mayor and City Council contended that 
the hearing justice erred in granting summary judgment for the 
Receiver under section 45-9-11.19 In the superior court, the  
hearing justice ruled “it [was] abundantly clear that the Receiver 
ha[d] satisfied the elements of his section 45-9-11 claims against 
Mayor Moreau and the City Council.”20 The hearing justice relied 
on evidence that the Mayor and City Council brought this suit 
after being put on notice by the Receiver that the municipality’s 
budget lacked appropriations for the retention of outside  
counsel.21 By going forward with this litigation, despite knowing 
there were no funds, the hearing justice concluded that the Mayor 
and City Council acted “intentional[ly] and in derogation of the 
Receiver’s superior and superseding authority,” conduct prohibited 
by section 45-9-11.22 Thus, the hearing justice held that the 
Receiver was entitled to reimbursement for the unappropriated 
funds expended in pursuing the superior court action.23 
 
15. Id. at 6. 
16. Id. at 7. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 11. 
19. Id. at 8. 
20. Id. at 6 (first alteration in original). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
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Prior to their de novo review of the superior court’s ruling, the 
Court observed that in the absence of any statutory provision 
expressly providing for an award of attorney’s fees, it would 
“adhere to the American Rule that . . . each litigant pay its own 
attorney’s fees.”24 Upon a finding that section 45-9-11 was 
completely silent with respect to attorneys’ fees, the Court stated 
that statutory interpretation precedent leaves “no room for 
implication by judicial construction.”25 Because the statute said 
nothing about attorneys’ fees, the Court reversed and denied the 
Receiver reimbursement of his attorneys’ fees.26 The Court 
determined that “the hearing justice focused in error on whether 
the requirements of section 45-9-11 were met, rather than  
whether that statute actually provided for the payment of 
attorneys’ fees.”27 
B. Indemnification of the Mayor 
Upon review of the hearing justice’s ruling to deny the Mayor 
and City Council’s motion seeking indemnification for the Mayor, 
the Court reversed because it found the Mayor was acting in his 
official capacity when he challenged the constitutionality of the 
Act, and therefore was entitled to indemnification.28 The Mayor 
and City Council argued that the Mayor was entitled to 
indemnification for attorneys’ fees and legal costs pursuant to 
Rhode Island General Law section 45-15-16 and Central  Falls 
Code of Ordinances section 2-109.29 The Receiver argued that he 
had the power of the Mayor and City Council when both were 
relegated to serve in solely advisory capacities, so the Mayor could 
not be entitled to indemnification because he could not have acted 
in that official capacity when bringing suit.30 Referring to the 
language of Rhode Island General Law section 45-15-16 and 
Central Falls Code of Ordinances section 2-109, the Court 
determined the only condition upon which the City Council would 
 
24. Id. at 8 (quoting Moore v. Ballard, 914 A.2d 487, 489 (R.I. 2007)). 
25. Id. at 10. (quoting Eleazer v. Ted Reed Thermal Inc., 576 A.2d 1217, 
1221 (R.I. 1990)). 
26. Id. at 11. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 16. 
29. Id. at 11. 
30. Id. 
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have had the discretion to not indemnify the Mayor would be if   
the Mayor were not “acting within the scope of [his] official duties 
or employment . . . .”31 By challenging the constitutionality of the 
Act and defending himself against the Receiver’s action, the Court 
determined the Mayor was acting in his official capacity.32 
The Court referred to “a number of reasons” for coming to this 
conclusion.33 The most significant of which pertained to the 
substance of the suit: a challenge to the constitutionality of the 
Act.34 At the time of filing, this newly enacted statute had yet to  
be challenged, and it “removed a significant amount of power held 
by the elected officials.”35 The Court noted that if “the 
constitutionality of the [Act had] already been established, then 
any acts by the Mayor which contravened the Act might well have 
been beyond the scope of his official duties . . . .”36 The Court 
further supported this ruling by explaining the implications had it 
ruled that the Mayor was not acting in his official capacity.37 
Without indemnification, the Mayor would be left “financially 
responsible in his individual capacity for these lawsuits . . . which 
were undertaken on behalf of the people of Central Falls to 
determine the constitutionality (or lack thereof) of a new, broad, 
and far-reaching statutory scheme.”38 Furthermore, the Court 
found that the oath taken by the mayor or any city council 
member of Central Falls “explicitly requires the person being 
sworn in to support the constitutions of Rhode Island and of the 
United States.”39 The Court stated this oath arguably creates a 
“duty to challenge the constitutionality of the [Act] in his official 
capacity.”40 Additionally, the  Court  referred  to  Flanders,  where 
 
 
31. Id. at 13 (alteration in original). 
32. Id. at 14. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 15 (citing Central Falls Home Rule Charter Art. II, Chap. 1, § 
2-105 (“The mayor and members of the city council, before entering upon the 
duties of their office, shall first be severally sworn or affirmed to the faithful 
discharge of the same, and to the support of the Constitution and laws of the 
state, and of the Constitution of the United States, in the form and manner 
provided for by law.”)). 
40. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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there was “little difficulty in concluding that the mayor and city 
council, in their individual and official capacities, ha[d] standing  
to challenge the constitutionality of the [Act].”41 The Court 
reversed, holding that the Mayor was acting in his official capacity 
when challenging the constitutionality of the Act, and was 
therefore entitled to indemnification “pursuant to section 45-15-16 
and the City Ordinance.”42 
C. Attorneys’ Fees for Attorney Goldberg 
Upon review of the hearing justice’s ruling that the City 
Council’s attorney for these actions was not entitled to attorneys’ 
fees, the Court reversed because the City Council “had standing,  
in its official capacity, to bring a constitutional challenge to the 
[Act].”43 The Mayor and City Council argued that the  City  
Council had acted in its official capacity when it  passed 
resolutions to hire outside counsel for guidance and litigation 
because the City Council had a “duty to challenge  the Receiver 
and the [Act] on behalf of its constituents.”44 The Receiver  
retained the position that the Act gave him the sole authority to 
engage outside counsel, and by acting on their resolution to  
engage outside counsel after the Receiver rescinded it, the City 
Council “exceeded the scope of its duties.”45 Again, the Court  
noted this decision’s unique and unprecedented circumstances.46 
Although the Court acknowledged the Act gave the Receiver the 
sole authority to rescind actions of the City Council, the Court 
stated that the City Council’s purpose in hiring legal counsel was 
to challenge the constitutionality of this Act.47 The Court said the 
hearing justice’s reliance on the Act was misplaced.48  Just like  
the Mayor, the oath the members of the City Council swore 
imposed a duty upon them to uphold “the constitution and laws of 
the state, and of the Constitution of the United States . . . ,” so the 
City Council’s challenge to the Act was consistent with its official 
 
41. Id. (quoting Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 574 (R.I. 2011)). 
42. Id. at 16. 
43. Id. at 18. (quoting Flanders, 15 A.3d at 574). 
44. Id. at 17. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 18. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
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duties.49 The Court once again referred to its unanimous decision 
in Flanders to find that the Mayor and City Council “had 
standing, in [their] official capacit[ies], to bring a constitutional 
challenge to the Financial Stability Act.”50 The Court ruled that 
the City Council’s decision “to hire outside legal counsel was 
entirely consistent with an effort to comply with that oath,” and 
therefore reversed the lower court.51 
COMMENTARY 
In the Chief Justice’s dissent, he agreed with the Court to 
deny the Receiver reimbursement for his attorneys’ fees, but found 
that neither the Mayor nor the City Council were acting in their 
official capacities when filing suit to challenge  the 
constitutionality of the Act.52 The Chief Justice reasoned that 
when the Receiver took office on July 16, 2010, to assume the 
duties and functions of the Mayor, who would only then serve in  
an advisory capacity, the Mayor could no longer have filed suit in 
an official capacity.53 Additionally, when the Receiver assumed  
the functions and duties of the City Council, the decision to 
indemnify the Mayor under Central Falls Ordinance section 2-109 
would no longer reside with the City Council, but within the 
Receiver’s discretion to deny said relief.54 The constitutionality 
issue had no effect on the Chief Justice’s analysis, stating that the 
Mayor’s suit to challenge the Act was a risk that he should have 
bore in his individual capacity.55 The Chief Justice reiterated this 
same reasoning for declining to award attorneys’ fees to the City 
Council. Like the Mayor, the City Council was stripped of  its 
duties and functions by the Receiver and merely served in an 
advisory capacity.56 In pursuing litigation to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Act, the City Council’s two  resolutions 
were  rescinded  by  the  Receiver,  yet  it  chose  to  move  forward 
 
 
49. Id. 
50. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565,  
574 (R.I. 2011)). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 19 (Suttell, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
53. Id. at 20. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 21. 
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anyway and should bear the costs as a result.57 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court made it clear that this 
decision turned on the unique circumstances presented by this 
constitutional challenge to a newly-enacted statute.58 Where the 
dissent found that the Mayor and City Council should not be 
entitled to relief because they exceeded the scope of their advisory 
capacities by bringing suit,59 the Court saw the challenge as a 
good-faith effort to assess the constitutionality of new legislation 
that stripped powers from elected officials.60 After upholding the 
Act’s constitutionality in giving the Receiver the authority to 
assume the duties and functions of officials, the Court still found 
the Mayor and City Council’s actions justified because they 
exceeded the scope of their capacities only to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Act, which stripped them of their original 
duties and functions.61 The dissent did not find the constitutional 
substance of the suit to justify the Mayor and City Council acting 
outside of their advisory capacities because the Act was ultimately 
ruled to be constitutional. 
The Court ruled in favor of the Mayor and City Council 
because their decision took more into account than just the Act. 
The dissenting approach appears to only determine whether one 
acted in their official capacity as established by the law. However, 
the Court does find some form of an exception to exist when 
considering the surrounding circumstances and an official’s reason 
for exceeding the scope of their official capacity. When they filed 
suit, the Mayor and City Council acted inconsistently with the  
Act, but they did so under a good-faith belief that the Act was 
unconstitutional and challenging it was necessary as part of the 
oath to Central Falls to uphold the Rhode Island Constitution and 
United States Constitution.62 The Court relies on  the  fact that 
the Mayor and City Council could not have seen the ultimate 
outcome  of  Flanders  at  the  time  of  filing.63  Flanders  held  the 
 
 
57. Id. 
58. See id. at 14, 18 (majority opinion). 
59. Id. at 20 (Suttell, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
60. See id. at 16, 18 (majority opinion). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 18. 
63. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565,  
574 (R.I. 2011)). 
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Mayor and City Council did have standing for this constitutional 
challenge,64 but the dissent has them doing so only in their 
individual capacities.65 The Court reasoned that officials make 
constitutional challenges on behalf of their constituents to 
determine the constitutionality of such laws.66 Requiring those 
officials to risk bearing the cost of such litigation if they do not 
prevail may only prevent laws from ever receiving judicial review. 
After Shine, officials of other municipalities challenging the 
constitutionality of the Financial Stability Act will not have as 
strong of a good-faith argument to recover their legal fees in the 
event that the law is upheld, but they may have that good-faith 
argument when challenging statutes, in analogous situations, that 
have yet to receive judicial review. The Court’s decision advocates 
for a tentative exception when dealing with constitutional 
challenges made by well-intentioned municipal officials. The 
Court’s explanation here relies on statutory interpretation as well 
as policy considerations, so the success of such arguments will rely 
on the substantive law and the challenging official’s intentions at 
the time of filing. By not excusing an official’s good-faith for 
pursuing a constitutional challenge, the dissenting position may 
have better ensured compliance from officials not willing to make 
such a constitutional challenge that could be potentially made out 
of pocket. Although the dissent’s position may better prevent 
litigious conflicts between government officials because of the 
accompanied risk that an official would be responsible for fees in 
their individual capacity if a challenge fails, this could chip away 
at the tools available to voice constitutional concerns. The Court’s 
decision does not endorse officials to challenge every law, but only 
in particular situations where a new law enacted has yet to be 
deemed constitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the superior court 
in all respects. The Court found that although the Financial 
Stability Act was held to be constitutional in Flanders, the Mayor 
 
 
64. Flanders, 15 A.3d at 574. 
65. Shine, 119 A.3d at 20 (Suttell, C.J., concurring in part and  
dissenting in part). 
66. Id. at 17 (majority opinion). 
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and the City Council were acting in their official capacities at the 
time they challenged this legislation and were therefore entitled to 
indemnification and attorneys’ fees from Central Falls. Although 
the Mayor and City Council may have violated section 45-9-11 by 
requiring Central Falls to expend unappropriated funds on court 
proceedings, the statute was silent as to whether attorneys’ fees 
could be recovered, and therefore the Court ruled that the  
Receiver was not entitled to be reimbursement by Mayor Moreau 
or the City Council. 
Connor Mills 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labor and Employment Law. Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC, 
134 A.3d 173 (R.I. 2016). A claim alleging the violation  of  the 
employer drug testing statute (R.I. Gen. Laws section 28-6.5- 1(a)) 
concerns “injuries to the person.” Subsequently, this determination 
invokes the three-year statute of limitations, as opposed to the ten-
year statute of limitations for a civil action, which begins to run at 
the time the violating drug test was administered. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Melissa Goddard (Plaintiff) was formerly employed by APG 
Security-RI, LLC as a security guard until her termination 
sometime in January 2010.1 The cause for her termination was her 
failure of an employment drug test.2 Plaintiff filed a claim on March 
27, 2014 against APG Security-RI, LLC, Scott Hemingway, and 
Anna Vidiri (collectively Defendants).3 Plaintiff alleged Defendants 
violated R.I. Gen. Laws section 28-6.5-1, the employer drug testing 
statute (EDTS), because the Defendants did not have reasonable 
grounds to administer the drug test.4 Plaintiff sought damages 
under both EDTS and R.I. Gen. Laws section 9-1-2.5 The 
Defendants responded to the complaint by moving for a dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure 
on the grounds that the complaint was not timely filed.6  A  hearing 
was held on June 9, 2014 in the Superior Court, where each party 
argued the appropriate statute of limitations to be applied to the 
EDTS violation.7   The Plaintiff cited to the ten-year 
 
 
1. Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC, 134 A.3d 173, 174 (R.I. 2016).   The 
exact date of termination was not in the record, but suggests sometime close to 
January 2010. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
 
842 
  
 
2017] SURVEY SECTION 843 
 
statute of limitations under R.I. Gen. Laws section 9-1-13(a).8 The 
Defendants, on the other hand, argued that the three-year statute 
of limitations under R.I. Gen. Laws section 9-1-14(b) was 
applicable.9 The hearing justice ruled for the Defendants and 
determined that the complaint was not timely filed by the 
Plaintiff.10 The hearing justice granted the Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss, and thereafter, the Plaintiff appealed the decision.11 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Court first noted the applicable standard of review when 
addressing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior 
Court Rules of Civil Procedure.12 The Court established that its 
review was “confined to the four corners” of the complaint, and that 
the allegations and facts must be viewed in the light most favorable 
to the Plaintiff.13 Upon review, the Court must decide whether 
“beyond a reasonable doubt that the [P]laintiff would not be entitled 
to relief” against the Defendants, even accepting all facts as true.14 
The Court simultaneously had to determine the appropriate 
statute of limitations to apply to the complaint, which proved 
essential to the Court’s decision in the appeal as a whole. The Court 
examined the purpose of the EDTS, specifically that it serves to 
protect employees from unjustified drug testing.15 The Court then 
focused on the effects of a violation of the EDTS, which include 
criminal convictions, punitive damages, and injunctive relief.16 
However, the Court noted that the statute does not indicate a 
statute of limitations to be applied in a civil action.17 When there is 
an absence of a statute of limitations clause within 
 
 
8. Id. at 175. 
9. Id. at 174. 
10. Id. at 175. The hearing justice also determined the action accrued at 
the time the test was administered, and at that moment the statute of 
limitations began to run. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. (citations omitted). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 176. 
16. Id. 
17. Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6.5-1 (West, Westlaw through 
Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
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the text of a statute itself, the Court must decide between either a 
three-year or ten-year statute of limitations.18 Section 9-1-14(b) 
states that when there are “injuries to the person,” the cause of 
action must be filed within a three-year window from the time the 
event occurred.19 The Court noted that “injuries to the person” 
extend to injuries other than physical  injuries.20  Subsequently, the 
Court examined the purpose of “injuries to the person” under 
Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, which identified that the 
phrase, “injuries to the person,” must be applied to the statute of 
limitations concerning “invasions of rights that inhere in a man as 
a rational being.”21 
The Court has historically relied on Commerce Oil, in 
determining the appropriate statute of limitations for causes of 
actions.22 As a result of the Court’s interpretation of Commerce Oil, 
as applied to the case at hand, the Court found the Plaintiff’s ability 
to utilize the ten-year statute of limitations was based on whether 
the Plaintiff’s “claim that her right to recovery for a violation of the 
EDTS accrue[d] to her ‘by reason of some peculiar status . . . .’”23 
The “peculiar status” arose from the fact that the Plaintiff was an 
employee.24 The Court noted it had not yet had the opportunity to 
consider the concept of an employee-based peculiar status claim 
against the backdrop of Commerce Oil, but also stressed it is more 
important to focus on the right violated  and not the “elements of 
damage.”25 Subsequently, the Court determined “the nature of the 
right created by the EDTS is analogous to an invasion of privacy,” 
and therefore the Plaintiff’s right is not of a “peculiar status,” but 
one “entitled by reason of being a person in the eyes of the law . . . 
.”26 The Court then reasoned that violations stemming from the 
EDTS are “injuries to 
 
 
18. Goddard, 134 A.3d at 176 (citation omitted). 
19. Id; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-14(b) (West, Westlaw through 
Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
20. Goddard, 134 A.3d at 176 (quoting Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. 
Miner, 199 A.2d 606, 610 (R.I. 1964)). 
21. Id. (quoting Commerce Oil, 199 A.2d at 610). 
22. Id. at 177. 
23. Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-13(a) (West, Westlaw through 
Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
24. Goddard, 134 A.3d at 177. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. (quoting Commerce Oil, 199 A.2d at 610). 
  
 
2017] SURVEY SECTION 845 
the person” and thus subject to the three-year statute of 
limitations.27 
To further support its position, the Court explained that its 
decision was consistent with the statute of limitations applied by 
the General Assembly to other employment causes of actions.28 The 
Court noted the intent of the General Assembly was to apply  a 
similar time period to the EDTS.29  Additionally,  the  Court found 
that under section 9-1-2, the correct statute of limitations was the 
three-year time frame.30 Therefore, the Court found the Plaintiff 
filed her complaint outside of the three-year statute of limitations 
and affirmed the Superior Court’s decision to grant the motion to 
dismiss.31 
COMMENTARY 
The Court was faced with a relatively straightforward appeal 
on the motion to dismiss. The Court needed to address one question: 
Which statute of limitations applied? Although, the Court seemed 
to be dealing with a relatively simple issue, it certainly proved more 
in-depth than not. 
The cause of action stemmed from a violation of the EDTS  and 
a subsequent termination following the failed drug test.  When drug 
tests are illegally administered, severe consequences can result. 
This is a more important issue as of late with the rise  of medicinal 
and recreational marijuana laws. Although, this case does not 
disclose what caused the failed drug test, one can see the potential 
issue arising out of new medical marijuana laws, where qualified 
individuals legally use a traditionally illegal substance, and how 
employers may react if there is any miscommunication resulting 
from a failed drug test induced by medical marijuana usage. Thus, 
it was paramount that the Court articulate a clear and precise 
decision on which statute of limitations applies in a EDTS violation 
context. 
The Court certainly made such an effort by analyzing the  facts   
against   Commerce   Oil,   which   is   the   standard   when 
 
 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 177–78. 
29. Id. at 178. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
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determining the appropriate statute of limitations, and did not 
depart from its precedent regarding statutes that remain silent as 
to the applicable statute of limitations.32 The Court  evenly  worked 
through the Plaintiff’s arguments against the backdrop of 
Commerce Oil, until it reached a conclusion. However, the Court did 
not stop there, as it wanted to ensure  the correct outcome.  The 
Court additionally considered the legislative intent of which statute 
of limitations to apply and examined other similar employment 
causes of actions for further support.33 The Court’s observations in 
these extra areas led to the same statute of limitations outcome. If 
the Court were to find that other similar employment causes of 
actions invoked the ten-year statute of limitations, the Court’s 
decision here would certainly appear much weaker. It was 
important for the Court to maintain the same consistency in 
applying which statute of limitations in these specific employment 
matters.  Lastly, the Court also noted how  the Plaintiff sought 
damages under section 9-1-2, and how that section applies a three-
year statute of limitations.34 Overall, the Court went through many 
steps to ensure the correct statute of limitations was applied. 
However, there is one minor point worth noting. In addition  to 
concluding which statute of limitations applies, the Court also 
found that the cause of action accrued at the time the violating drug 
test was administered. Therefore, the Plaintiff had three years to 
file a complaint starting from the day she took her drug test. 
Therein lies a potential problem.  It does not seem outside  the 
realm of possibilities that following a failed drug test, a company 
would give an employee a second chance. If the failed drug test 
played a role in a subsequent termination,  the employee’s potential 
cause of action would have already begun running on the drug test 
date. This could severely impact a potential plaintiff with a limited, 
legal time window. Therefore,  the cause of action should begin to 
accrue at the time the violation adversely affects the employee.35 
 
32. Id. at 177–78. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 178. 
35. The potential plaintiff would of course have to sufficiently establish that 
the earlier drug test played a role in his or her subsequent firing. However, 
this very well could prove to be difficult depending on the amount 
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an action under 
section 28-6.5-1(a) invokes the three-year statute of limitations 
under section 9-1-14(b) because the right violated consisted of 
“injuries to the person.” Additionally, the Court found that the 
three-year statute of limitations was consistent with the  legislative 
intent behind the statute and other employment causes of actions. 
Lastly, the Court identified that the cause of action under section 
28-6.5-1(a) begins to accrue at the time the drug test is 
administered. 
John W. Caruolo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of time elapsed between the drug test and termination. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medical Malpractice. Ribeiro v. R.I. Eye Inst., 138 A.3d  761  (R.I. 
2016). An expert’s testimony in a medical malpractice case should 
have been admitted because it would have assisted the jury in 
establishing that it was more probable that the misdiagnosis and 
passage of time led to the patient’s permanent vision loss. Thus, an 
expert’s testimony is admitted if its probative value is  not 
immensely outweighed by the risk of jury confusion. A motion for 
judgment as a matter of law must be renewed at the close of all 
evidence. The motion is thereby waived and cannot be renewed once 
a verdict is returned. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On August 24, 2004, Antonio Ribeiro (Ribeiro) attended  an eye 
appointment with Dr. Newman, an optometrist at the Rhode Island 
Eye Institute, LLC (Eye Institute).1 Ribeiro presented symptoms of 
blurred vision in his right eye.2 Dr. Newman diagnosed Ribeiro with 
central serous retinopathy (CSR).3 On August 25, 2004, Dr. 
Newman confirmed the diagnosis based on  an Optical Coherence 
Tomography (OCT) scan, and on October 25, 2004, Ribeiro returned 
to Dr. Newman because his vision had worsened.4 Dr. Newman 
again diagnosed Ribeiro with CSR and referred Ribeiro to a retinal 
specialist, Dr. You.5 On November 1, 2004, Dr. You diagnosed 
Ribeiro with a retinal detachment, which is a tear in the back of the 
eye.6 Despite Dr. You’s efforts to surgically repair the tear, Ribeiro 
permanently lost central vision 
 
 
1. Ribeiro v. R.I. Eye Inst., 138 A.3d 761, 764 (R.I. 2016). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 765. CSR is a “blister” on the back of the eye that causes fluid 
to accumulate behind the retina. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 765–66. A detached retina is a tear that develops behind the eye, 
and like CFR, it involves fluid accumulation; however, it is more serious than 
CFR because when the tear fills with fluid, the retina pulls away from the eye 
and loses its blood supply, thus rendering it functionless. Id. 
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in his right eye.7 
Ribeiro brought a medical malpractice action against Dr. 
Newman and the Eye Institute (collectively, Defendants),  asserting 
a negligence claim against Dr. Newman, and that the Eye    
Institute    was    vicariously    liable.8 During    pretrial 
communications, Ribeiro disclosed that it would call expert witness 
Dr. Greenstein, O.D.—an optometrist—to testify that on August 24, 
2004, Dr. Newman breached the standard of care by failing to 
diagnose a detached retina, as well as expert witness Dr. Bressler, 
M.D.—an ophthalmologist—to testify that the untreated fluid 
buildup was the proximate cause of Ribeiro’s permanent vision loss 
in November 2004.9 
On November 1, 2011, there was a motion in limine hearing  to 
determine whether Dr. Bressler’s testimony could include the 
October 2004 OCT.10 On November 10, there was a similar  hearing 
concerning Dr. Bressler’s testimony about Dr. You’s report.11 The 
Defendants contended that the jury  would confusedly rely on Dr. 
Bressler’s opinion, as an ophthalmologist, to determine if Dr. 
Newman, an optometrist, breached the standard of care.12 Ribeiro 
submitted an offer of proof that Dr. Bressler’s testimony was limited 
to causation and damages.13 As such, the trial justice decided to let 
the parties limit Dr. Bressler’s testimony themselves through 
“usual means,” questioning and objections.14 
On November 10, 2011, another motion in limine was held.15 
 
 
7. Id. at 766. 
8. Id. at 763. 
9. Id. at 766. 
10. Id. at 766. 
11. Id. at 768. 
12. Id. at 766. Ophthalmologists can diagnose and treat all forms of eye 
disease and can perform eye surgery; however, optometrists provide vision care 
by testing and correcting vision using corrective lenses as well as detecting 
certain eye abnormalities.  Id. at 766 n.5 (internal citation omitted). 
13. See id. at 766–67. Ribeiro explained that it was necessary for Dr. 
Bressler to compare the August 2004 OCT to the October 2004 OCT to show 
that in August 2004 Ribeiro’s macula was detached, but could have been 
reattached, as compared to the October 2004 OCT, which showed that by this 
time, the macula was completely detached, and therefore Ribeiro’s vision was 
permanently damaged. Id. 
14. Id. at 767. 
15. Id. 
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The Defendants, still concerned about jury confusion, moved to 
limit Dr. Bressler’s testimony about the August and October OCTs 
to “hypothetical questions.”16  The  trial justice permitted Ribeiro to 
question Dr. Bressler about the August OCT, but limited October 
OCT questions to hypotheticals.17 Ribeiro asserted that this was 
prejudicial because it barred Dr. Bressler’s opinion about Ribeiro’s 
worsened vision from August to November, which was  the basis of 
her causation theory.18 
Next, the Defendants argued that Dr. Bressler’s testimony 
should be limited exclusively to the August 2004 appointment 
because, given that Dr. Newman was allegedly negligent only 
during the August 2004 appointment, Dr. Bressler’s testimony 
regarding Ribeiro’s eye condition in October was irrelevant.19 In 
response, the trial justice “modif[ied] or change[d] its earlier ruling” 
and agreed to instruct the jury that Dr. Bressler’s testimony was 
limited to causation, but also permitted Ribeiro to question Dr. 
Bressler about both the August and October OCT results.20 
Thereafter, the Defendants argued that Dr. Bressler could not 
testify about the duration of Ribeiro’s detached retina because 
neither her deposition nor expert disclosure provided her opinion 
on this.21 The trial justice finally called an end to the arguments 
and ambiguously held that depending on Dr. Bressler’s cross- 
examination, “the [c]ourt may permit [Ribeiro]on redirect 
examination to further opine as to the chronicity of Mr. Ribeiro’s 
eye in her opinion.”22 
At trial, Ribeiro attempted to question Dr. Bressler about the 
October OCT, to which the Defendants immediately objected.23 At 
sidebar, the parties tried to decipher exactly what the trial justice 
previously held regarding the scope of Dr. Bressler’s testimony.24 
 
 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. See id. 
19. Id. at 768. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 769 (first alteration in original). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. Ribeiro contended that the trial justice previously granted 
permission to ask about both the August and October OCTs, and that Dr. 
Bressler needed to discuss the eye’s condition on both dates to support her 
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The trial justice, adopting the Defendant’s view, held that unless 
the Defendants brought the October OCT scan into evidence, 
neither the witness nor Ribeiro’s counsel could refer to it.25 
Trial recommenced, and Ribeiro asked Dr. Bressler a question 
about Dr. You’s medical notes regarding Ribeiro’s appointment on 
November 1, 2004.26 The Defendants objected, and the  trial justice 
held that unless the Defendants brought Dr. Young’s notes into 
evidence on cross-examination, Ribeiro was barred from such 
inquiry.27 
On cross-examination, Dr. Bressler was neither asked about 
the October OCT nor Dr. You’s treatment.28 Thus, Dr. Bressler was 
prevented from discussing Ribeiro’s worsening eye condition from 
August to November, which precluded her opinion as to how 
Ribeiro’s undiagnosed condition eventually caused his permanent 
vision loss.29 The Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of 
law, which the trial justice reserved ruling on.30 The Defendants 
proceeded, calling only Dr. Newman to question him exclusively 
about Ribeiro’s eye condition from August to October 2004.31 
Accordingly, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the  Defendants, 
finding that although Dr. Newman breached the standard of care, 
his deviation was not the proximate cause of Ribeiro’s injury.32 
Ribeiro moved for a new trial, contesting that the trial justice 
erred  when  he  precluded  Dr.  Bressler’s  causation  testimony.33 
 
opinion regarding Ribeiro’s eventual vision loss. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. The Defendants objected, based on the presupposition that because 
Ribeiro was barred from asking Dr. Bressler about the October OCT, Ribeiro 
was also barred from questions relating to Dr. You’s  notes.  Id. Ribeiro asserted 
that Dr. Bressler relied on Dr. You’s notes because they formed her conclusion 
that, given Ribeiro’s eye condition in October,  his retina was incurable. Id. 
27. Id. at 770. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. Pursuant to Rule 50 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law based on the assertion 
that Ribeiro failed to prove: that the standard of care was breached, proximate 
cause, and damages.   Id. at 763–64; see also  SUPER. CT. 
R. CIV. P. 50. 
31. Id. at 770. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
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The Defendants sought to renew the Rule 50 motion, and in the 
alternative, moved for a new trial on the standard of care.34 The 
trial justice denied Ribeiro’s motion, reasoning that because the 
negligence claim was limited to August 24, 2004, causation 
evidence was appropriately limited to that date.35 The  trial  justice 
also reasoned that the risk that the jury would rely on Dr. Bressler’s 
testimony, as an ophthalmologist, to determine the standard of care 
of an optometrist outweighed its probative value.36 Lastly, the trial 
justice held that any alleged error was harmless because Dr. 
Bressler’s testimony was limited “only to the extent that she 
intended to talk about Mr. Ribeiro’s condition in October, two 
months after anything could have been done to prevent his 
permanent vision loss.”37 The Defendants’ motions for judgment as 
a matter of law and for a new trial were denied.38 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to 
determine whether the trial justice’s decision to preclude Dr. 
Bressler’s testimony regarding the October OCT scan was an 
“abuse of discretion.”39 The Court explained that within the medical 
malpractice context, an expert witness’s opinion is only admitted if 
it has met “the requisite degree of positiveness.”40 However, given 
that “[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading 
because of the difficulty in evaluating it,” the admittance of expert 
testimony warrants greater oversight.41 For this reason, the Court 
explained that a trial justice must act as a gatekeeper, weighing the 
expert testimony’s probative value against the danger of unfair 
prejudice.42 
 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 771 (citing Franco v. Latina, 916 A.2d 1251, 1258 (R.I. 2007)). 
40. Id. (quoting Riley v. Stone, 900 A.2d 1087, 1092 (R.I. 2006)). Expert 
opinion must “rise to the level of reasonable medical certainty, that is, some 
degree of positiveness or probability and not possibility.” Id. (quoting Riley, 900 
A.2d at 1092). 
41. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 
729 A.2d 677, 688 (R.I. 1999)). 
42. See id. (citing Owens v. Silvia, 838 A.2d 881, 891 (R.I. 2003)); see also 
R.I. R. EVID. 403. 
  
 
2017] SURVEY SECTION 853 
The Court began its analysis by addressing the relevancy of Dr. 
Bressler’s testimony regarding the October OCT scan.43 According 
to the Court, not only did Ribeiro have to establish that Dr. 
Newman breached the standard of care on August 24, 2004, but also 
that this deviation was the proximate cause of Ribeiro’s permanent 
vision loss.44 The Court simply explained that this required Ribeiro 
to “prove what actually did happen as a result of that deviation.”45 
As such, Ribeiro had to form “links” showing that the deviation “set 
in motion the ‘natural, unbroken and continuous sequence,’” which 
led to the outcome.46 Therefore, Dr. Bressler inevitably had to 
testify about Ribeiro’s eye condition between August and October to 
illustrate the “natural [and] unbroken” deterioration of the retina, 
which led to Ribeiro’s permanent vision loss in November 2004.47 
The Court then considered whether the probative value of Dr. 
Bressler’s testimony outweighed any prejudicial effect.48 In regards 
to the “balancing test,” the Court shed light on the notion that 
“[h]elpfulness to the trier of fact is the most critical consideration 
for the trial justice in determining whether to admit proposed 
expert testimony.”49 Taking this into account, the Court found that 
the expert’s opinion about the August OCT—unlike the October 
OCT—would have benefited the jury because it would have helped 
them conceptualize that it was “more probable” that 
 
43. See Ribeiro, 138 A.3d at 771. The Court analyzed the testimony’s 
relevancy under Rule 401 and Rule 402 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. 
Id. Under Rule 401, to be  “relevant,” the evidence must “hav[e]  any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.” R.I. R. EVID. 401. Rule 402 provides  that  “[a]ll relevant evidence is 
admissible, except as otherwise provided by law.”  Ribeiro, 138 A.3d at 771 
(alteration in original) (quoting Boscia v. Sharples, 860 A.2d 674, 678 (R.I. 
2004)). 
44. Id. at 772 (citation omitted). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. (quoting DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 692). 
47. Id; see also DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 692. 
48. Id. Rule 403 provides that according to a justice’s discretion,  evidence 
is excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.” R.I. R. EVID. 403. 
49. Ribeiro, 138 A.3d at 772 (alteration in original) (quoting Owens v. 
Silvia, 838 A.2d 881, 891 (R.I. 2003)). 
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Dr. Newman’s misdiagnosis, along with the passage of time, 
caused Ribeiro’s eventual loss of vision in November.50 
The Court then analyzed the probative value of Dr. Bressler’s 
testimony against a risk of jury confusion, regarding the difference 
between the standard of care and causation.51 Another postulate 
the Court relied on was that “[u]nless evidence is of limited or 
marginal relevance and enormously prejudicial, the trial justice 
should not act to exclude it.”52  Accordingly, the Court held that,  in 
regards to Dr. Bressler’s testimony about the October OCT, the 
potential for jury confusion did not outweigh the testimony’s 
probative value.53 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that such 
concerns would have been eradicated with the justice’s  “cautionary 
instruction,” which specifically advised the jury that Dr. Bressler’s 
testimony could not be used to determine whether Dr. Newman 
breached the standard of care.54  Therefore,  the Court held that, 
Dr. Bressler’s testimony was not “enormously prejudicial, . . . [and] 
the trial justice strayed beyond the bounds of his discretion . . . .”55 
Moreover, the Court held that Dr. Bressler’s preclusion from 
testifying about the October OCT and Dr. You’s notes were not 
harmless error.56 As the Court explained, the expert’s credibility 
and opinion depended on this evidence because her inability to 
compare the August OCT against both the October OCT and Dr. 
You’s notes, prevented the jury from theorizing why it would have 
been more probable for the eye to be cured in August, but not in 
November.57  The Court concluded that the  trial justice’s preclusion 
was an “unsustainable exercise of his discretion,” and a new trial 
on all issues was granted.58 
Lastly, the Court addressed the Defendants’ motion for 
judgment   as   a   matter   of   law.59        Despite   the  Defendants’ 
 
50. See id. at 772; see also R.I. R. EVID. 401. 
51. Ribeiro, 138 A.3d at 772. 
52. Id. at 772, 773 (quoting Wells v. Uvex Winter Optical, Inc., 635 A.2d 
1188, 1193 (R.I. 1994)). 
53. Id. at 772. 
54. Id. at 772–73; State v. Clark, 754 A.2d 73, 80 (R.I. 2000) (noting that 
“the members of the jury are presumed to follow the trial justice’s 
instructions.”). 
55. Id. at 773 (citing Wells, 635 A.2d at 1193). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 773–74. 
58. Id. at 774. 
59. Id. 
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contentions, the Court reaffirmed “[its] established rule that if one 
party makes a motion for judgment as matter of law at the close of 
the opponent’s case and then presents evidence on his . . . own 
behalf, the motion must be renewed at the close of all [the] 
evidence.”60 As such, because the Defendants did not renew their 
motion at the close of their evidence, the Defendants’ earlier motion 
was waived and could not be appealed.61 The Court also held that 
because Ribeiro was granted a new trial on all issues,  the 
Defendants’ motion for a new trial was denied.62 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court discussed how a trial justice 
abused his or her discretion when admitting expert testimony into 
trial.63 The Court brought to light the challenge posed  by  potential 
jury confusion as well as the prejudicial effect that such evidence 
may have upon jury members.64 However, consistent  with the 
adversarial search for the truth, the Court set forth the importance 
of precluding expert testimony only when  “enormously” 
prejudicial.65 For this reason, the Court provided mechanisms upon 
which a trial justice may rely when making this complicated 
decision. The Court emphasized the power of “crisp and succinct 
cautionary” jury instructions in order to prevent such confusion.66 
Moreover, the Court presented  fundamental questions for trial 
justices to consider, such as how “helpful” the testimony might be 
to the jury, as well as, whether admitting the testimony would be 
“enormously” prejudicial.67 The Court  was also empathetic to the 
importance of ensuring that the parties had a fair opportunity to 
fully present their case. As for the jury, the Court had a keen eye to 
ensure that the jury had sufficient information to reach a fair 
determination.  Through its opinion,  the Court stressed how 
imperative it is for the jury to know these 
 
60. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 
742 A.2d 282, 287 (R.I. 1999)). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. See id. at 771–74. 
64. See id. at 772–74. 
65. Id. at 773; see also Wells v. Uvex Winter Optical, Inc., 635 A.2d 1188, 
1193 (R.I. 1994). 
66. Id. 
67. See id. 
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relative facts in order to fully understand the case at hand as well 
as the legalities involved. For this reason, it is imperative for the 
trial justice to heavily weigh the more attenuated implications that 
an exclusion may have. 
Consistent with the search for the truth, there is also a need  to 
foster ideals of conflict resolution. For this reason, a trial justice’s 
inconsistent decisions pose the risk that this will enable a case to 
become more complicated and confrontational than necessary. 
When opposing counsel partakes in multiple hearings on the same 
issues this may cause the parties to become  distracted from the 
principle issue of the case as well as their role within the system of 
justice. The golden rule is that a client is entitled to a “just, speedy, 
and inexpensive” trial. As such, when there are multiple cases 
within a case, this inevitably requires additional time, costs, and 
court resources. Nonetheless, the greatest concern presented by 
this attenuation is the risk of jury confusion as well as a 
misconstruction of the law. For this reason, the Court’s decision and 
analysis serve as a model for applying fundamental discretionary 
tests in order to ensure that the truth is attained, the conflict is 
resolved, and the purpose for which the case was brought remains 
the priority. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Superior Court 
abused its discretion when it excluded a causation expert’s 
testimony as to a patient’s scans and medical record because this 
information was relevant to the expert’s causation theory. 
Furthermore, this testimony would have assisted the jury in 
conceptualizing that it was more probable that the misdiagnosis 
was the proximate cause of the patient’s irreparable injury, and 
thus its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. The 
Court also held that a motion for judgments as a matter of law must 
be renewed at the close of all evidence, and once the verdict is 
returned, the motion is thereby waived and cannot be renewed. 
 
Alexandra Rawson 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mortgage Law. Twenty Eleven, LLC v. Botelho, 127 A.3d 897  
(R.I. 2015).  A prior recorded mortgage on a condominium held by 
a bank is extinguished when a super-priority lien is created by 
statute and the condominium sold at auction does not generate 
enough funds to cover both liens. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In December of 2004, Michael Botelho purchased a 
condominium unit in Warwick, RI.1 As part of the  process,  
Botelho executed a promissory note in favor of First Franklin 
Financial Corp. in the amount of $114,400.2 The loan amount was 
then secured by a mortgage on the condominium unit.3 After a 
period of years, Botelho became delinquent on the associated 
monthly condominium association fees.4 This delinquency created 
a statutory lien under the Rhode Island Condominium Act (RICA), 
and the condominium association (Association) eventually sold the 
condominium unit in a lien foreclosure sale to the Plaintiff, 
Twenty Eleven, LLC, on July 19, 2011.5 Subsequent to that sale, 
the original mortgagee6 tried to foreclose on its mortgage on the 
property on January 18, 2013.7 Plaintiff brought an action in the 
Rhode Island Superior Court, seeking to quiet title to the 
condominium unit in its favor.8 The Superior  Court  decision 
relied heavily on a strict reading of the statute, which does not 
include any reference to extinguishment of prior recorded 
mortgages.9   Therefore, the hearing justice dismissed the action as 
 
 
1. Twenty Eleven, LLC v. Botelho, 127 A.3d 897, 898–99 (R.I. 2015). 
2. Id. at 899. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. The  original mortgage  holder was PNC Bank, National Association. 
Id. at 898. 
7. Id. at 899. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
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of August 28, 2013.10 The Plaintiff then appealed to the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court. 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Court began its discussion by stating that the question at 
bar required a statutory interpretation, which the Court reviews 
de novo.11 The Court immediately turned to RICA, section 34- 
36.1-3.16(b).12 The Court read section 34-36.1-3.16(b)(1)(ii) as 
stating that a lien under this section is prior to all other liens 
except a first mortgage on the condominium unit recorded prior to 
the date on which assessment is sought.13 If that was all the 
statute stated, the lender’s original mortgage would be the highest 
priority lien with the Association’s lien having a lower priority.14 
The Court then moved to section 34-36.1-3.16(b)(2),15 which 
created a “super-priority lien,” consisting of all “common expense 
assesments.”16 
The Court considered section 34-36.1-3.16 in its entirety and 
found that it created a bifurcated lien, in which one part had a 
higher priority than all other mortgages,17 and a remaining part  
of the lien18 would be of a lower priority than previously recorded 
mortgages. Here, once the Association foreclosed on the “super- 
priority lien,” the question became what happened to the interest 
of  the  first  mortgage  holder?   The  Court,  following  section 34– 
 
 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 900. 
12. Id. at 901; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-36.1-3.16(b) (West, 
Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
13. Botelho, 127 A.3d at 901. 
14. Id. 
15. The operative provision the Court addressed is quite unusual (“[t]he 
lien is also prior to any mortgage or deed of trust described in subdivision 
(b)(1)(ii) of this section to the extent of the common expense assessments 
based on the periodic budget adopted by the [condominium] association . . . 
which would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the six 
(6) months immediately preceding the foreclosure of the interest of the unit 
owner including any costs and reasonable attorney’s fees . . . .”). § 34-36.1- 
3.16(b)(2). 
16. Id.; see also § 34-36.1-3.16(b)(1). 
17. Botelho, 127 A.3d at 901 (the first part of the bifurcated lien equates 
the “super-priority lien” to the last six months of “common expense 
assessments” by the condominium association). 
18. Id. (the second part of the bifurcated lien regards all other liens held 
against the condominium unit). 
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36.1–1.08 of RICA, looked to “[t]he principles of law and equity” to 
“supplement the provisions of this chapter.”19 There, the Court 
found a common rule: When a higher priority lien is foreclosed on, 
and the property is subject to lower priority liens, the “junior  
liens” are extinguished in favor of satisfying the higher priority 
lien.20 The Court suggested multiple safeguards lenders could 
employ in order to prevent the extinguishment of their security 
interest, including simply paying the six months of outstanding 
fees to prevent the foreclosure stemming from the “super-priority 
lien,” and then adding the amount to the principal balance of the 
mortgage.21 
The Court then discussed the right of redemption provision, 
added to RICA in 2008.22 The right of  redemption  provision 
allows the holder of the first mortgage or deed of trust to redeem 
its security interest in the condominium unit by: 
[T]endering payment to the association in full of all 
assessments due on the unit together with all attorney’s 
fees and costs incurred by the association in connection 
with  the  collection and foreclosure  process  within thirty 
(30) days of the date of the post foreclosure sale notice 
sent by the association ....... 23 
The Court pointed out that this provision evidenced the 
Legislature’s intent to have the  “super-priority lien”  extinguish 
the first mortgage because “one cannot redeem what it has not 
lost.”24 In its conclusion, the Court pointed out that the bifurcated 
lien is indeed a unique scheme.25 However, the Court also gave 
heavy weight to the consideration of both the drafters of the 
Uniform   Condominium   Act,26   as   well   as   the   Legislature in 
 
19. Botelho, 127 A.3d at 902; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-36.1-1.08 
(West, Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
20. Botelho, 127 A.3d at 902. 
21. Id. at 904. 
22. Id.  at  905;   see  also   R.I.  GEN.  LAWS   ANN.  § 34-36.1-3.21  (West, 
Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
23. Botelho, 127 A.3d at 905; see also § 34-36.1-3.21. 
24. Botelho, 127 A.3d at 905. 
25. Id. at 903. 
26. Id.  (specifically, the  “Commissioners’ Comments to the act describe 
the split-lien as ‘[a] significant departure from existing practice’ . . . created  
to ‘strike[] an equitable balance between the need to enforce collection of 
unpaid assessments and the obvious necessity for protecting the priority of 
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adopting and adapting the scheme with notice and redemption 
procedures.27 
COMMENTARY 
The Dissent argued that the statute itself is devoid of any 
language regarding extinguishment of the security interest of the 
first mortgage holder, which was in accord with the trial justice’s 
view.28 Justice Robinson expounded on this point by noting that 
the term the Court used to describe the Association’s lien for the 
last six months of common assessments, “super-priority,” is also 
not found anywhere in the text of the statute.29 The dissent 
critiqued what language is in the statute, pointing out that the 
Legislature needed to be “clear, precise, and broad” with its use of 
language when drafting a provision with such drastic 
repercussions.30 
The Court’s decision to unsecure a loan through a judicial 
interpretation of such an unusual provision in the statute was, by 
the Court’s own admission, a hard ruling for mortgage 
companies.31 Even though the debt still existed, the mortgagee 
here lost its security interest—essentially all it had—because the 
mortgagor was most likely judgment proof. The fact that the 
Legislature went back to this statute to add in the notice provision 
does suggest that it is aware of the “draconian” effects possible 
under the statutory scheme as written. However, the law does 
create a cap on the amount of money that can exist under the 
“super-priority lien,”32 and any additional proceeds from the 
foreclosure of the condominium unit can go to the subordinate 
priority lenders.33 This strikes an “equitable balance” and 
functionally    splits    the   losses    among    the    parties,    as the 
 
 
the security interests of mortgage lenders.’”). Id. (internal citation omitted) 
(alterations in original). 
27. Id. at 906. 
28. Id. at 906–07, 906 n.2 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
29. Id. at 906–07. 
30. Id. at 907 (specifically Justice Robinson noted “I do not believe that 
any objective speaker of English would be inclined to use those adjectives to 
describe the statutory scheme presently before us.”). 
31. See id. at 908. 
32. Id. at 904 (majority opinion). 
33. Id. $13,501.57  was  sent  to  the  Defendant  as  a  surplus  of  the 
foreclosure sale, which the Defendant did not accept.  Id. at 903 n.7. 
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Commissioner’s Comment from the UCA drafters suggested was 
their goal.34 It is important to note that the Court based much of 
its decision on a similar case decided by the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals; however, that case did not include the additional 
twist of the right of redemption provision found in RICA.35 
Viewing the decision of that case, the conclusion the Court  
reached here is not as outlandish as it might otherwise appear. 
As a practical matter, it would seem that the Association, 
consisting of all the other condominium unit owners, should bear 
some cost. The outstanding fees were all for improvements made  
to the condominium property as a whole, meaning all of the 
condominium owners received some benefit. In the event of an 
individual owner not paying the fees associated with that unit, the 
security interest in a condominium unit should not be 
extinguished to satisfy the outstanding condominium fees. The 
value of the foreclosure sale should be proportionately spread to 
the secured parties, both the mortgage company and the 
condominium association. 
From a policy perspective, the decision the Court reached is a 
well-reasoned solution to a confusing statute. The Court seems to 
suggest that in using the right of redemption, a bank can pay off 
the outstanding association fees, thus removing the “super- 
priority” portion of the condominium association’s lien, returning 
the bank mortgage to the highest priority lien.36  At that point,  
the bank could foreclose against the property without the 
impediment of the Association’s liens. If the bank did not  
generate enough proceeds from the foreclosure sale, all other  
lower priority liens would be extinguished, just as the first 
mortgage was extinguished in this case, and whoever bought the 
condominium would own it free of any encumbrances. This is also 
a sound policy because it prevents the existence of multiple liens 
against the same condominium unit, which would severely impact 
the marketability of the unit. Through this process, the 
condominium association would have its “super-priority lien” paid 
off,  and   the   bank   would  salvage  whatever  it  could  from the 
 
34. See id. at 903. 
35. See Chase Plaza Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
98 A.3d 166 (D.C. 2014). 
36. Botelho, 127 A.3d at 905 (the Court essentially refers to this process 
as a “conditional foreclosure”). 
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property. 
However, the use of the phrase “all assessments due on the 
unit” in the right of redemption provision would suggest that in 
order to redeem its security interest, a holder of a first mortgage 
would be required to pay not just the “super-priority” portion of 
outstanding fees but also the junior priority lien of any fees owed 
to the association that fall outside of the “super-priority” section.37 
If the intention of the Legislature was to give some protection 
against the harshness of the “super-priority lien,” it would be 
prudent to insert a specific, right-of-redemption provision in which 
only that section of the outstanding fees, which constitute the 
“super-priority,” should be paid by the holder of the first  
mortgage, in order to redeem its security interest. The Court 
seemed to send a message to lenders and the Legislature—that 
this is the practical effect of the law as written, and lenders should 
learn it and adapt to it. The dissent shined a spotlight on the 
ambiguous and confusing language of the statute, presumably in 
an effort to drive the Legislature to clarify certain aspects. Either 
way, the Legislature should scrutinize the RICA series of statutes 
after this ruling, as other parties have noted.38 
CONCLUSION 
The Court ruled that the mortgage holder’s security interest  
in a condominium unit was extinguished when the valid 
foreclosure by the condominium association on its statutorily 
created “super-priority lien” failed to yield enough proceeds to 
satisfy the association’s lien. In doing so, the Court navigated a 
confusing section of the RICA to a well-reasoned and practical 
ruling. 
 
James Caleb Bass 
 
 
 
 
 
37. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-36.1-3.21 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 
2016 Legis. Sess.). 
38. See Cale P. Keable and Santiago H. Posas, Rhode Island Supreme 
Court Rules That Condominium Assessment Liens Could Extinguish First- 
Priority Mortgages, Partridge Snow & Hahn LLP (Jan. 2016), 
http://www.psh.com/?t=40&an=52377&anc=742&format=xml. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Premise Liability. Roy v. State, 139 A.3d 480 (R.I. 2016). The 
Rhode Island Recreational Use Statute provides limited liability 
protection to landowners who either “directly or indirectly invite[] 
or permit[] without charge any person to use that property for 
recreational purposes.” In addition, the danger of diving is an 
“open and obvious” danger. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On July 10, 2008, Brett A. Roy (Roy) walked from his car to a 
pond at the World War II Veterans Memorial Park in Woonsocket, 
Rhode Island, and dove into the water.1 Due to the shallowness of 
the pond, Roy became paralyzed from the neck down; the injuries 
sustained by Roy were damaging to Roy, his wife, Dawn K. Roy 
(collectively, Plaintiffs), and the Plaintiffs’ two children.2 The 
Plaintiffs filed an action alleging several counts of negligence and 
premise liability against the Department of Environmental 
Management (DEM) and two individuals in  their  official 
capacities as DEM employees (collectively, State).3 During the 
trial, the director of DEM at the time of the incident, W. Michael 
Sullivan (Sullivan), testified that he made the decision to have the 
pond filled in June 2008, and that DEM operated the facility with 
the “expect[ation] that there would be people . . . using the [pond]” 
even when DEM prohibited swimming-at-your-own-risk.4 The 
Associate Director of Natural Resources for DEM, Larry 
Mouradjian (Mouradjian), testified that the pond has a  
“designated lap pool, a swim area, and a diving platform.”5 
Mouradjian also described that “diving near the wall into the lap 
 
 
1. Roy v. State, 139 A.3d 480, 482, 485 (R.I. 2016). 
2. Id. at 482. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 483. DEM operated the pond with the assumption that when 
there were “no[] lifeguards present at [the] swimming facility, that the 
swimming facility was closed.” Id. 
5. Id. 
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pool would be dangerous because it was too shallow”6 and believed 
that the pond should be drained or left empty due to lack of 
preparation needed for the pond.7 The DEM Deputy Chief of the 
Rhode Island Division of Parks and Recreation, John Faltus 
(Faltus), also testified at trial.8 Faltus stated that diving is 
generally not allowed; however, “[p]eople [were] allowed  to 
possibly do some shallow entry dives.”9 
Seasonal laborer for DEM Kenneth Henderson testified that 
on the day of July 10, 2008, he “saw ‘about half a dozen’ people 
swimming in the pond.”10  Some of the people present on the day  
of the incident testified differently as to what took place that day. 
One witness described Roy’s dive into the pond as that of a “belly 
flop kind of dive; not a complete dive.”11  Another  witness 
described Roy’s movement before the incident as if he was 
“r[unning], like you run when you bowl,” followed by a shallow 
dive.12 The witness who accompanied Roy to the pond on that day 
testified that Roy jogged from the car to the pond and as Roy was 
diving “t[old] him not to dive over there . . . because it was shallow 
water.”13  Roy stated in a deposition that he “never saw a sign   
that said ‘[n]o [s]wimming.’”14  Prior to jumping in, Roy stated   
that he checked the depth of the water by looking at the water, 
which he described as being “murky,” and that he “definitely 
couldn’t see the bottom.”15 Roy also described his dive to be a 
shallow dive and that no one said anything to him when he 
conducted a dive in the same spot the previous year.16 Roy 
admitted that “the way that [he] check[ed] the depth  of  the  
water . . . was probably irresponsible . . . .”17 
The trial justice denied both parties’ motions for judgment as 
 
 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. (alterations in original). 
10. Id. at 484. 
11. Id. at 485. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. (alterations in original). 
15. Id. Roy believed that if the water were too shallow he would be able 
to see the bottom.  See id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. (alterations in original). 
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a  matter  of  law  after  all  evidence  was presented.18 After an 
extensive trial, a jury returned a verdict for the State on question 
one, finding “that the [S]tate had not ‘willfully or  maliciously 
failed to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, 
structure or activity’ or against a ‘non-obvious, latent dangerous 
condition’ at the pond.’”19 As a result, both parties made renewed 
motions for judgment as a  matter of law.20  The State supported 
it’s motion by arguing that the Plaintiffs did not meet their 
standards to find that the State was liable under the Recreational 
Use Statute and that, as a matter of law, Roy’s conduct was 
“‘highly  dangerous’  and  ‘no  duty  was  owed  to  him.’”21 The 
Plaintiffs argued that the “[S]tate’s witnesses admitted sufficient 
facts at trial to establish the [S]tate’s liability as a matter of law 
under  the  Recreational Use Statute.”22 However, the Plaintiffs 
also moved for a “new trial on damages, or, in the alternative, a 
new trial on all the issues.”23 The trial justice denied both parties’ 
motions for judgment as a matter of law and granted the  
Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial on all the issues, but the State 
timely appealed this decision, and Plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal.24 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
In reviewing the appeals, The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
limited its review to the State’s renewed motion for judgment as a 
matter of law because the Court concluded that the State owed no 
duty to Roy.25 Furthermore, in order for the Court to review the 
trial justice’s decision on the motion, the Court was bound  to 
follow “the same rules and legal standards [that] govern the trial 
justice.”26 Essentially, the Court “must examine ‘the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, without weighing 
the evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and draw[] 
from the record all reasonable inferences that support the position 
 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 486, 487. 
20. Id. at 487. 
21. Id. The State also argued that Roy assumed the risk of injury by 
failing to check the pond’s depth before diving into the murky water.  See id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 488. 
26. Id. (quoting Hough v. McKiernan, 108 A.3d 1030, 1035 (R.I. 2015)). 
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of the nonmoving party.’”27 After the Court reviewed  the  
evidence, it should enter a judgment as a matter of law “when the 
evidence permits only one legitimate conclusion in regard to the 
outcome.”28 
Upon review, the Court initially sought to determine whether 
the State was liable under the Recreational Use Statute.29 The 
Court recounted that the purpose of the statute was to provide 
limited liability to owners of land and water areas made available 
to the public for recreational use.30 The Court noted that the 1996 
Amendment to the statute clearly showed that the “[L]egislature 
intended to include the state and municipalities among owners 
entitled to immunity under the statute.”31 The Court determined 
that the statute only provides limited liability and not that of 
absolute.32 The statute does not extend its liability limitations 
towards willful or malicious conduct.33 The State further argued 
that the Plaintiffs’ evidence did not establish that the State 
“willfully and/or maliciously failed to warn against a dangerous 
condition.”34 The Plaintiffs cited Berman v. Sitrin;35 there the 
defendants were found to have specific knowledge regarding 
“multiple incidents of death and grievous injury” that could occur 
with any individual that uses their property, such as the 
plaintiff.36 The Plaintiffs argued that the case at hand is 
comparable to Berman because the “shallow water and dangers of 
diving [into the pond] at this particular facility were not obvious to 
users . . . yet were in fact known to [the State].”37 However, in the 
case at hand, when it comes to the pond, only “relatively minor 
injur[ies] [had been] reported several days before Roy’s 
catastrophic  injuries.”38     The  Court  concluded  that  this  case is 
 
27. Id (alteration in original) (quoting Perry v. Alessi, 890 A.2d 463, 467 
(R.I. 2006)). 
28. Id. (quoting Long v. Atlantic PBS, Inc., 681 A.2d 249, 252 (R.I.  
1996)). 
29. See id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 488–89. 
34. Id. at 489. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. (quoting Berman v. Sitrin, 991 A.2d 1038, 1051 (R.I. 2010)). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 490. 
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distinguishable from Berman, and found that the Plaintiffs did not 
show the State to have “willful[ly] or malicious[ly] fail[ed] to guard 
or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity 
after discovering [a] user’s peril.”39 Thus,  the Court  concluded 
that the State’s motion for judgment as a matter of law should 
have been granted.40 
However, even if the Recreational Use Statute did not apply, 
the Court found that it is of common knowledge that the “danger 
of diving in and of itself is an ‘open and obvious’ danger,” as to 
preclude liability.41 Lastly, to support its finding, the Court 
recounted the evidence that Roy “admit[ted] he was aware of” the 
dangers of diving into shallow water.42 The Court concluded that 
Roy must have had knowledge and an appreciation of the risk 
because “[u]ltimately, it was [Roy’s] own behavior that caused his 
injuries.”43 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court definitively analyzed the 
purpose of the Recreational Use Statute and its authority to limit 
the liability of landowners with land or water areas for public 
recreational usage, ultimately concluding that the State was 
protected by the statute and owed no duty to Roy.44 The Court 
correctly bound themselves to the same standard as those of the 
trial justice because the Court explained that in reviewing a trial 
justice’s decision on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, it is 
bound to follow the “same rules and legal standards as govern the 
trial justice.”45 The Court’s ruling continues to make the  
immunity granted by the Recreational Use Statute possible for 
landowners of property used for recreational purposes, but that 
immunity should not be mistaken as absolute immunity. If the 
Recreational Use Statute were to be read as an absolute 
limitation, it would render any injury sustained by the public to be 
unrecoverable,  even  if  such  injuries  were  caused  willfully  or 
 
39. Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. (quoting Bucki v. Hawkins, 914 A.2d 491, 496 (R.I. 2007)). 
42. Id. (alteration in original). 
43. Id. (first alteration in original). 
44. Id. at 488. 
45. Id. 
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maliciously by the State. This standard not only protects the  
rights of the public to still have standing, but also still allows 
owners such as the State to provide its land for recreation 
purposes to the public. 
The Court’s ruling also upheld the requirements that need to 
be taken by the nonmoving parties to make a reasonable effort 
during its presentation of evidence in order to readdress their 
injuries as a matter of law. It would be unreasonable for  the 
Court to redress an injury just because a party has such daunting 
injuries and to exclude the rights granted by the Legislature for 
owners of land. The Court correctly noted that the State did  
“admit knowledge of the unique features of the pond,” but that  
Roy also admitted knowledge of the dangers and continued to dive 
in to the pond.46 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld that landowners 
have limited liability protection under Recreational Use Statute 
with regards to their property used for recreational purposes. 
Furthermore, the Court held that the dangers of diving are an 
open and obvious danger. 
 
Jonathan L. Pierre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46. Id. at 489. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Property Law. Am. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., v. Mardo, 140 A.3d 106 
(R.I. 2016). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that in a case 
that presents exceptional and unique circumstances, a balancing  
of the equities can justify a deviation, in the exercise of sound 
discretion, from their general rule regarding the remedy for a 
continuing trespass if it can be shown that undue hardship will 
burden one of the parties. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Goat Island South Condominium (GIS) is a 154-unit residency 
that consists of Harbor Houses Condominium (Harbor House), 
America Condominium (America), and Capella Condominium 
(Capella)—three residential sub-condominium areas.1 GIS is 
comprised of nineteen, stand-alone, townhouse, residence units 
located in Harbor House; forty-six, single-residence units located  
in America; and eighty-nine residence units in Capella.2 Each sub-
condominium within GIS is subject to separate association 
governance and declarations; however, residents must also adhere 
to the provisions of GIS’s master declaration.3 
On April 19, 2011, Plaintiffs, America and Capella, initiated 
the instant action against Defendants, Stefania M. Mardo, as 
Trustee of the Constellation Trust–2011 (the Trust), and Harbor 
House, seeking injunctive relief to prevent the expansion of Unit 
18 located in Harbor House.4 Plaintiffs’ original complaint alleged 
that Defendants breached the GIS Second Amended and Restated 
Declaration of Condominium (SAR), violated restrictive covenants, 
committed a common law trespass, and violated Rhode Island’s 
Condominium Act (the Act).5 
 
1. Am. Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Mardo, 140 A.3d 106, 109 (R.I. 2016). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. All four of these associations and declarations must adhere to 
Rhode Island’s Condominium Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-36.1. Id. 
4. Id. at 110. Bernie Sisto, the father of trustee Stefania Mardo, was 
entered into the suit as “an additional trustee.” Id. 
5. Id. 
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A bench trial was held on various days between May and 
September of 2011.6 During the trial, Bernie Sisto testified 
regarding the expansion of Unit 18.7 During his testimony, Mr. 
Sisto stated that although the Trust had expanded the walls of 
Unit 18; the walls were built on an existing foundation that the 
previous owners had constructed as a part of their expansion 
project on the property in 2000 and 2001.8 Mr. Sisto testified that 
when he purchased Unit 18, he had built on the foundation that 
the previous owners had laid out, which they had used as a patio 
and back deck.9 Mr. Sisto further testified  that the foundation  
had not been intended as a patio or back deck, but was in fact 
intended to be a part of a “proposed building expansion” by the 
prior owners.10 Mr. Sisto testified that it was his belief that a  
prior court had ordered the foundation to be put into the ground, 
but that the parties agreed not to continue construction until that 
case was entirely resolved.11  Mr. Sisto further testified that “ten 
(10) of the nineteen (19) Harbor House unit owners ha[d]  
expanded over the years, including most recently in 2008.”12 
Finally, Mr. Sisto testified that he had communicated via e-mail 
with the President of the GIS Board, Natalie Volpe, in which she 
requested that he not take further action in his expansion without 
the unanimous consent of all 154 unit owners.13  Mr.  Sisto 
believed this email to be the “personal opinion of Ms. Volpe, not  
the opinion of the GIS Board, since [t]hey did not vote on [it].”14 
The president and the owner of America testified that they had  
not provided consent for the expansion of Harbor House Unit 18, 
although the president testified that she knew of at least one 
Harbor House expansion in the past.15 
On August 22, 2012, the trial justice rendered her decision, 
finding  that  the  Defendants  had  acted  in  violation  of  the Act, 
 
 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. The “expansion was confined to the existing foundation, which 
was on the property when he purchased it.” Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 111. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. (alterations in original). 
15. Id. 
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whose statutory provisions require a unanimous vote from all unit 
owners.16 Moreover, the trial  justice found that since the GIS  
SAR was subject to the Act, Defendants had also violated its 
requirements.17 The trial justice  further  granted  Plaintiffs’ 
request for injunctive relief to preclude Unit 18 from further 
expansion but did not grant Plaintiffs’ request that she issue a 
mandatory injunction requiring the Trust to remove all 
construction beyond its “pre-expansion footprint.”18 Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ fees and further costs were not awarded.19 
The trial justice entered final judgment on February 25, 2014, 
and held that: (1) the expansion provisions as provided in the GIS 
SAR violated the Act and were unenforceable; (2) defendants had 
breached sections 2.3(a)(i)(A)&(M) and 11.1(b) of the GIS SAR; (3) 
count three of Plaintiffs’ complaint alleging a violation of 
restrictive covenants was moot; and (4) that the Trust had 
committed a common law trespass.20 
The Plaintiffs appealed three issues: (1) that the trial justice 
had erroneously “failed to issue a mandatory permanent 
injunction” to remove the trespass despite properly finding that 
there had been one; (2) the trial justice erred in ruling Plaintiffs’ 
count three as moot; and (3) that the trial justice had committed 
an error of law when she failed to recognize a contractual basis for 
awarding attorneys’ fees as was provided by  GIS  SAR.21  The 
Trust brought a cross-appeal arguing that: (1) the trial justice 
erred as a matter of law in her ruling that the Trust breached the 
GIS SAR; and (2) the trial justice committed error when she ruled 
that the Trust committed a trespass.22 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the trial justice’s decision, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court conducted a de novo review, applying the laws of 
contract      construction      in      evaluating      the   condominium 
 
 
16. Id. at 111, 112. 
17. Id. at 112. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 113. 
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declaration.23 The Court stated that it would read all clear and 
unambiguous terms as they are written.24 Further,  when 
examining a judgment in a non-jury trial, the Court will reverse 
the judgment only if it can be shown that “the trial justice 
misapplied the law, misconceived or overlooked material 
evidence[,] or made factual findings that were clearly wrong.”25 
The Court held that the trial justice did not commit error when 
she determined that the Trust had breached the GIS SAR or when 
she ruled that the Plaintiffs’ count three alleging restrictive 
covenants violation was moot.26 However, the Court did find error 
in the trial justice’s failure to award attorneys’ fees and other  
costs to the Plaintiffs based on the Trust’s violation of the GIS 
SAR.27 Further, the Court held that the trial justice had  not 
abused her discretion in issuing an injunctive order to halt further 
expansion of Unit 18 despite not issuing an injunctive order 
requiring the removal of the expanded part of Unit 18 (“the 
trespass”).28 
A. The GIS SAR 
The Court first addressed the Trust’s cross-appeal contention 
that the trial court erred in ruling that they had violated the GIS 
SAR by expanding Unit 18.29 The Trust argued that since  the  
trial justice had ruled that section 2.3 of the GIS SAR, which 
prohibits the expansion, violated the Act, its provisions are 
therefore “unenforceable and cannot form the basis of a breach of 
contract.”30   The Court stated that the Act required unanimous 
 
 
23. Id. “The contract must be viewed in its entirety, and the contract 
terms must be assigned their plain and ordinary language.” Id. (quoting 
Rivera v. Gagnon, 847 A.2d 280, 284 (R.I. 2004)). 
24. Id. “The Court will refrain from engaging in mental gymnastics or 
from stretching the imagination to read ambiguity into a [contract] where 
none is present.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Bliss  Mine  Road 
Condo. Ass’n v. Nationwide Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 11 A.3d 1078, 1083 (R.I. 
2010)). 
25. Id. at 117 (alteration in original) (quoting Rose Nulman Park Found. 
ex rel. Nulman v. Four Twenty Corp., 93 A.3d 25, 28 (R.I. 2014)). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 120. 
29. Id. at 113. 
30. Id. The Trust further argued that §11.1(b) of the GIS SAR was not 
applicable.     The   language   in   §11.1(b)   is   as   follows:   “Consistent with 
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consent of all 154 unit owners before any expansion or changes in 
boundaries of any unit could be made, and section 11.1(b) of the 
GIS  SAR  “clearly  and  unambiguously  echoes  that   
requirement . . . .”31 Relying on Mr. Sisto’s testimony at trial 
where he conceded to lacking unanimous consent from all 154 unit 
owners, the Court held that the Trust had violated section 11.1(b) 
of the GIS SAR.32 
The Court then addressed the Plaintiffs’ appeal regarding the 
mootness of count three in their complaint.33 In count three of 
their complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Trust had violated 
the “restrictive covenants that lie with the land” when it expanded 
Unit 18 and changed the boundaries of the Unit without obtaining 
the required amendment.34 The Court stated that since the trial 
justice had found that there was a breach of contract and a 
common law trespass, she had awarded what she considered to be 
appropriate damages based on Plaintiffs’ complaint and their 
relief sought.35 The Court further  acknowledged  that  the 
Plaintiffs requested the same relief in count two (breach of GIS 
SAR) and in count three.36 As it follows, the Court stated that 
deciding the breach of contract claim and awarding damages was 
within the discretion of the trial justice, and that she did not 
commit an error in declining to “contend with the restrictive 
covenants claim since it was not necessary for her to do so.”37 
The third issue the Court addressed was Plaintiffs’ contention 
that  the  trial  justice  had  committed  an  error of  law  when she 
 
subsection 34-36.1-2.17(d) of the Act, except to the extent expressly permitted 
or required by the Act, no amendment may . . . change the boundaries of any 
Unit . . . in the absence of unanimous consent of the Unit Owners.” Id. at 114 
(emphasis added). 
31. Id. 
32. Id.  The Trust then argued that it could not have breached §11.1(b)  
of the GIS SAR because that section specifically applies to amendment of the 
GIS SAR, and in this case the Trust had not sought an amendment to the  
GIS SAR. Id. The Court held that the fact that the Trust did not seek an 
amendment “does not change the fact that the Act requires the Trust to seek 
such an amendment before expanding boundaries of the unit and that  the 
GIS SAR incorporates that requirement in §11.1(b).” Id. Accordingly, the 
court held that §11.1(b) clearly applies to this case. Id. 
33. Id. at 114–15. 
34. Id. at 115. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
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failed to award them attorneys’ fees and costs.38 The Court 
indicated that it has long adhered to the “American rule”39 in 
determining whether to award attorneys’ fees and other costs.40 
The Court looked at section 11.3 of the GIS SAR, which it believed 
to be relevant pertaining to Plaintiffs’ claims for attorneys’ fees 
and other costs.41 The Court found that the plain language of 
section11.3 of the GIS SAR clearly did provide a basis for  an 
award of attorneys’ fees and costs in the present case.42 Having 
found a valid basis for awarding attorneys’ fees and other costs,  
the Court then turned to the issue of whether the trial justice had 
abused her discretion in not awarding such damages.43 The Court 
read section 11.3 of the GIS SAR to specifically focus on the word 
“shall” in the sentence that dictates the mandatory award of 
attorneys’ fees and other costs stemming from a breach of the GIS 
SAR.44 Reading the terms of the contract and applying them as 
they are written, the Court held that there was a valid basis for an 
award of attorneys’ fees and costs to exist, and that the  trial 
justice had abused her discretion in not awarding them to 
Plaintiffs.45 
B. Trespass 
In its cross-appeal, the Trust argued that the trial justice had 
committed an error as a matter of law when she ruled that the 
expansion of Unit 18 created a common law trespass because “the 
area over which the expansion was made is property that the  
Trust owns [as a tenant in common] and had the exclusive right to 
use” and because the “the Trust had the consent of GIS and 
Harbor Houses.”46   The Trust relied  on  the established  fact that 
 
38. Id. The Trust argued that because the expansion provisions of §2.3  
in the GIS SAR were found to be unenforceable, a breach of that section 
would not be a valid basis for awarding attorney’s fees and other costs under 
the GIS SAR. Id. 
39. The American rule requires that each litigant pays his or her own 
attorneys’ fees absent a statutory authority or finding of contractual liability. 
Id. 
40. Id. (citation omitted). 
41. Id. at 115–16. 
42. Id. at 116. 
43. Id. (citing Dauray v. Mee, 109 A.3d 832, 845 (R.I. 2015)). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 117. 
46. Id. (alteration in original). 
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the original expansion of Harbor House Unit 18 had begun back in 
2000–2001 by the previous owners, and that his construction of  
the expanded walls on Unit 18 merely completed what the 
previous owners had started.47 The Trust further relied on  the 
fact that the previous owners had been given express 
authorization by the Superior Court to expand Unit 18.48 The 
Court reviewed the trial justice’s finding that the expansion of 
Unit 18 created an encroachment upon a common area, which 
caused “a de facto alteration of the percentage of the undivided 
interest which each owner has in the common areas . . . .”49 The 
Court ruled that despite the Trust building on the previous 
owner’s foundation, it had still committed a trespass by 
appropriating the limited common area for their own use, and 
therefore the trial justice had not committed error in finding that  
a trespass had occurred.50 
The final issue the Court addressed was the Plaintiffs’ 
contention that because the trial justice had found a “continuing 
trespass” she had committed error when she failed to mandate an 
injunction to remove the trespass.51  The Plaintiffs argued that  
the removal of a trespass is required by law unless an “exceptional 
circumstance” is present, which they argued was not applicable.52 
Plaintiffs further contended that the injunction they sought to 
remove the trespass would not “operate oppressively or 
inequitably.”53 In addressing these arguments, the Court cited 
Rose Nulman Park Foundation ex rel. Nulman v. Four Twenty 
Corp. in which it stated a general rule for injunctions as they 
relate   to   a   continuing   trespass.54      The   rule   states   that a 
 
47. Id. at 110. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 117 (quoting Strauss v. Oyster River Condo. Trust, No.  
114843, 1992 WL 12153337, at *23 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 27, 1992)). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 117–18. The Plaintiffs pointed to the record and argued that 
the trial justice did not cite to any exceptional circumstances in this case, 
therefore removal of the trespass is required by law. Id. at  118.  The 
Plaintiffs also argued that the Trust had notice and a warning from Ms.  
Volpe that their expansion violated the GIS SAR and the Act, so no 
exceptional circumstances existed here and balancing of the equities should 
not be considered in this case. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id.  In another notable case, the Court stated: 
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continuing trespass “wrongfully interferes with the legal rights of 
the owner, and in the usual case those rights cannot be adequately 
protected except by an injunction which will eliminate the 
trespass.”55 However, exceptional circumstances exist when a 
substantial right of the landowner may be properly protected 
without ordering an injunction, which would otherwise operate 
oppressively and inequitably.56 If, after balancing the equities, a 
court finds that there would be an undue hardship to one of the 
parties, then an exceptional circumstance exists.57 
However, this Court noted that when an intentional trespass 
occurs where the defendant continues to proceed with the trespass 
despite notice or warning, it will not consider exceptional 
circumstances.58 Plaintiffs argue that the Trust was put on notice 
and given warning by the e-mail from Mr. Sisto.59 However, the 
Court agreed with the Trust that the e-mail merely reflected Ms. 
Volpe’s own opinion and that it was not an official notice or 
warning after a vote was taken by the GIS.60 The Court agreed 
that the Trust, through Mr. Sisto, could not be certain that when 
Unit 18 was being expanded that they had to do any more than 
comply with the terms of the GIS SAR as they understood them.61 
The Superior Court decisions at issue here were still pending on 
appeal to the Supreme Court, and the issue as to whether or not 
unanimous approval of the other condominium owners was 
required for expansion had not been concretely decided when Ms. 
 
[T]he owner of land is entitled to a mandatory injunction to require 
the removal of a structure that has been unlawfully placed upon his 
land, and the fact that such owner has suffered little or no damage 
because of the offending structure, or that it was erected in good 
faith, or that the cost of its removal would be greatly 
disproportionate to the benefit accruing to the plaintiff form its 
removal, is not a bar to the granting of [injunctive] relief. However, 
the existence of such circumstances may in exceptional cases move 
the court to withhold the [injunctive] relief contemplated by the 
general rule. 
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Santilli v. Morelli, 230 A.2d 860, 863  
(R.I. 1967). 
55. Id. at 118. 
56. Id. (citation omitted). 
57. See id. 
58. Id. (citation omitted). 
59. Id. at 119. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
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Volpe e-mailed Mr. Sisto.62 The Court considered this to be an 
exceptional circumstance, which justified balancing the equities.63 
In addition to the exceptional circumstance mentioned above, 
the Court emphasized the important fact then when the Trust 
bought Unit 18, the previous owners had already constructed a 
foundation in anticipation of an approved expansion.64 The Trust 
was made aware that the Superior Court had specifically ordered 
that the previous owners be allowed to proceed with their 
construction and that the GIS Board had approved the expansion 
as no resident had objected to it.65 The Court  stated  that  the 
Trust had acted in good faith when it had reasonably believed that 
it was able to expand on the existing foundation laid out by the 
previous owners.66 Further, the Court reminded itself that the 
Plaintiffs had originally sought a preliminary injunction against 
the Trust but had “failed to litigate vigorously in pursuit of such 
an injunction,” and had allowed their motion to be advanced to 
trial on the merits.67 During that time, the expansion on Unit 18 
was completed.  The Court concluded that requiring the removal  
of the now-completed expansion on Unit 18, thus removing the 
trespass, would be “enormously oppressive, both logistically and 
financially.”68 
The Court concluded that the trial justice did not abuse her 
discretion in issuing an injunctive order against the expansion of 
Unit 18 while not issuing an injunctive order to remove the 
trespass.69 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island  Supreme Court clearly stated that  when  a 
 
62. Id. 
63. Id. (citation omitted). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. The Court also considered the important facts that the Trust’s 
expansion was actually smaller than the intended expansion by the previous 
owners, and that other Harbor Houses units had expanded in the past. Id. 
67. Id. at 120. 
68.   Id. at 119.  The Plaintiffs are not affected by the Court’s decision not 
to remove the expansion. Id. “The expansion is on land designated for the 
exclusive use of Unit 18, and there is no allegation that the expansion is 
affecting the water views of any resident or is otherwise a material 
inconvenience for the other residents.” Id. 
69. Id. at 120. 
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trespass occurs an injunction mandating the removal of that 
trespass is required by law; however, exceptional circumstances 
may exist where it must balance the equities before issuing the 
injunction.70 Where a substantial right of a landowner may be 
safeguarded without resorting to an injunction, to order that 
injunction would be oppressive and inequitable.71 However, when 
adequate notice and warning are given to a potential trespasser 
and are not heeded, the Court will not balance the equities to 
consider a hardship to the wrongful party.72 
As such, the Court correctly took into account that not all 
trespasses are the same, and therefore application of remedies will 
also differ. Clearly, requiring the Defendants in this case to 
remove the trespass would qualify as an immense hardship on 
their behalf. Although not specifically mentioned  by the Court,  
the Defendants would be faced with both economic and 
environmental hardship had they been required to remove the 
expansion from Unit 18. In recognizing this hardship, the Court 
properly decided that removing the trespass was a justified 
deviation to their general rule. 
However, despite the Court’s exception to their general rule, 
they correctly held that the trial judge did err in not awarding 
attorney’s fees to the Plaintiffs. In his concurrence, Justice 
Flaherty agreed with the Court’s opinion that the trial justice’s 
discretion did not permit her to decline to award attorney’s fees by 
stating that “the parties have a right to the benefit of their 
bargain.”73 When parties enter into a contractual agreement part 
of that bargain is agreeing to certain terms, such as awarding of 
attorney’s fees should litigation result from any breach of the 
contract. Both parties are free to agree or disagree to those terms. 
The trial justice erred when she disregarded that agreement 
between the parties and declined to award attorney’s fees. Had  
she been correct in that decision, bargaining between parties  
when coming to an agreement would essentially be counter- 
productive. 
 
 
 
70. Id. at 118 (citation omitted). 
71. Id. at 118 (citation omitted). 
72. Id. (citation omitted). 
73. Id. at 121 (Flaherty, J., concurring). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice 
did not abuse her discretion in finding that the Trust had 
committed a trespass.74 However, conflictingly, the Court found 
that the trial justice did not err in failing to issue a mandatory 
injunction required by the law to remove the continuing trespass 
that is Unit 18.75 Further, the Court held that the trial justice did 
not err in ruling Plaintiffs’ count three as moot and did not err in 
determining that the Trust breached the GIS SAR.76  However,  
the Court held that the trial justice did abuse her discretion in 
failing to award attorneys’ fees and other costs to Plaintiffs based 
on the terms of the GIS SAR.77 
Sophie Bellacosa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74. Id. at 120. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Records. Providence Journal Co. v. R.I. Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety, 136 A.3d 1168 (R.I. 2016). Records that could reasonably  
be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy do not have to be disclosed by a governmental agency 
under the Access to Public Records Act (APRA) if the  records 
would otherwise be in the public interest. A citizen seeking to 
compel disclosure of records for the public interest, over the 
privacy interest, to uncover government negligence or impropriety 
must provide evidence of government negligence or impropriety, 
not just mere speculation or suspicion. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On May 28, 2012, Caleb Chafee (Caleb), the son of then- 
Governor Lincoln Chafee, hosted a party on property owned by the 
then-Governor where alcohol was consumed by some underage 
attendees, resulting in an underage, female attendee being taken 
to the hospital for an alcohol-related illness after leaving the 
party.1 Following this, the Rhode Island State Police2 went to the 
property to conduct an investigation, which yielded 186 pages of 
investigative documents.3 Caleb was charged with furnishing or 
procurement of alcoholic beverages for underage persons.4 On 
August 22, 2012, Caleb pled nolo contendere in Rhode Island 
District Court, receiving a $500 civil penalty, and on March 13, 
2013, Caleb’s motion to expunge his record was granted by the 
District Court judge.5 
 
 
1. Providence Journal Co. v. R.I. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 136 A.3d 1168, 
1170 (R.I. 2016). 
2. The property is located in the town of Exeter, which does not have a 
local police force, so the State Police responded to the incident.  Id. n.1. 
3. Id. at 1170–71. 
4. Id. at 1171. The 186-page report included witness lists, witness 
statements, land evidence records, and narrative reports written by various 
officers. Id. The investigation led to Caleb being charged under R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 3-8-11.1 (2010), the Social Host Law. Id. 
5. Id. 
 
880 
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Seeking information, on June 21, 2012, a Providence Journal 
Company (Journal) reporter requested by email for the state  
police to provide copies of the reports of Caleb’s incident.6 The 
reason given for the request was that it would be “in the public 
interest to know how the situation was handled regarding the 
governor’s son—especially since the state police answer directly to 
the governor.”7 The Rhode Island Department of Public Safety 
denied the request because the records were part of an ongoing 
criminal investigation, and the records could reasonably be 
expected to be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.8 The 
reporter sent another request on August 21, 2012, which was 
denied for similar privacy concerns.9 The Journal made a similar 
request on September 5, 2012, which was denied for the same 
reason.10 
Unable to get the information by request, the Journal filed a 
complaint in Providence County Superior Court, alleging violation 
of the APRA, the United States Constitution, and the Rhode  
Island Constitution.11 Both parties filed motions for summary 
judgment, and after the hearing justice reviewed the documents 
and the parties’ memoranda and heard oral arguments, summary 
judgment was granted in favor of the defendants.12 The hearing 
justice determined that the Journal had failed to demonstrate “a 
belief by a reasonable person that alleged government impropriety 
might have occurred,” that “disclosure would not advance the 
public interest,” and that even if the documents were to be 
redacted, it would be clear that it would be Caleb’s event that was 
being investigated.13   The Journal appealed the decision.14 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court considered the 
grant of summary judgment and  the  interpretation  of  APRA  de 
 
 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 1171–72. 
11. Id. at 1172. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
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novo.15 Furthermore, when public interests and privacy interests 
are balanced for disclosure purposes by a trial justice, the Court 
gives the same amount of deference as it would to a trial justice’s 
finding of fact, overturning the decision only if the trial justice 
“overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise 
clearly wrong.”16 
The Court then turned to the function of the APRA and found 
that its purpose is to provide the public access to public records, 
but to also protect against an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.17 To effectuate this purpose, APRA was drafted with a 
general rule of disclosure that provides that all records kept by a 
public body are public records, which every person has the right  
to, subject to exception.18   “Public records” include 
all documents, paper, letters, maps, books, tapes, 
photographs, films, sound recordings, magnetic or other tapes, 
electronic data processing records, computer stored data . . . or 
other material . . . made or received pursuant to law or ordinance 
or in connection with the transaction of official business by any 
agency.19 
Furthermore, the APRA categorizes certain records as non- 
public records that include those “maintained by law enforcement 
agencies for criminal law enforcement and all records relating to 
the detection and investigation of crime, including those 
maintained on any individual or compiled in the course of a 
criminal investigation by any law enforcement agency.”20  
However, these records are considered to be non-public only “to 
 
15. Id. When conducting a de novo review of a grant of a motion for 
summary judgment, the Court applies the “same standards and rules as did 
the motion justice,” and the Court views the evidence “in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. at 1172–73. Likewise, when  
conducting a de novo review of a trial justice’s ruling concerning the 
interpretation of a statute, the Court strives to “to give effect to the purpose 
of the act as intended by the Legislature.” Id. at 1173 (citation omitted). 
Furthermore, the statute “may not be construed in a way that would . . . 
defeat the underlying purpose of the enactment.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
16. Id. at 1173 (citation omitted). 
17. Id. at 1173; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 38-2-1 (West, Westlaw 
through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
18. Providence Journal Co., 136 A.3d at 1173–74; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 38-2-3(a) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
19. Providence Journal Co., 136 A.3d at 1174. 
20. Id. at 1174; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 38-2-2(4)(D)(c) (West, 
Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
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the extent that disclosure of the records or information . . . could 
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy.”21 
Because the APRA is similar to the Freedom of Information 
Act and contains a similar privacy exemption for law enforcement 
records,22 the Court looked to federal case law to aid in its 
interpretation of APRA and found the United States Supreme 
Court’s framework in National Archives and Records 
Administration v. Favish23 worthy of adoption.24 The U.S. 
Supreme Court found that the term “unwarranted” requires a 
balancing of the privacy interest against the public interest in 
disclosure, and the method of balancing requires a two-step test 
that the citizen must use to prove that he or she is entitled to the 
records at issue.25 The test requires that the citizen first show  
that “the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one, 
an interest more specific than having the information for its own 
sake,” and secondly, that the citizen show that “the information is 
likely to advance that interest.”26 Before proceeding with the 
Favish test, the Court first dispensed with the APRA rule that the 
requesting citizen has no duty to provide a reason for desiring the 
requested records because the Favish test requires that such a 
rule be inapplicable in order to balance the competing interests.27 
Taking up the Favish test, the Court concluded that the 
Journal’s reason for seeking the records, i.e., to potentially  
uncover government negligence or impropriety, lacked an 
evidentiary basis that showed any government negligence or 
impropriety.28 The Court held that the Journal sought the records 
under  a  suspicion  or  speculation  that  responsible   government 
 
 
21. Providence Journal Co., 136 A.3d at 1174; see also § 38-2-2(4)(D)(c). 
It is this exemption that is the basis of the appeal. 
22. Providence Journal Co., 136 A.3d at 1174; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254). 
23. 541 U.S. 157 (2004) (considering the applicability of this exemption  
to certain photographs of a decedent’s body at the scene of death). 
24. Providence Journal Co., 136 A.3d at 1175. 
25. Id. (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 171). 
26. Id. (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 172). Normally, only the public body 
has to provide a reason for withholding a requested record, and this APRA 
rule is similar to a rule in the Freedom of Information Act. Id. 
27. Id. (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 172). 
28. Id. at 1175, 1177. 
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officials acted improperly in the performance of their duties, but 
that this is not enough, and that the requester “must produce 
evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that 
the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.”29 The 
Court determined that the Favish standard may be inapplicable in 
cases where a party has another reason, other than government 
impropriety, for requesting the records, but that the Journal had 
not offered such an additional reason.30 The Court afforded a 
“presumption of legitimacy accorded to the Government’s official 
conduct . . . and where the presumption is applicable, clear 
evidence is needed to displace it.”31 The Court found that the  
State Police had performed a comprehensive investigation of 
Caleb’s violation of the Social Host Law, given by its compilation  
of 186 pages of documents, which resulted in Caleb being charged, 
and that the Journal provided no evidence that any government 
official acted negligently or improperly in doing so.32  The 
Journal’s mere speculation that there was some impropriety due  
to the then-Governor’s position was not enough, and thus the 
Journal failed the Favish test.33 
While the Journal had failed the Favish test, the Court 
continued its analysis in order to evaluate the privacy interests at 
stake.34 The Court held that Caleb’s privacy interest was not 
diminished because the incident received media attention, as the 
media coverage revealed none of the intimate details of the 
incident, except the charge against Caleb.35 The Court further  
held that Caleb’s privacy interest was not diminished by his nolo 
contendere plea because that only applies to the fact that he was 
convicted, not to the facts underlying such a conviction.36 
The Court  ultimately concluded  that Caleb’s privacy interest 
 
29. Id. at 1175 (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 174). 
30. Id. at 1176. 
31. Id. at 1176 (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 174). 
32. Id. at 1176–77. 
33. Id. at 1177. 
34. Id. The Court did so for completeness and future guidance. Id. 
However, the Court did not consider the privacy interests of third parties. Id. 
at 1177 n.7. 
35. Id. “The privacy interest at stake flows not from the widespread 
knowledge of the fact that Caleb was charged, but, instead, from the 
information and personal details that may have been discovered in the police 
investigation.” Id. 
36. Id. at 1178. 
  
 
2017] SURVEY SECTION 885 
was significant,37 the Journal’s unsubstantiated assertion of 
possible government impropriety due to the then-Governor’s 
position did not permit disclosure, the trial justice did not err or 
overlook evidence, and under the APRA records need not be 
disclosed where such disclosure could create an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy.38 
COMMENTARY 
With regards to both public and private interests, the Court 
struck a sensible balance between the competing interests, and 
interpreted the APRA to give it its intended purpose. Naturally, 
citizens have an interest in public institutions, and that interest 
requires citizens be granted access to information contained in 
those institutions; however, those institutions contain sensitive, 
personal information that should sometimes be prohibited from 
members of the general public. If all information given to public 
institutions were available to every member of the public, then no 
information would remain private. The Court and the APRA 
appropriately address this concern by protecting against 
unwarranted invasions of privacy in the disclosure of records. 
Law enforcement agencies are but one of these public 
institutions that acquire personal information for its own function. 
If law enforcement agencies could not investigate personal, 
intimate details, then its investigative abilities would be so 
diminished as to render the enforcement of crime immensely 
difficult. As the Court notes, for “documents developed by law 
enforcement in the investigation of a private individual, the 
privacy interest is considerable and should not be easily displaced 
absent a particularly noteworthy public interest.”39 Furthermore, 
this information is not likely made available to the public by the 
suspect without the investigation, and it should not automatically 
become public information by virtue of its inclusion in an 
investigative police report. The information in the report is likely 
to include personal information that was not voluntarily given by 
the suspect, or was voluntarily given under the notion that it will 
 
 
37. The  Court  considered  only Caleb’s privacy  interest, not that of the 
then-Governor.  Id. at 1178 n.9. 
38. Id. at 1178, 1179. 
39. Id. at 1178. 
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be used for an investigation and be kept private. 
While the Court does provide a framework for one’s privacy 
interests to be overcome by the public interest, it is perhaps 
difficult for a member of the public to overcome that privacy 
interest. The evidence needed to meet the standard is not easily 
uncovered and is likely to be closely guarded. Therefore, there 
likely would never be more than suspicion or speculation for 
situations where the evidence to meet the standard is difficult to 
obtain. Here, a suspicion is perhaps justly warranted  by  the 
public when the law enforcement agency, accountable to the 
Governor, is investigating a member of the Governor’s family to 
ensure that the investigation is conducted fairly. The Court says 
that the investigative report was comprehensive, but stays silent 
on what constitutes a comprehensive report. While it might be 
impossible to have a standard for a comprehensive report given  
the varying nature of every investigation, the lack thereof leaves 
little direction for assessing a report and possibly leaves the door 
open for impropriety to be concealed this way. Moreover, the  
Court pointed to Caleb’s charge as a reason for lack of  
impropriety. This seemingly suggests that not being charged 
might be evidence of impropriety, but the Court leaves unclear 
whether this is so. This also suggests that charging a suspect may 
be enough per se to always protect information in police reports 
from becoming public, which leaves open the possibility of subjects 
of a police investigation simply being charged in order to protect 
the information in investigative police reports from being made 
available to the public. Therefore, the Court might have left open 
possibilities that could allow law enforcement records that could 
show government impropriety from ever being accessed by the 
public. 
Yet, it is unlikely that these possible routes around the 
standard to always protect information from the public will be 
successful.  The person requesting the records could always bring  
a suit to compel the disclosure of records, at which point a trial 
judge would assess those records and make a determination 
whether or not they should be disclosed. It is extremely unlikely 
that government impropriety would reach the reviewing trial 
judge. 
Furthermore, the privacy interests are likely to be strong 
enough    to    outweigh    the    public    interest.   As    mentioned, 
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investigative reports are likely to be highly detailed and rife with 
personal information, which would normally not be disclosed to  
the public. This normally undisclosed information should not 
automatically be disclosed because it happens to be in the records 
of a public institution, or else the exceptions to the disclosure law 
and general notions of personal privacy would be defeated. The 
privacy concerns are exactly why the need to provide evidence of 
impropriety to access records is necessary, so that private 
information is not easily discoverable on mere speculation or 
suspicion of some wrongdoing. Therefore, the Court’s holding 
enforces the safeguards against the disclosure of private 
information while keeping with the spirit of making records 
accessible to the public for the public interest. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a citizen seeking 
to compel a public institution to disclose records for the public 
interest, under the APRA, to uncover government negligence or 
impropriety must provide evidence of such negligence or 
impropriety, not just speculation. The Court determined that this 
standard is necessary in order to protect individual privacy 
interests and give the statute its proper effect of limiting 
disclosure of public records in order to prevent an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy. 
 
Andrew D. Senerchia 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tort Law. Hyde v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 139 A.3d 
452 (R.I. 2016). Repressed recollection, on its own, does not qualify 
as an “unsound mind” disability, and therefore does not toll the 
statute of limitations in cases of childhood, sexual abuse against 
non-perpetrator defendants. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Helen Hyde and Jeffrey Thomas (Plaintiffs), former students of 
Our Lady of Mercy in East Greenwich, Rhode Island, filed suit in 
Providence County Superior Court, seeking damages from the 
Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence (Defendant) for the sexual 
abuse they experienced while under Defendant’s supervision.1 The 
sexual perpetrator, Father Brendan Smyth (Smyth), an agent and 
employee of Defendant, passed away prior to the commencement of 
this suit.2 
Ms. Hyde’s abuse began in 1967, when she was six years old 
and a student at Our Lady of Mercy.3 Ms. Hyde states that the 
abuse took place in a classroom, schoolyard, church, her home, and 
in the woods outside of her house.4 Mr. Thomas claimed that not 
long after Smyth began to abuse Ms. Hyde, Smyth raped and 
molested him in the church’s rectory and in Hyde’s backyard.5 
In their complaints, the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant and 
his predecessors knew about Smyth’s sexual abuse of children by 
the 1940s, yet continued to allow him to serve as priest under his 
supervision.6 The Plaintiffs also claimed that due to the amount of 
sexual abuse inflicted, Smyth was sent away for treatment before 
he was allowed to return to Our Lady of Mercy.7   The Plaintiffs 
 
1. Hyde v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 139 A.3d 452, 454–55 
(R.I. 2016). 
2. Id. at 455. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
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alleged “numerous counts of negligence, negligent supervision, 
vicarious liability, fraud, intentional nondisclosure, and intentional 
failure to supervise,” against the Defendant.8 The Plaintiffs also 
asserted that each of them had repressed recollection of the abuse 
that was committed against them and did not recover these 
memories until within three years of the filing of the lawsuit.9 
In response to the Plaintiffs’ complaints, the Defendant filed 
motions to dismiss the complaints on the grounds that repressed 
memory only applied in cases where the perpetrator is the 
defendant, so the action was barred by the statute of limitations, 
and the Plaintiffs had failed to allege facts sufficient to support the 
tolling of the statute under the “unsound mind” provision of Rhode 
Island General Laws section 9-1-19.10 The Plaintiffs opposed, 
arguing that repressed memory by itself can be a tolling mechanism 
under the “unsound mind” provision, an evidentiary hearing was in 
order pursuant to precedent, and their fraud claims were timely 
because they could not have known about the Defendant’s 
fraudulent conduct until they remembered the sexual abuse.11 
At the motion to dismiss hearing, the Defendant argued that 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court had never held that repressed 
memories alone could constitute an unsound mind.12 The 
Defendant also argued that the statute did not apply to non- 
perpetrator defendants, so there was no need for an evidentiary 
hearing.13 The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss, without prejudice, pending an evidentiary hearing to be 
held to determine if the Plaintiffs could demonstrate that repressed 
 
 
 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-19 provides: 
If any person at the time any such abuse of action shall accrue to him 
or her shall be under the age of eighteen years, or of unsound mind, 
or beyond the limits of the United States, the person may bring the 
cause of action, within the time limited under this chapter, after the 
impediment is removed. 
(West, Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
11. Id.  Plaintiffs’ claimed that according to the Court’s decision in Kelly 
v. Marcantanio, 678 A.2d 873, 879 (R.I. 1996), they deserved an evidentiary 
hearing on repressed memory. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
  
 
 
890  ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:888 
 
memories would qualify as an unsound mind.14 However, the trial 
court did agree that prior decisions definitively held that non- 
perpetrator defendants could not be tolled under the statute.15 
More than a year later, the Defendant filed a motion for entry 
of a scheduling order and attached a proposed schedule.16 Plaintiffs 
objected to the proposed order because they asserted their right to 
conduct discovery on an intentional concealment toll pursuant to 
section 9-1-20.17 The Defendant argued that the Plaintiffs had 
waived their right to present a fraudulent concealment theory.18 
The trial justice held that she would not allow discovery on 
fraudulent concealment, but she would allow the Plaintiffs to file a 
motion to reargue the motion to dismiss and raise this issue.19 
Following the justice’s suggestion, the Plaintiffs moved to 
reargue their opposition to the Defendant’s motion to dismiss.20 A 
hearing was held, and the trial justice determined that none of Ms. 
Hyde’s allegations constituted fraudulent concealment.21 The trial 
judge also held that she would not allow Plaintiffs to combine the 
claims of fraudulent concealment and repressed memory to extend 
the statute of limitations.22 At a later continuation of the hearing, 
the trial court found that there was no evidence of actual 
misrepresentations by the Defendant, and any misrepresentations 
that were made to Ms. Hyde’s mother were only applicable until 
Ms. Hyde reached eighteen.23 The trial court also denied the 
Plaintiffs’ motion for discovery regarding fraudulent 
concealment.24 
Finally, the trial court held that the Plaintiffs did not meet the 
 
 
14. Id. at 456. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. R.I GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-20 provides that 
If any person, liable to an action by another, shall fraudulently, by actual 
misrepresentation, conceal from him or her the existence of the cause of action, 
the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue against the person so liable at the 
time when the person entitled to sue thereon shall first discover its existence. 
(West, Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 457. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 457–58. 
23. Id. at 458. 
24. Id. 
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definition of “unsound mind,” and therefore the statute of 
limitations began at the time of the offense, not when the Plaintiffs 
became aware through a recovered memory.25 Accordingly, the 
trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, 
and Plaintiffs timely appealed.26 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to 
interpret Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-19 to address the 
dispute between the parties.27 The Court first looked to see if 
Plaintiffs’ repressed recollection, by itself, satisfied the “unsound 
mind” requirement necessary for the statute of limitations to toll 
under Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-19.28 The Court 
relied on its prior holding in Kelly v. Marcantanio and Roe v. 
Gelineau, which held that an “unsound mind” meant the inability 
to manage one’s day-to-day affairs; however, there was ambiguity 
as to whether this applied to repressed recollection.29 Looking to 
resolve whether not being able to manage one’s day to day activities 
was required under repressed recollections, the Court looked at the 
General Assembly’s enactment of section 9-1-51.30 The Court 
focused on the Assembly’s decision to phrase the statute as limiting 
the provision to actual abusers.31 The Assembly stated that this 
 
 
25. Id. at 459. 
26. Id. at 460. 
27. Id. The Court conducted a de novo review to see whether the trial 
court should have granted summary judgment. Id. at 460 (citing Woodruff v. 
Gitlow, 91 A.3d 805, 809 (R.I. 2014)). Whether a statute of limitations has run 
against a plaintiff’s claim is a question of law that is also reviewed de novo. 
Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp., 115 A.3d 938, 942–43 (R.I. 2015)). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 463 (quoting Roe, 794 A.2d 476, 486 (R.I. 2002). 
30. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §9-1-51 provides that: 
(a) All claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct brought 
by any person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result 
of childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within seven years of 
the act alleged to have abused the injury or condition, or seven years 
of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered 
that the injury or condition was caused by the act, whichever period 
expires later. 
(West, Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
31. Id. at 465 (quoting Kelly v. Marcantanio, 678 A.2d. 873, 878 (R.I. 
1996). 
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was because of the causal connection between the abuser, who is 
responsible for the “. . .[victim’s] psychological defense mechanism 
leading to repression,” and the victim.32 Accordingly, the Court 
held that under section 9-1-19, repressed recollection, standing 
alone, does not toll the statute of limitations when dealing with non- 
perpetrator defendants.33 
The Court then went on to discuss the Plaintiffs’ contention 
that the trial court erred in denying them the opportunity to seek 
discovery on fraudulent concealment claims.34 On this issue, the 
Court was required to give considerable deference to the trial 
court’s decision concerning discovery, reversing only for abuse of 
discretion.35 Relying on their decision in Ryan v. Roman Catholic 
Bishop of Providence, the Court stated that the Plaintiffs, to prove 
fraudulent concealment, must show: “(1) that the defendant made 
an actual misrepresentation of fact; and (2) that, in making that 
misrepresentation, the defendant fraudulently concealed the 
existence of plaintiff’s causes of action.”36 
Here, the Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant made many 
misrepresentations, such that the Defendant knew of Smyth’s 
abuse and failed to report it; the parish held Smyth out in good 
standing to the community; that when Ms. Hyde’s mother went to 
the church to complain about the abuse, they threatened to 
excommunicate her; that a prior Providence bishop, in an unrelated 
case, made a sworn statement that it was his job to protect priests 
accused of abuse; and finally, when Ms. Hyde recovered her 
memories in 2005 and confronted the Defendant, the Defendant 
attempted to conceal and deflect Smyth’s abuse.37 However true or 
false these allegations were, the Court held that none of the conduct 
could have led the Plaintiffs to believe that the abuse did not occur, 
therefore leaving the statute of limitations intact.38    Hence, the 
 
 
32. Id. (quoting Kelly, 678 A.2d. at 878.) 
33. Id. The Court said that reading §§ 9-1-19 and 9-1-51 together made it 
clear that § 9-1-51 set the exclusive means with which repressed recollection 
could toll the statute of limitations. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 460 (citing Shelter Harbor Conservation Soc’y, Inc. v. Rogers, 21 
A.3d 337, 343 (R.I. 2011)). 
36. Id. at 465–66 (quoting 941 A.2d 174, 182 (R.I. 2008)). 
37. Id. at 466. 
38. Id. The Court stated that mere silence is not enough to be actual 
misrepresentation; just because the Defendant may have known about Smyth 
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Court stated that the trial justice did not err when denying the 
Plaintiffs’ request to seek discovery on the fraudulent concealment 
claim.39 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court relied mainly on the Rhode 
Island General Assembly’s enactment of section 9-1-51 after the 
Court chose not to integrate a discovery rule into that provision in 
their holding in Kelly.40 However, if you read into what the General 
Assembly enacted after the Court refused to include a discovery 
rule in that statute, it could be reasonably argued that there does 
not have to be a discovery rule for section 9-1-19, since they are both 
dealing with the type of sexual abuse that happened to the 
Plaintiffs here. Also, in section 9-1-51, the General Assembly 
completely left out unsound mind and let the discovery rule apply 
by itself.41 If the Court read the sections together under this light, 
it would seem that repressed recollections, by themselves, could toll 
the statute of limitations. 
However, it seems the Plaintiffs could not sue under section 9- 
1-51 because the Court previously held that it did not apply to non- 
perpetrator defendants, and the Plaintiffs were suing the Bishop, 
who was a non-perpetrator defendant.42 Alternatively, the Court 
left open just what evidence a plaintiff is required to show, other 
than just repressed recollections, to toll the statute of limitations 
under section 9-1-19. This seems to be an important aspect that 
the Court left out, which makes it almost an unattainable standard 
to meet when trying to sue non-perpetrator defendants. 
When dealing with the fraudulent concealment argument, the 
Court  stated  the  elements  that  the  Plaintiffs  had  to  show  to 
 
abusing children, does not mean it was specific to these plaintiffs; just because 
the Defendant threated excommunication does not establish that he misled the 
Plaintiffs to believe that no cause of action existed; and Plaintiff was actively 
investigating Smyth as an abuser, so the fact that the Defendant tried to 
deflect could not have led her to believe the abuse did not occur; finally, holding 
Smyth out in good standing to the community is not a misrepresentation to the 
Plaintiffs themselves required to toll the statute of limitations. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 464. 
41. Id. at 465 (quoting Kelly v. Marcantanio, 678 A.2d. 873, 878 (R.I. 
1996). 
42. Id. (quoting Kelly, 678 A. 2d at 878–79.) 
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demonstrate that there was fraudulent concealment as stated 
above, and held that the Plaintiffs’ allegations failed to meet this 
demonstration. However, the Plaintiffs were asking for discovery 
on this claim to uncover what other misrepresentations were made 
so that they could satisfy the rule. When the Court denied them 
this opportunity, it cut off their only other alternative to hold the 
Defendant accountable for the abuse that they endured under his 
supervision. 
While under these facts, the Court was completely justified in 
its holding under the repressed recollections, it left no standard to 
decide what evidence, combined with repressed recollections, could 
toll the statute of limitations. The Court also could have 
interpreted the General Assembly’s action or inaction in a different 
light that would have been more favorable to the Plaintiffs in this 
case. Finally, the Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claim should 
have been allowed discovery before the Court decided whether or 
not they had enough proof of actual misrepresentation to permit 
denying or granting summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s 
grant of summary judgment. The Court held that the statute of 
limitations under the “unsound mind” provision is not tolled by 
repressed recollections in and of themselves against a non- 
perpetrator defendant because of the causal connection reasoning 
behind the General Assembly’s enactment of section 9-1-19. Finally, 
the Court held that the Plaintiffs did not meet the burden of 
showing actual misrepresentation of the Defendant to toll the 
statute of limitations under the theory of fraudulent concealment. 
 
Tara Gunn 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC LAWS OF NOTE 
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 007, 008. An Act Relating to 
Elections—Registration of Voters. This Act allows Rhode Island 
citizens the ability to complete voter registration through an  
online portal, so long as their information is verifiable. The 
Secretary of State shall maintain the electronic voter registration 
system, and may request any state agency, quasi-public agency, or 
municipality to furnish information that the Secretary of State 
deems necessary to cross-reference and verify information that 
registrants submit. Any information collected by the Secretary of 
State or submitted by a registrant can be shared or disclosed with 
any governmental or non-governmental entity for any reason 
except for voter registration purposes or pursuant to a court order. 
However, the secretary of state may enter into an agreement and 
exchange registrant data with any other state for the purposes of 
updating the statewide central voter register, provided that the 
Secretary of State enters into an agreement to protect the 
confidentiality of such registrants’ data. 
 
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 039, 041. An Act Relating to 
Criminal Offenses—Electronic Tracking of Motor Vehicles. This 
Act makes illegal the act of knowingly installing, concealing, or 
placing an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle 
without the consent of the operator and all occupants of the 
vehicle for the purpose of monitoring or following the operator, or 
any of the occupants of the vehicle. However, such installing, 
placing, or concealing of an electronic tracking device on a motor 
vehicle is not an offense if done by a law enforcement officer in 
furtherance of an investigation and carried out in accordance with 
applicable state and federal law. Similarly, if an electronic 
tracking device is placed on a motor vehicle by a parent or legal 
guardian who owns or leases a car for the purpose of monitoring a 
minor child when the child is an occupant in the vehicle, then the 
parent or legal guardian need not obtain consent.  Furthermore, 
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this Act does not apply to electronic tracking devices installed  in 
or on goods located within a motor vehicle for the purpose of 
tracking such goods; electronic tracking devices used remotely to 
disable the starter of a motor vehicle if used by a motor vehicle 
dealer with the express written consent of the vehicle’s purchaser, 
lessor, or lessee; if a electronic tracking device is used by a 
business for the purpose of tracking vehicles  that are owned  by 
the business, its affiliates, or contractors. A violation of this Act is 
a misdemeanor and carries with it a penalty of up to one year in 
prison, a $1,000 fine, or both. 
 
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 092, 104. An Act Relating to 
Education—Holocaust and Genocide Education. This Act 
specifically defined “Holocaust” to mean the “systematic, 
bureaucratic, state-sponsored, persecution and murder of 
approximately six million (6,000,000) Jews and five million 
(5,000,000) other individuals by the Nazi regime and its 
collaborators. Under this Act, the state is required to collect and 
disseminate to every school district, private school, mayoral 
academy, and charter school materials on holocaust and genocide 
awareness and education. Furthermore, every school district is 
required to include in its curriculum a unit on holocaust and 
genocide, not limited to the materials furnished by the state. The 
required unit on holocaust and genocide education must be 
utilized during appropriate times in middle school and/or high 
school curricula, as determined by the local authority, and all 
students should have received instruction on holocaust and 
genocide awareness materials by the time they have graduated 
from high school. 
 
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 131, 135. An Act Relating to 
Criminal Procedure—Domestic Violence Prevention Act. This Act 
established the Domestic Violence Prevention Fund used to 
support and promote evidence-based programs aimed at 
preventing domestic violence and dating violence throughout the 
state, and the fund shall be administered by the Rhode Island 
Coalition Against Domestic Violence. The Coalition shall create a 
committee, which will be responsible for the implementation of 
programs to prevent domestic violence by developing a plan for  
the distribution of funds, develop  criteria  for awarding  for funds, 
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issue requests for proposals to organizations that will provide 
services to the committee, review proposals for funds, and monitor 
and account for funds. The Coalition shall submit an annual  
report detailing the expenditure of funds to the senate and house 
finance committee on or before February 28 of each year. 
 
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 202, 204. An Act Relating to 
Criminal Procedure—Identification and Apprehension of 
Criminals. This Act allows a person to file a motion for the 
expungement of records relating to a deferred sentence ten (10) 
years after the completion of the sentence. After filing such a 
motion, the court will hold a hearing on the motion. In order for 
said motion to be granted, the individual must: comply with all 
terms of the deferred sentencing agreement, have paid any and all 
court-ordered fines, fees, costs, assessments, and restitution, have 
no criminal proceedings pending against them, and establish that 
he or she has good moral character. 
 
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 352, 373. An Act Relating  to 
Human Services—Abused and Neglected Children. This Act 
establishes the duty of individuals to report the sexual abuse of 
children in an educational program. The Act requires that anyone 
who has reason to know or suspect that any child has been 
subjected to sexual abuse by an employee, agent, contractor, or 
volunteer of an educational program, as defined in R.I. Gen. Laws 
§ 40-11-2, to notify, within twenty-four hours, the Department of 
Children Youth and Families (DCYF). The Act then mandates  
that DCYF forward the report to state police or local authorities to 
initiate an investigation. 
 
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 377, 499. An Act Relating  to 
Human Services—Public Assistance Act.  This Act limits  the use 
of an electronic-benefit-transfer card.  Under this Act, holders of  
an electronic-benefit-transfer card may not use said card at any 
liquor store, casino or other gambling facility, retail establishment 
that provides adult-oriented entertainment. An individual that 
receives direct-cash assistance on said card and uses such cash 
assistance for any prohibited use shall, for the first offense, have 
their cash assistance reduced for one month by the portion of the 
family’s benefit attributable to one parent.   For a  second  offense, 
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the individual’s cash assistance shall be reduced by three months 
by the portion of the family’s benefit attributable to one parent. 
For a third offense, an individual who receives cash assistance 
shall be disqualified from the direct-cash assistance program. 
Reciprocally, an establishment listed in this Act that accepts 
payment from an individual using funds from the direct-cash 
assistance program. Any establishment that violates this 
prohibition shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine 
no more than five hundred dollars ($500); for a second offense, no 
less than five hundred dollars ($500) and no more than two 
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500); and for a third, or 
subsequent offense a fine of not less than two thousand five 
hundred dollars ($2,500). In addition to these fines, an 
establishment’s license to conduct business may be revoked. 
 
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 411, 412. An Act Relating to 
Criminal Procedure—Cell Phone Tracking. This Act forbids any 
agent of the state to obtain location information without a warrant 
unless a warrant requirement exception applies. The Act has 
specific notice requirements that an agent of the state must 
complete when he or she wishes to obtain location information. 
The agent or political subdivision of the state shall notify the 
customer no later than five (5) days after the agent or political 
subdivision of the state receives location information. By 
registered, first-class, or electronic mail, the agent or political 
subdivision of the state must provide the customer notice, which 
includes: a copy of the warrant, if applicable, a statement of the 
law enforcement inquiry, a statement that location information 
maintained by a service provider was supplied to a law 
enforcement, a number associated with the electronic device, and 
the dates for which the location information was obtained. Under 
the Act, an agent or a political subdivision of the state may obtain 
location information without a warrant under the following 
circumstances: in order to respond to a call for emergency services; 
if an agent of the state believes that an emergency involving 
immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any  
person requires the obtaining of information relating to the 
emergency without delay; if the location information was 
generated by electronic device used as a condition of release from  
a  penal  institution  or  other  sentencing  order; with  the express 
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consent of the owner or user of the electronic device concerned; 
with the express, informed consent of a parent or foster parent of  
a minor who is the owner or user of the electronic device; if the 
electronic device is lost or stolen; or if the electronic device is a 
government-owned device issued to an employee.  An acquisition  
of location information shall immediately terminate when the 
location information sought is obtained. An agent or political 
subdivision may obtain, without court order, location information 
when that information, including metadata attached to images  
and videos, is otherwise publicly available on social media. By 
January 31 of each year, each law enforcement agency that  
collects location information must submit a report for the previous 
year, identifying the number of warrants issued for location 
information for an electronic device that were approved and 
denied. Said report must include: the agency making the 
application; the offense specified in the warrant are application 
thereof; the number of warrants granted, in full or in part, and the 
number denied; and the number and duration of any extensions of 
the warrant. 
